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ABSTRACT 
 
 This thesis is about developing a recovery ethos for psychiatric services in New 
Zealand. The argument of the thesis is that  currently a procedural ethos is dominant in 
psychiatric services in New Zealand, based on eclectic ways of facilitating recovery. 
Recovery from mental illness, is based on the criteria of symptom reduction and 
functioning and can be further refined to   have a client and professional perspective. 
Rather than using an eclectic approach to facilitating recovery the thesis argues for a 
pluralistic approach, where the virtues, the relationship with professionals, client 
narrative and the psychiatric community become central to decision making, rather than 
principle based procedures. 
  The thesis is an argued, applied philosophical thesis in terms of methodology. 
The scope of the thesis is psychiatric services and the focus is broadly ethical decision 
making. There are three main divisions to the thesis. Part 1 is concerned with clarification 
of the main terms used in the thesis. This involves exploring the  historical background to 
the concept of recovery, clarifying the concept of recovery itself and providing an 
argument for giving greater prominence to the term mental illness over the term mental 
disorder. Part 2  identifies the main problem of the thesis, namely the procedural ethos, 
and the problems it is causing clients suffering from mental illness in facilitating their 
recovery. Part 3  shows what is involved in developing a recovery ethos for psychiatric 
services in New Zealand.   
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PREFACE 
 
 
 The following thesis was written during the period 2004 - 2006 while a 
Philosophy Ph.D student at the University of Waikato. The central ideas of the thesis 
have been ones that have germinated over the past decade in my clinical work as a 
psychiatric nurse. This is not a thesis that is focused on psychiatric nursing however, but 
on psychiatric services. While this work has been written with much passion I believe 
that does not preclude the work also offering a rational and coherent insight into 
psychiatric services within New Zealand.   
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INTRODUCTION  
 
Let me start with a personal reminiscence that crystallises the fundamental 
problem with which this thesis deals.  
The reminiscence relates to a planning session within a psychiatric service1 
to deliver ‘recovery focused services’. Present were managers, many different 
clinicians from various professional disciplines, and client and family representatives. 
The only thing these representatives (including myself) could agree on was that 
‘recovery focused services’ was a good idea but what that actually meant sparked a 
range of views, some of which were quite incompatible. In order to achieve 
consensus, the planning session agreed to follow a minimal set of procedures for 
reaching decisions in the future. In other words, while the planning meeting could 
agree on a notional form of words for the ethos of the service, the substantive content 
of what those words meant was harder to find agreement on. Hence the need to resort 
to procedures. 
 This reminiscence highlights an important problem for modern psychiatric 
services; namely that of finding an ethos  that is focused upon the clients they serve 
but also being able to talk meaningfully to professionals and the clients’ families 
without resorting to procedures. Modern psychiatric services comprise many 
competing views on the nature of mental disorder and how it should be treated. These 
differences are most particularly marked between client and professional perspectives. 
There are also many different psychiatric professionals with their own history and 
traditions. In articulating any common views or statements about psychiatric services 
there is, therefore, the need to go beyond a notional set of words – which can 
sometimes be nothing but empty mantras – to an underlying agreement about 
substantive content. Agreement about content should not be seen as meaning 
consensus. Consensus is essentially an attempt to find a position that everyone can 
agree with at whatever cost. Consensus is one of the dragons that I want to slay in this 
thesis.   
  The need to achieve consensus, I believe, has led psychiatric services into 
adopting a procedural ethos as its current de facto philosophy. This procedural ethos, 
                                                          
1 Throughout this thesis I use the term psychiatric services to refer to  publicly funded services in New 
Zealand providing services to those clients with serious mental illness. When I refer to ‘other mental 
health services’ I include non-governmental organisations, private services and primary services which 
are mostly targeted at people with mild to moderate mental health problems. Sometimes the term 
‘mental health services’  is used by other writers to refer to psychiatric services.  
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it is thought, is a way of achieving consensus in the face of professionals holding 
apparently irreconcilable beliefs about the nature of mental disorder and how it should 
be treated. As I will show in this thesis, however, consensus comes at a very high 
price. That price is that procedures become the main way in which decisions are made 
in psychiatric services.  
  The aim of this thesis is two-fold. The first is to criticise the procedural 
ethos, which I will argue currently pervades psychiatric services. The second is to 
propose and defend an alternative to the procedural ethos, namely what I call a 
‘recovery ethos’. As a consequence, this thesis is trying to answer two questions. 
Firstly; why is the procedural ethos a problem for achieving recovery from mental 
illness in psychiatric services? Secondly; how do we replace this procedural ethos 
with a recovery ethos?  
  The first question is important because, at its most crucial, the idea of an 
ethos is important.  An ethos is the spirit of a community, its motivating purpose and 
rationale. The ethos of psychiatric services is of great importance in terms of assisting 
clients who have a mental illness but that ethos receives (and has received) little 
attention from either psychiatric professionals or philosophers. Historically, the ethos 
of psychiatric services has had a strong emphasis upon the professional ethos of 
psychiatry. 
  The various professional groups within psychiatric services all have a 
particular professional ethos. Psychiatry has been the dominant professional group 
within psychiatric services and therefore, to many people the professional ethos of 
psychiatry has been seen as the ethos of psychiatric services2. During the long period 
from the nineteenth century into modern times when expertise was venerated, this 
professional ethos of psychiatry did essentially become the ethos of psychiatric 
services. This professional ethos of psychiatry was essentially about showing how 
psychiatry (and hence psychiatric services) was just another branch of medicine, like 
cardiology or endocrinology. Psychiatrists are trained as medical doctors so it is 
reasonable that their professional ethos should reflect this – the problem is in 
extending this ethos beyond psychiatry to engage with other disciplines, and clients 
and their families. Other medical specialties and psychiatry have many 
commonalities; these other medical specialties, for example cardiology and 
                                                          
2 The dominance of psychiatry is reflected in the type of clinical procedures which are dominant in 
psychiatric services, particularly the psychiatric classification systems. 
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endocrinology, tend to result in  medicine providing the dominant professional ethos 
within those specialities.  There is, however, a fundamental distinction between 
psychiatry and other areas of medicine which makes the professional ethos of 
psychiatry inappropriate for psychiatric services in general. Psychiatry may involve 
diagnosis like medicine, but that diagnosis is based on descriptive psychopathology 
rather than an aetiological classification system and, unlike medical diagnosis, there is 
no place for pathology biopsies in confirmation of diagnosis. In other words, there is 
much more to psychiatric services than diagnosis and treatment understood in 
narrowly medical ways. The professional ethos of psychiatry is simply not inclusive 
enough of the various other professional groups and clients to warrant becoming the 
ethos of psychiatric services.  
 Nursing has become the largest professional group in terms of numbers 
within psychiatric services.  Nursing within psychiatric services has, however, never 
had one articulated ethos but a consensus has developed around the centrality of the 
therapeutic relationship between the nurse and the client. This therapeutic relationship 
is seen as fundamental to all care and treatment and needs to be genuine, meaningful 
and imbued with integrity and honesty. There are, however, problems with adopting 
such a ‘thin’ ethos based on the therapeutic relationship as the ethos of psychiatric 
services.  One problem is that it tends to emphasise interpersonal interactions and 
hence a social model of care; whereas biological and psychological approaches are 
also important and while such approaches might use a therapeutic relationship they 
would not necessarily be based on them. The therapeutic relationship simply does not 
carry enough content to stand by itself as the ethos of psychiatric services. It does, 
however, have the advantage of being based on something that all professional 
disciplines and clients can relate to3.  
  The ethos of other professional groups, such as that for psychology, social 
work and psychotherapy, also tend to be insufficiently inclusive of other professional 
groups and clients to become the ethos of psychiatric services. 
  This leaves the task of finding an ethos of psychiatric services that is 
inclusive of all professional groups, clients and their families. There has been an 
attempt to make recovery the ethos of psychiatric services, but with very limited 
success. This notion of recovery articulated for millennia by carers as disparate as 
                                                          
3 As we will see later, the relationship between clients and professionals while not sufficient to be an 
ethos in itself is nevertheless part of the recovery ethos. 
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Hippocrates and Galen has  become the formally identified ethos of psychiatric 
services in the past decade. Prior to this formal recognition, recovery has historically 
always been part of psychiatric and other health services but often in an unrecognised 
or understated way. The Mental Health Commission in New Zealand articulated 
recovery as the ethos of psychiatric services in 1998 and this was reiterated in the 
Second National Mental Health Plan released by the Ministry of Health (2005).  
While recovery has become officially endorsed as the ethos of psychiatric services, 
this appears, however, more of a wish and a hope than a reality.4    
  While recovery has formally been recognised as the ethos of psychiatric 
services, in reality I would maintain it is the procedural ethos that is the real ethos and 
recovery has simply been ‘proceduralised.5’ Moving the ethos from procedures to 
recovery will take more than simply wishing it so.  
  There are advantages in choosing recovery as the ethos of psychiatric 
services. Its main advantage is that it makes the client a central focus. Historically 
there has been a focus upon the expertise of the psychiatric professional as the ethos 
of psychiatric services and with it a focus, not upon the client, but upon those 
psychiatric professionals.  
  While recovery has been presented as the ethos of psychiatric services, as I 
will show in this thesis, there are a number of different conceptions of recovery and 
different ways of fostering recovery. The current ‘recovery approach’ introduced by 
the Mental Health Commission (1998) and forming the basis of the current formal 
acceptance of recovery has a very client-centred conception which depends upon 
clients deciding for themselves whether they are recovering and emphasising the 
client’s responsibility for fostering their own recovery. While this approach has 
gained traction, it has not been able to become sufficiently inclusive of all the 
professional groups involved in psychiatric services to become the real ethos of 
psychiatric services.  
  The particular ‘recovery approach’ conception of recovery which has 
become dominant at the moment is only one conception of recovery. Recovery is a 
                                                          
4 The Ministry of Health’s Te Kokiri (2006) contains the following sentence in its glossary in 
connection with recovery “A challenge faced by both the mental health and addiction sectors is the 
ongoing development of the concept and language of recovery” (p.79). As this quote indicates, there is 
a recognition that more work needs to be done on clarifying and exploring the concept of recovery. 
This thesis is an attempt to do that. 
5 As I will show in a later chapter. the idea that recovery has been medicalised rather than 
proceduralised within psychiatric services is mistaken. Psychiatry itself has come to rely on procedures.    
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rich and complicated concept. Historically, psychiatric professionals determined 
whether clients were recovering.  During the long period when expertise was in the 
ascendancy within psychiatric services, this professionally determined understanding 
of recovery was seen as the only valid understanding of recovery, irrespective of 
whether those approaches were biological or psychological in nature. Within 
psychiatric services, as opposed to most of the other  mental health services (such as 
non-governmental organisations, primary services and private care), there remains a 
strong attachment to professionally determined approaches to understanding recovery. 
Within these other mental health services, the client-determined approaches to 
recovery have become more dominant. There has, therefore, been tension and 
disagreement between psychiatric services with their professionally determined 
emphasis on recovery and other mental health services where client-determined 
approaches have become more dominant. Within psychiatric services this tension is 
also sometimes apparent. There has also been a strong emphasis within the recovery 
approach on clients taking responsibility for fostering their own recovery.  The role of 
professionals is often seen in ambiguous ways in terms of fostering recovery within 
this approach, an ambiguity dealt with by using consensus-building techniques based 
on procedures. 
  The procedural ethos has accepted the formal language of the recovery 
approach but has embraced an approach to fostering recovery based on a form of 
eclecticism  These procedures provide a mechanism for building consensus and they 
tend to take the form of a reliance upon guidelines, protocols and policy. 
  This thesis is essentially attempting to present a philosophical basis for a 
recovery ethos6 in psychiatric services. Recovery is a field of study which has 
received considerable attention from clinical perspectives and from consumer groups 
but has received little attention from philosophers or ethicists, which is unfortunate 
since understanding the notion of recovery is a requirement for the development of an 
adequate recovery ethos. While there are competing views on what recovery means 
there will continue to be an emphasis upon eclecticism as a way of achieving 
consensus. This is partly why the procedural ethos within psychiatric services has 
persisted. A major motivator for this study is to fill that philosophical vacuum with an 
                                                          
6 The recovery ethos should be seen as a broad de facto philosophy of psychiatric services. While there 
are specific issues involved in recovering from particular illnesses that is not the focus here. In other 
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attempt to provide a cogent, logical analysis of what a recovery ethos might look like. 
As things stand it could be argued that the Mental Health Commission’s (1998)  
‘recovery approach’ will fail, since it represents only one approach to recovery and 
one insufficiently inclusive of the various psychiatric professionals involved in 
providing psychiatric services. 
  Part of my attempt to answer the second question which this thesis 
addresses; How do we replace a procedural ethos with a recovery ethos?  concerns the 
importance of understanding responsibility. In developing a recovery ethos we need to 
ask ourselves: When does responsibility for mental health care move from the 
professional to the client and vice versa? Traditionally, the expert clinician had the 
answers and the client was a passive recipient of care who had little or no 
responsibility for their own recovery. Alternatively, but associated with this, are 
recovering clients who relapse and need additional assistance and who need to pass 
some responsibility back to the various psychiatric professionals. The purely client-
determined understanding of recovery, in which the client is largely responsible for 
fostering their own recovery, has no difficulties with the notion that the client can 
assume increasing responsibility for their own health. However, such an approach 
tends to have difficulty when the psychiatric professional needs to assume increased 
levels of responsibility for the client’s health. The various professionally determined 
ways of understanding recovery and fostering recovery have no difficulty with the 
notion that psychiatric professionals can assume increasing responsibility for a 
client’s health but they often have more difficulty letting go of some of that 
responsibility and assisting clients to find their own way. Any professionally 
determined understanding of recovery and professionally focused way of fostering 
recovery which is not balanced with a client-focused way of determining and 
fostering recovery will find it difficult to account for the client’s recovery journey in 
total. This is the basis for my argument for a pluralistic approach to fostering recovery 
in which professionally determined and client-determined approaches are respected, 
but not equally, for each phase of the client's journey towards health. I will argue that 
this pluralistic approach to fostering recovery cannot rest upon procedures which, in 
turn, are based on principles as the mechanism for determining when one or another 
approach to recovery should be used, but needs to be based on client and professional 
                                                                                                                                                                      
words the recovery ethos applies to all mental illnesses, with self awareness the only complication, 
since ( as I will show in Part 3) a certain level of self awareness is needed to develop virtues. 
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virtues and  client narratives with its basis in a psychiatric community. This pluralistic 
approach to fostering recovery revels in difference and almost rejoices in differing 
conceptions of recovery and does not attempt to generate some consensus 
understanding. Unlike eclectic approaches based on procedures, it does not try to 
smooth over differences but honestly acknowledges them and then tries to  resolve 
any differences by determining which approach is best at the specific moment, 
drawing upon the particular virtues of client or professional.  For clients to recover, 
amongst many other virtues, they need to trust psychiatric professionals and be able to 
collaborate with them. In addition to technical virtues and many other virtues, 
professionals need the virtue of clinical wisdom to know when to withdraw and when 
to become more involved in a client’s care. The nature of the collaborative 
relationship between professionals and clients is one way these virtues can be 
developed.  In addition to these virtues, clients need to find some level of meaning in 
their illness experience so that they can start to develop a recovery narrative as part of 
their journey from illness to health.  Finally, in order to implement a pluralistic 
approach to fostering recovery, I argue for a  psychiatric community  so that there can 
be some agreement about the ends being pursued by psychiatric services and other 
mental health services, and hence the kind of decisions which need to be made at each 
stage of the client’s recovery about which approaches should be dominant.   
 There are, as a consequence, four main tasks associated with this thesis.  
Firstly, there is considerable confusion about what recovery means in the context of 
mental illness, so the task in Part 1 will be to clarify some of this background. 
Secondly, there is the explanation of recovery by either a professionally determined or 
client-determined approach and the task is to show (see Chapter 2) that recovery 
should be seen as a broader concept than either of these two versions seen in isolation. 
Thirdly, Part 2 will argue that the ethos of psychiatric services is currently a 
procedural ethos based on an eclectic approach to fostering recovery and the task is to 
show the weakness in this procedural ethos. Finally, in terms of developing a recovery 
ethos based upon a pluralistic approach to facilitating recovery, the task is the need to 
re-engage with an older virtue and narrative tradition set within a psychiatric 
community as will be shown in Part 3.    
 The scope of this thesis is narrowly psychiatric services in New Zealand 
rather than the broader scope of psychiatric and other mental health services in New 
Zealand. However to develop a recovery ethos, psychiatric services need to share the 
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same ethos with other mental health services. This is in contrast with the procedural 
ethos, where  psychiatric and other mental health services do not share the same 
procedural ethos. While this thesis could have  been written with the broader scope of 
psychiatric and other mental health services in mind, the scope has been narrowed to 
psychiatric services since this is where the most impact will be had from developing 
the recovery ethos. The reason that most impact will be experienced from developing 
a recovery ethos within psychiatric services is that this is where most clients with 
serious mental illness are currently receiving services. Additionally other mental 
health services, particularly non-governmental organisations, comprise a diverse 
group, and it would take more space than was available in this thesis to address the 
application of the recovery ethos to all those various services.  
The focus of this thesis is broadly ethical. However the reason for this  focus 
is not because recovery only involves ethical decisions, since recovery involves 
decisions in all the various health domains7. However,  decisions  made about which 
health domain to apply, while possibly clinical decisions in themselves, are based on 
ethical assumptions. Those ethical assumptions are determined by the ethos within 
which people receive services or work. 
This is an argued thesis in terms of methodology and that argument is laid 
out in three parts comprising a number of chapters made up of a number of sections. 
The methodology of this thesis is in contrast to a more empirically focused thesis. 
This thesis will be developing an applied philosophical argument which, while at 
times it will rely on empirical studies for support, is not itself an empirical study. 
Part 1 will be divided into three chapters and is broadly concerned with 
clarification of the main terms and concepts involved in the study. Chapter 1 will 
provide an historical introduction to the notion of recovery from mental illness, 
indicating that ‘recovery’ has had changing meanings over the past two thousand 
years in the western tradition, almost all in the professionally determined tradition of 
recovery. Only recently has the explicit use of recovery as a client-determined 
conception started to be discussed as a possible ethos underpinning psychiatric 
services. Chapter 2 will clarify the concept of recovery itself and indicate that the 
concept is best understood by distinguishing between professional and client 
                                                          
7 Health domain refers, respectively, to biological, psychological and social professional approaches. 
Culture and spirituality are also sometimes considered as health domains. However in this thesis, it 
should be seen as referring to biological, psychological and social approaches. 
 8
perspectives on the nature of mental improvement.  Chapter 3 will provide 
clarification of the conceptual foundations of the thesis in the sense of showing which 
understandings of mental disorder, mental illness and mental health will be used in the 
thesis that are consistent with a pluralistic approach to fostering recovery. 
 Part 2, Chapters 4 and 5,  will be concerned with the problem of a 
procedural ethos in psychiatric services and how that ethos gets in the way of 
recovery. Chapter 4 will background and analyse the theoretical understanding of a 
procedural ethos, showing how all-pervasive it has become and the way in which an 
eclectic approach to fostering recovery has become dominant. This procedural ethos is 
essentially an attempt to generate consensus in an area dogged by disagreements. 
Chapter 5 will detail the problems with that procedural ethos, based on a form of 
eclecticism, towards fostering recovery. It is interesting to note that, while bioethics 
and the philosophy of medicine and nursing have concerned themselves with 
investigations of competency, autonomy, surrogate decision-making and the like, 
recovery has received little attention in philosophical writing. This is curious given 
the centrality of recovery for the whole venture of psychiatric treatment and care. The 
focus in these disciplines, particularly bioethics, has been on procedural attempts to 
provide consensus. Indeed the paradigm of consensus in bioethical discourse is the 
institutional ethics committee, which has much to do with procedures but arguably 
little to do with either ethics or bioethics.  There has also been little discussion of the 
nature of an ethos in healthcare, which is also curious given that an ethos can be seen 
to contain current ethical concerns but also to go much wider and indicate the 
prevailing spirit of a community. Chapter 5 will show, from a practical perspective, 
how the procedural ethos makes recovery harder rather than easier.  
 Part 3 is broadly concerned with how a recovery ethos based on a pluralistic 
approach to fostering recovery could replace a procedural ethos based on an eclectic 
approach to fostering recovery. Essentially, Part 3 indicates how a recovery ethos 
could be realised. There are four chapters to this part of the thesis which detail and 
argue for aspects of the recovery ethos.  Chapter 6 describes and analyses how the 
virtues and development of character are a foundational aspect of the recovery ethos, 
indicating the character virtues which clients and professionals would need in order to 
assist a client to recover in a pluralistic way. It emphasises the central role of 
psychiatric professionals in terms of their role in teaching clients the virtues necessary 
to recover. Chapter 7 then provides some notion of the type of client-professional 
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relationship that is likely to assist in fostering recovery. Chapter 8 provides a further 
component of the  recovery ethos: the need for clients to develop a recovery narrative 
to assist with their recovery and the identification of the virtues that are activated at 
particular points in a client’s  life through the development of that recovery narrative. 
The final component of the recovery ethos, Chapter 9, is focused on the notion of a 
psychiatric community that, it will be argued, is a necessary context if we are serious 
about introducing a recovery ethos. This is because there is no consensus currently 
within a liberal society, or within psychiatric services, on the human goods that 
individuals should pursue. Consequently, it is unclear which decisions are needed to 
determine the approaches that should be dominant at any point in a client’s recovery 
journey. The idea of a psychiatric community for psychiatric  and other mental health 
services addresses the need to achieve some agreement about the purposes and 
objectives of psychiatric care. It also provides a link back to the idea of an ethos as the 
spirit of a community. I will argue that in order to have a recovery ethos, some 
agreement about the nature of recovery and the ends we are aiming at in psychiatric 
care is necessary. 
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CHAPTER  1 
Historical Background to Recovery 
  Recovery1 from mental illness is viewed differently today from the way it 
has been viewed in the past. In the future, the nature of recovery will almost certainly 
be viewed differently to the way it is viewed today. This chapter discusses some 
historical background to the current understanding of the nature of recovery.  
  The argument in this chapter is threefold. Firstly, Section One  will explore 
our changing notion of  recovery from mental illness2 by considering the history of 
psychiatric services which has had an alternating biological and psychological 
understanding of how recovery from mental illness occurs. Almost all of this history 
has happened within the professionally determined tradition of recovery. These 
professional approaches have been in the purist tradition until recently, when eclectic 
approaches have been used. ‘Purist’ refers to an approach that used one of the 
professional health domains exclusively, either biological or psychological. ‘Eclectic’ 
refers to an approach that uses a combination of professional health domains and 
client self help approaches. Secondly, Section Two will indicate that ‘the recovery 
approach’, which is focused on client based ways of fostering recovery, can be seen as 
having three phases in its recent development. These three phases have essentially 
brought together strands from wellness approaches, existential approaches and 
magical/supernatural approaches while attempting to reject much of the historical 
approach from psychiatric services, by emphasising a self-determined approach to 
recovery. Thirdly, Section Three will show how the ethos of psychiatric services has 
changed through the past few centuries.  
                                                          
1 Until I clarify the concept of recovery in the next chapter I will use the word in the loose sense of 
getting better. However, as will be explained in more detail in Chapter 2, there is a difference between 
the way we foster recovery and the criteria for determining whether recovery has occurred.  
Historically this is particularly marked since, for example, during the superstitious ethos the criteria for 
recovery would have been ‘ lack of possession by the devil’. As will be seen, historically there have 
been predominantly two ways of fostering recovery professionally, biological and psychological 
approaches. Historical ways of fostering recovery are the focus of section one in this chapter. 
2 The term mental illness and mental disorder are not the same. Chapter 3 will further discuss these 
differences. Suffice to say here that mental illness is the preferred term. The term mental disorder is 
used when referring explicitly to psychiatric classification. 
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  There is a common way of presenting the history of psychiatric services3 in 
which  the practice of psychiatry has evolved and thus advanced over time. These 
books show the current place of scientific psychiatry to have been achieved through 
new advances in psychiatric research and clinical practice.  As a counter to such a 
progressive perspective, the work of  Foucault (1965) can be refreshing.  Foucault 
sees the development of scientific psychiatry as representing ever more sophisticated 
means of controlling and manipulating the mentally ill. It is perhaps impossible to 
stand outside the assumptions of one’s own time and present a perspective-less view, 
a view from nowhere, so to speak.  This is even more true when looking at the history 
of recovery from mental illness, since in determining past views on the nature of 
recovery we inevitably use material from that time with all the assumptions and 
perspectives of that period. There have been attempts to see the history of psychiatry 
as an anthropological enterprise with different traditions within various societies and 
civilisations, for example in the work of  Rosen (1968), but such approaches 
inevitably take a position with regards the underlying pathological processes. 
  The current procedural ethos provides a powerful way of making sense of 
issues in psychiatric services. This procedural ethos has been the dominant way of 
conceiving of issues in psychiatric services for the past two or possibly three decades. 
Many professionals trained while this ethos was in place, and have known no other 
service ethos. It has become a feature of modern psychiatric practice. However, it has 
not arrived from nowhere: the seeds of its birth can be traced back to earlier periods.  
In tracing this historical development, my purpose is not to provide a comprehensive 
history but rather one where I am seeking to show that the professionally determined 
understanding of recovery has alternated between biological and psychological 
approaches over the centuries. This flip-flopping has resulted in different beliefs 
concerning how to foster recovery. Additionally, running in parallel with these 
disorder formulations (whether biological or psychological), there have also been 
supernatural and magical accounts. These supernatural and magical accounts are 
particularly important in psychiatric history, as they have been influential. Additional 
                                                          
3 There have been a number of important historical works on psychiatric services: for example 
Ackerknecht  (1968) which has a strong clinical focus in its historical sweep; the magisterial work by 
Alexander and Selesnick (1967) which is particularly useful in identifying historical themes; Jones 
(1972) who traces the historical development of psychiatric  services from the 18th century to the 1970s 
from a British perspective;  and Jones (1983)who  has a clinical treatment focus in its short coverage of 
historical developments. Additionally, more recently, Shorter  (1997) provides a useful sociological 
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to these accounts, there have been increasingly important wellness accounts of mental 
health. By wellness accounts I refer to approaches which are focused on what is 
needed for good mental health rather than approaches focused upon treating disorder.   
  This has given rise to a problem in that professionally determined and 
client-determined approaches to recovery are unable to achieve a satisfactory 
consensus. In the modern era, in large part because of the difficulty of achieving 
consensus (between the various approaches mentioned), we have adopted a 
procedural understanding. The recovery approach – which I see as falling into three 
chronological phases – has not yet become a recovery ethos within psychiatric 
services. We can speculate on the possible reasons for this and I will provide an 
explanation in later chapters. However, I will broadly argue that the recovery 
approach uses a narrow understanding of how to foster recovery which can never be 
inclusive enough of all the various psychiatric professions.  
 
Section One: History of Recovery in Psychiatric Services  
  Hippocrates (c490-430 BC) was the first figure in the western tradition to 
attempt to explain all diseases on the basis of natural causes. The Hippocratic writings  
- known as the corpus Hippocraticum – consists of more than seventy-six treatises on 
more than fifty subjects. Hippocratic physicians emphasised observation as the basis 
for symptom identification. So profound has been the Hippocratic influence that even 
students today learn the tenet that ‘it is nature that heals the patient’ and the doctor is 
simply nature’s assistant. While students today learn the concept of homeostasis, 
medicine in Hippocrates time was based on the humoral theory.  The humoral or 
‘classical’ theory of disease (that of both Hippocrates and Galen) is the theory of the 
four humours. In this theory the body consists of four different juices: blood, yellow 
bile, black bile and phlegm, which correspond to the four elements: air, fire, earth and 
water. To each humour belong two of the four qualities: hot, moist, dry and cold. One 
humour predominates in each of the four temperaments: the sanguine, choleric, 
melancholic and phlegmatic. All diseases are caused by a disturbance in equilibrium 
of the humours, by the predominance or failure of one of them. Melancholia, for 
example, is a disease caused by the predominance of the hypothetical black bile. 
Hippocrates was interested in cases which were seen to have ‘failed’ and he himself 
                                                                                                                                                                      
account of the history of psychiatry, particularly strong on the 19th century and the rise of 
psychoanalysis. All these accounts share the progressive, evolutionary perspective. 
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claimed that up to sixty percent of his difficult cases ended fatally. He introduced 
numerous supportive therapeutic methods, for example exercise, bathing, dieting and 
proper hygiene. In terms of treatments, he used bloodletting and purgatives but only 
after other measures had proven unsuccessful. He prescribed medicinals such as 
emetics for those deemed insane.  
   Hippocrates inaugurated the first classification of mental disorder, one 
based on rational criteria. This included epilepsy, mania, melancholia and paranoia. 
Along with his followers, Hippocrates made the first attempt to understand 
personality in terms of the humoral theory. So the legacy of Hippocrates is a 
significant one, but in terms of our focus on recovery in this study what does it have 
to tell us?  The notion that nature decides on matters of disease (almost in a 
deterministic sense) is a powerful idea and one which is anathema to most modern 
day writers on recovery, for whom freedom and autonomy are central. If nature 
decides, then individuals cannot be held responsible for their own health. As the 
interpreters or assistants for nature, the physicians are responsible for the patient’s 
health but that responsibility needs to be exercised ethically. As Hippocrates famously 
insisted “If you can do no good, at least do no harm”. In terms of our understanding of 
recovery, responsibility is situated in nature and the physician. While Hippocrates was 
interested in the course of illness and particularly prognosis, he did not differentiate 
between the levels of responsibility as the illness progressed except in the types of 
supportive therapy on offer. He certainly viewed others as moral agents with self-
identities based on his view that consciousness was present. However, he saw the 
brain as fundamental and wrote of how it is the brain which gives rise to our pleasures 
and pains and the brain that was the interpreter of consciousness. Recovery for 
Hippocrates was possible, therefore, but it needed the physician to identify, through 
correct clinical observation, the disease the person was suffering from and apply the 
correct treatment and supportive aides (particularly for those with chronic disorders). 
While we may scoff at the underlying humoral theory, the notions of recovery are 
very much those of modern medical practice. 
  The psychiatry of the Middle Ages, as Alexander & Selesnick (1967) 
indicate, can scarcely be distinguished from prescientific demonology and psychiatric 
treatment was synonymous with exorcism. The dominant ethos of psychiatric 
‘services’ at that time was supernatural. During the early medieval period, the 
Christian spirit of charity resulted in some humanity being shown to those with 
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mental illness. In the later medieval period, these early Christian ideals were debased 
to the point where reliance upon authority and supernatural explanation for diseases 
characterised psychiatric care and it became indistinguishable from demonological 
exorcism. However, running parallel with this demonical tradition was a layman’s 
perspective on mental disorder as originating in emotional upset. Some of the poems 
of the period certainly indicate a connection between emotional upset and mental 
illness. However, whether the result of demonic possession or emotional upset, during 
the early medieval period, care for the mentally ill was viewed as a community 
responsibility. Towards the later medieval period the mentally ill were viewed as 
witches and they were subject to considerable persecution.  The later period in 
particular, held the person who was mentally ill as completely responsible for their 
state. The work of Augustine (1982) – constructive and important in so many other 
areas – can be seen to have had a role in the psychological responsibility levelled at 
the mentally ill. Augustine  provides a deeply insightful work that links his own 
personal faith, ethics and psychology. In a profoundly Christian period, that 
psychological insight focuses on his fall from grace and the sins which he feels a need 
to confess and in so doing, the need to accept responsibility for his sinning. If 
Augustine is responsible for his sinning, the reasoning goes, then so are others whose 
sin is demonic possession because in some way they have brought that condition upon 
themselves. 
  The Renaissance is often seen as the period of rebirth in science and 
philosophy. Paracelsus (1491-1541) was the most renowned physician of his day and 
he had a particular interest in psychiatry. In 1520, he wrote an influential book called 
Diseases which lead to a loss of reason, which was published in 1567 (Paracelsus, 
1958). The book makes it clear that mental illness is not caused by spirits but by 
natural diseases. He created a new classification of mental diseases to replace the 
classical triad of mania, melancholia and phrenitis, namely the classification: 
epilepsy, mania, true insanity, St Vitus’ dance and suffocatio intellectus (the old 
hysteria). He divided epilepsy into  five types.  He reasoned that mania consisted of a 
disturbance of reason and not of the senses, and he thought there was a tendency to 
relapse and that the disorder could be primary or secondary.  True insanity, according 
to Paracelsus was a permanent state related to the stars. He differentiated five sub-
groups: lunatici, ansani, vesani, melancholici and obsessi.  The whole emphasis of 
Parcelsus’s work is away from psychological understanding towards a chemical 
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understanding and a chemical view on recovery for some conditions that we would 
now classify as medical. Given his view that true insanity was a permanent state, the 
idea of recovery was simply not present. There are echoes of this notion of recovery 
through even the Victorian period. 
 Paracelsus is important for changing the  emphasis on clinical intervention 
and naturalistic understanding. The implications of this change in the early and later 
medieval period are also marked in the way people with mental illness were treated. 
As Foucault (1965) has poetically described it, from being treated with neglect in the 
early medieval period, when they were seen as part of a community but somehow 
pushed to the fringes, the mentally ill through their lack of reason were moved on. 
Thus emerged the idea (part mythological) of the ‘ship of fools’ which captures this 
idea very well. The idea that the mentally ill were moved on to other places – 
sometimes literally by ship - was a powerful image of the period. As the medieval 
period moved into the ‘age of reason’ the mentally ill were seen as undermining the 
very foundations of that society and hence commenced, in Foucault’s words, ‘the 
great confinement’.  
  In many respects the ideas taken from Hippocrates and Parcelsus were still 
current into the eighteenth century.  The philosophers of the enlightenment were 
particularly concerned about the mad. In an age when reason is held to be the greatest 
good, those without reason are accorded great sympathy. The optimism of the 
philosophers and natural scientists was boundless. Those without reason could be 
cured. Recovery from mental illness was possible. The fatalism of the Middle Ages 
and the Renaissance was overthrown. These startling advances came towards the end 
of the eighteenth century when asylums were opened throughout Europe. 
   Foucault would interpret this opening of the asylums as the need to control 
and manipulate those not possessed of reason. Others have seen the motivation for 
their opening in the extensive abuses occurring in the private madhouses. In Britain 
these madhouses were essentially unregulated until 1774 when an Act to regulate 
them was passed in the British Parliament.  There is a considerable body of literature, 
mentioned in Jones (1972) to attest to the neglect and mistreatment that occurred in 
the Madhouse system during this period when restraint was of a very brutal nature. 
There was growing interest during the eighteenth century in the plight of the mentally 
ill and the very public difficulties of George the Third helped to increase public 
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interest. William Battie’s4 work from this period was based on his clinical experience 
rather than on speculation and he pointed out that there could be spontaneous 
recovery without treatment (an idea finding interesting parallels with current notions 
in the recovery approach) and that vigorous purging and emetics could be harmful. 
Nevertheless, responsibility for someone’s recovery from mental illness was still seen 
as the physician’s.  
  ‘Moral management’ was an approach to care and treatment that dates from 
this late eighteenth century. Moral management, which in many respects can be seen 
as a form of psychological treatment, had aspects of both illness and wellness focus.  
Introduced into the early madhouses such as the York retreat and the Bicetre in Paris, 
it was concerned to lessen abuses and introduce more respect for the client. In that 
sense it involved psychological treatments such as strengthening and assisting the 
client to control their own illness, applying measures to improve the general comfort 
of the individual and using restraint only when necessary. A principle of separating 
cases was enforced:  incurable and curable for example. Discipline and good 
behaviour were insisted on, but chains or corporal punishment were not to be used or 
threatened. Instead, an atmosphere in which the loss of esteem of others was 
something to be concerned about encouraged a form of self-restraint. The moral 
management approach also used methods now used in wellness-based programmes: 
diet or healthy eating, exercise, relaxation and talking about issues. Implicit in such an 
approach is the assumption that those in need of assistance are able to exercise more 
responsibility for their own wellbeing. 
  As the nineteenth century progressed the asylums started to fill. They filled 
at a remarkable rate. As documented by Jones (1972)5, the trickle became a flood and 
towards the end of the century they were running over capacity. The significance of 
this for recovery is that many of the initiatives which had characterised moral 
management – individualised care, humane treatment, listening to the client – became 
impossible due to the growth in the numbers of clients.6 The expansion in attempts to 
describe and clinically account for disorders also increased during the period.  These 
attempts can be seen to have reached their zenith in the work of Kraepelin (1856-
                                                          
4 Mentioned in Shorter  (1997) 
5  A New Zealand perspective on overcrowding can be gleaned from Williams (1987) who provides 
insight into the history of Porirua Hospital, Wellington. 
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1926) who developed a powerful clinical classification system. His achievement was 
to have constructed the three fundamental forms of functional psychosis in use today: 
dementia praecox (later termed Schizophrenia by Bleuler), paranoia, and manic-
depressive psychosis. In terms of recovery, the period was marked by its separation of 
the curable from the so-called incurable. It was also the period that stressed the 
importance of expertise and the role and responsibility of the expert. Indeed clients or 
patients had little responsibility for their own recovery.  
  Psychoanalysis represented a major change of emphasis within psychiatric 
services. The psychological illness model moved centre stage displacing the 
biological approach. Freud and Jung, the initial developers of the approach, shared 
many assumptions but they did have important differences. They both believed that 
the unconscious represented an important vehicle for helping individuals to recover. 
However, Freud was a strong determinist (and reductive in his psychological 
approach) whereas Jung was more holistic and open to a causal role for human moral 
agents. In their views on the responsibility of the clients they saw, they also had 
differences.  While they were both committed to the central role of the interpretative 
expert, they differed in terms of how much they saw the client as responsible for their 
own health. Jung thought that the individual client was responsible for integrating the 
unconscious back into their conscious awareness, a process he termed ‘individuation,’ 
whereas Freud  was less clear in his views concerning responsibility derived from his 
deterministic perspective. The psychoanalytical period was, however, a continuation 
of the clinical-expert ethos commenced under the biological period of the Victorians. 
  Psychopharmacology and biological approaches became increasingly 
important in the twentieth century, eventually displacing the psychoanalytical 
approach.  From Iminodibenzl (mood modifier), phenothiazine (forerunner of the 
neuroleptics) and Paraldehyde (sedative) in the late nineteenth century and early 
twentieth century, to the middle of the century there developed the neuroleptics, the 
antidepressants, the anxiolytics, Lithium treatment and mood stabilizers.  In parallel 
with these pharmacological developments there were a number of biological 
approaches in the same period. Surgical practice revealed  that interrupting the 
connections of frontal lobes produced docility. This was useful in very disturbed 
                                                                                                                                                                      
6 As Shorter (1997) has indicated, there remains debate as to whether this increase in numbers was 
caused by an increase in illness during the period or whether it was due to an increase in intolerance 
towards people seen as ‘different’ from others.  
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patients (particularly for clients not responding to convulsive therapy or deep insulin 
therapy). Electro-convulsive therapy was found to have beneficial results for some 
patients and it continues to have a place in the psychiatric armamentarium. In terms of 
recovery, all these approaches tended to shift responsibility on to the treatment 
intervention and away from either the professional or the client. Hence we have the 
beginnings of an emphasis upon procedural techniques rather than the expert as such, 
though the clinical judgement of the expert clinician continued to be a central focus 
during this period. 
  Starting in the 1960s, the anti-psychiatry movement began recognising that 
psychiatry had a political role and significance. Anti-psychiatry was essentially the 
view that institutional psychiatry had somehow gone wrong, particularly in its 
reliance on psychiatric classification and ‘unproven’ biological treatments. Some 
adherents of the anti-psychiatry movement held particular views about the causation 
of mental illness, usually adopting a social causation theory. Clients in the large 
psychiatric hospitals were accorded increasing rights as new civil rights legislation7 
was passed. As Sedgwick (1982) has indicated, there were four main thinkers 
responsible for this politicisation of psychiatry: Goffman, Laing, Foucault and Szasz8. 
While these four writers were fundamentally different in many respects, they shared a 
social perspective on mental health and rejected the categorical classification 
approach with all its assumptions. Indeed, they all shared the view that mental 
disorder as then conceived in the classification systems was misguided. Many of their 
assumptions9 about responsibility lay within a social theory context (though Szasz is 
an extreme libertarian individualist); and they thought  that recovery can only be 
understood within a social environment. The recovery approach accepted many of the 
ideas of the anti-psychiatry theorists and in a consequence of this social bias the 
recovery approach found it more difficult to be fully integrated into clinical as 
opposed to non-clinical services. 
  From the late 1960s, the large asylums stated to close (as quickly as they 
were originally opened two hundred years earlier), a process known as 
                                                          
7 The period saw the coming together of three strands of thought and activity: the open door policy in 
psychiatric hospitals (and away from locked units); and new powerful medication and civil rights 
legislation which started to accord increased rights, checks and balances to those under the Mental 
Health Act.   
8 For an interesting work on some of the practical realities of these anti-psychiatry views,  Baron 
(1987) charts her experiences in a psychiatric day hospital based on a therapeutic community using 
ideas from Goffman and others as it moves from a therapeutic ideal to a totalitarian system.   
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deinstitutionalisation, and as the institutions closed there was a need for community 
care. It could be argued that the asylums created relationships of dependency and that 
responsibility was removed from clients. As the asylums closed these relationships 
were changed. Clients were suddenly decanted out into their local communities. There 
were a number of stepping-stones to assist clients with their transition to community 
living: half way homes, supported homes, independent flats, rehabilitation hostels, 
day hospitals and the like which were all designed to make the transition easier. In 
many cases, however, neglect became normal, mirroring an earlier period in 
psychiatric history. This decanting of long term (and other) clients out into the 
community did not mean clients had recovered. In some ways, the initial period of 
community care was a period characterised by maintenance therapy, that is to say the 
idea was to maintain the mental state of clients such that individuals would not need 
to go back to hospital. 
  The ‘survivor movement’ began as a way of respecting the experience of 
those clients who had been in the large asylums and then ‘survived to tell the tale’. It 
was a consumer-based movement concerned not with symptomatology but with 
individual experience: what helped, what did not help. As will be discussed in the 
next chapter, the individual experience of the client tended to be primarily focused on 
the client’s understanding of functioning.  Helped by the politicisation of psychiatry, 
many of these ‘consumer movements’ had an explicit political agenda: to end 
psychiatry, to develop alternate methods, to create self-help movements etc. Perhaps 
the most lasting impact of the survivor movement was ethical. It gave consumers a 
voice, one they would never lose again. In giving ‘consumer movements’ a voice, it 
started the transition of power and responsibility towards the client and self-
determined approaches to recovery and away from the professional. That ebbing tide 
of professional power is very much the characteristic of our time. 
  While  most histories of psychiatric services emphasise the way that 
biological and psychological models have dominated at various times, and while the 
psychological approach to illness has certainly had an influence on the development 
of the current recovery approach, few histories emphasise the role of magic and the 
supernatural in that history.  Alexander and Selesnick (1967) are an exception to this.  
They note that magic and the supernatural have always had an important role in the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
9 Laing and Cooper (1971), in particular, accepted an existentialist philosophy.  
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history of approaches to mental illness. From  primitive medicine and demonology to 
homeopathic, imitative and mimetic magic there have always been practices which 
relied on principles such as similarity (i.e. because things look alike they must be in 
sympathy with each other) and contiguity (i.e. where there is continued action upon 
each other of things once close but now separated). Our current era has a number of 
new age and supernatural practices (some of the evangelical churches for example) 
which draw heavily on these two principles for their effect. There has been, and 
continue to be, revivalist religious views which have contributed ideas about hope, 
faith and charity as central to recovery. The current emphasis within recovery 
discourse on future-orientated projects rather than the illness experience would seem a 
development of this hope-orientated approach. The impact of these approaches to 
recovery has been profound (if not always helpful).  Magical and supernatural 
thinking  have had an impact on the recovery approach through the  emphasis on 
wellness; the belief that adopting a particular mental state will inevitably have a 
causal relationship to the presence or absence of mental illness; that individuals are 
completely free to choose; that there are mysteries in the universe that can be 
adequately understood outside the scientific paradigm - all are hallmarks of a magical 
perspective when combined. Such thinking shifts responsibility towards the client, but 
only to a limited extent, since there are still thought to be intermediaries who can 
interpret magical events as experts. 
  The culmination of much of this previous history in terms of recovery is the 
self-help movement. This self-help movement has used bibliotherapy as its main 
vehicle. The publication of books on how to have good mental health and how to be 
happy has proliferated. There is a long tradition, all the way back to Samuel Smiles’ 
(1958) ‘self help,’ of self-help literature. The emphasis in this self-help literature is on 
individuals assuming responsibility for their own health and wellbeing.  This 
approach may work with those who experience mild or even moderate symptoms; 
however, for those with severe symptoms it is more problematic. There has also been 
a growth in self-help groups and organisations; such organisations as GROW, which 
is a self-help organisation which believes professionals can be unhelpful at a certain 
point in someone’s recovery journey. 
  Wellness accounts of mental health have become increasingly important 
since the Second World War. These accounts commence with trying to understand 
mental health, rather than with trying to treat mental illness. Much of the work in this 
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regard has come from public health measures (that is, the  nature of healthy 
relationships, anger management courses, stress relief etc.) rather than psychiatric 
services. However, such measures have  mainly been at a population health level. In 
the past decade or so, the role of some of this mental health work has become 
important in primary health and the self-help strategies mentioned above connect with 
this development. While there is a connection between primary mental health 
problems (that is mild and moderate problems) and psychiatric services (for serious 
mental illness), the applicability of mental health models to psychiatric services 
remains problematic.  
 
Section Two: The Recovery Approach 
   The recovery approach is the final development in the historical 
background of recovery to the present day.  The  origins of the recovery approach 
appear to be a blending of several historical streams, which I have already discussed: 
the survivor movement, wellness accounts of mental wellbeing, supernatural/magical 
accounts, anti-psychiatry accounts (at least in the early and middle phases) and ideas 
drawn from existentialism which I will discuss later. While the recovery approach is a 
new development, it is possible to see three phases to its current developmental stage, 
early, middle and late.   
Early Phase:  The emergence of the recovery approach in modern times was 
closely connected to the survivor movement.  Those who had survived the asylums 
and the psychiatric regime saw recovery as being as much about recovery from the 
psychiatric system as about recovery from mental illness. This is perhaps 
understandable given the therapeutic methods of the late asylum system, which were, 
in Goffman’s (1961) memorable phrase, ‘total institutions’: that is, all aspects of 
someone’s life could be, and usually were, regulated by the asylum: what people ate, 
what time they got up, went to bed, who they saw and when visitors were allowed, 
how people spent their time and so on. Parallels have been made with prisons and 
even concentration camps. While prisons and concentration camps share the total 
institutional framework of the asylum they were not motivated by explicitly 
therapeutic ideals. In practice, the asylums did have punitive outcomes for many 
clients, but in most cases that was not the intention.     
  The early phase of the recovery approach was connected to the 
deinstitutionalisation and community care period. As the asylums closed, they were 
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replaced by rudimentary community services, which, in part because of poor 
resourcing, found themselves with a difficult task. Hence they tended to emphasise 
maintenance over all other objectives. The main aim was to keep people out of 
hospital and to maintain clients in the community. This tended to be the hospital 
regime transferred to the community. It was uncritically disorder-focused and clients   
and new consumer groups were critical of it. During this early phase, there was 
increasing focus by consumer groups on a better term than ‘patients’ to describe them 
as a collective. The terms clients, users, and consumers  became more fashionable. 
  The early phase of the recovery approach tended to adopt social learning 
approaches to mental illness as Sedgwick (1982) has indicated. Ideas came  from 
Goffman (1961) (labelling theory), Szasz (1961) (that mental illness was a myth),  
Laing (1965) (that we could learn from psychosis and be richer for it) and Foucault 
(1965) (that psychiatry was a social police force). It tended to embrace new age 
thinking in the 1960s (particularly connected to experiments in living). There was also 
an influence from revivalist evangelical thinking and ideas overturning long-cherished 
theological ideas. There were also (not always consciously understood) influences 
from wider societal events in the sixties: the increase in civil rights and alternative 
lifestyles and ways of living. There were also ideas, such as existentialism, which 
have had an important role. 
  Existentialism10 – certainly in the form espoused by Sartre (1969) – was 
gaining traction in the 1960s. Being and Nothingness had been published in English 
for the first time at the end of  the 1950s. While that book was not itself about ethics 
or psychiatry explicitly, existentialism and ethics have been linked to existentialist 
schools of thought in psychiatric practice. There were three main reasons for the 
influence of existentialism upon the early phase of the recovery approach. Firstly, 
existentialism had entered mainstream culture. Secondly, existentialism had a 
particular impact upon psychiatric practice, giving rise to existential psychiatry which 
was seen as being at odds with traditional psychiatric practice. Thirdly, it connected 
with the antipsychiatry movement.  
The two fundamentally important ideas from existentialism that gained 
currency and influenced the recovery approach were firstly that being in itself (quite 
                                                          
10 Sartre is probably the most important thinker in terms of existentialism; but while Being and 
Nothingness is arguably his most important philosophical work, it is his own fiction and the work of 
Camus who have popularised existentialist ideas.  
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apart from what it does) is a foundational idea. Even if someone had not read Being 
and Nothingness (which would have been the majority) and hence understood the 
notion of Being-in-itself and  Being-for-itself, the idea of  Bad Faith was certainly 
widely grasped, if not always for the correct reasons. Bad Faith would be seen by 
many as living inauthentic lives. The apparatus of the state and the rules and 
regulations of the state were in need of dramatic change because they helped to 
reinforce inauthenticity. The same revolutionary concepts (as opposed to evolutionary 
thinking) were present in the early recovery approach thinking. Additionally the idea 
of freedom, particularly the radical freedom that individuals were free to make 
themselves afresh and make their life over, was a very attractive notion. 
Unfortunately, much of existentialism was anti-rational, anti-scientific and even anti-
political. Some of those roots would also influence the recovery approach. 
  The early phase of the recovery approach was characterised by paradox 
perhaps more than anything else. While the consumer groups and others who saw 
themselves as involved in a movement developed, they did not in the early phase refer 
to themselves as taking a recovery approach. This came later. In the early phase, they 
were criticising the professional dominance of psychiatric services11. 
Middle Phase:  The middle phase in the nineteen seventies could be 
characterised as a period of challenge to the existing order in psychiatric care. This 
was a period (in Europe and North America)12 of community care. There were, 
increasingly, publications of the experience of those who had lived through 
psychiatric care (particularly asylum care). The experiential nature of recovery easily 
connected to the central notions of existentialism around ‘being’ and ‘freedom,’ and 
hence the continued anti-psychiatry emphasis of much of the writing in this period.  
During this period, recovery became an approach characterised by a focus on the self-
determining client, and as something a client chooses for themselves. This influenced 
teaching and research in some of the main academic centres, particularly 
rehabilitation courses. However, it was still a repressed discourse. Perhaps because of 
the centrality given to experience (i.e. Beingness) and to freedom, psychiatry was 
seen as trying to alter people’s experience through mind-altering substances and as 
wanting to imprison people. The ideas of some of the humanistic psychotherapists, 
                                                          
11 Wolfensberger (1972, 1983) has provided one of the best attempts to move away from a professional 
dominance of human services, and his earlier writing dates from this period. 
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such as Rogers (1967), for example, were also very influential. The notion that we are 
all on a journey and grow and develop as people and that we can learn from our 
experience of ill health was very a very powerful one. Unfortunately, that journey was 
seen as something best done without professional help. 
  Later Phase: This phase of the recovery approach is one we are currently 
living with. It is characterised by official endorsement and official publications, 
emphasising that recovery is now a dominant discourse. It is marked by consolidation 
of the recovery approach in non-clinical settings but by a continued struggle and 
challenge with existing clinical services; this struggle being essentially concerned 
with the differences between a professionally determined and a client-determined 
understanding of recovery. The recovery approach is now taught and is seen as core 
training for all psychiatric professionals. As already mentioned, however, this 
approach is currently delivered through the procedural ethos, which itself has an 
historical background, which will be discussed next. 
 
Section Three: Ethos of Psychiatric Services 
   The aim of this section is to provide a brief history of the ethos of 
psychiatric services. An ethos is the way a particular community sees itself and 
organises its activities and procedures. Psychiatric services have had a changing ethos 
for the past two hundred years. An ethos changes for many reasons: partly in response 
to societal changes; also because of changes in technology or science; and finally, 
because of new theories or art forms.  An ethos is the prevailing way of doing things, 
the spirit of a community. An ethos provides a framework, one that is available to all 
members of that community. A framework may not be something which practitioners 
in that service are aware of at the time, but it provides an orientation in ‘moral space’, 
to use Taylor’s term. Taylor (1989) provides an argument for the inescapable nature 
of frameworks: that is that frameworks provide an orientation for people and thereby 
a sense of identity.  They also need to be contrasted with individual beliefs or ethical 
positions: there may be many different ethical and clinical views within a particular 
service, like psychiatric services, but there will only be one ethos. I believe that there 
have been four types of ethos in the past two hundred years in terms of psychiatric 
                                                                                                                                                                      
12 New Zealand’s experience of community care started over a decade later than Europe and North 
America.  
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services: a superstitious ethos, a utilitarian ethos, a clinical-expert ethos and a 
procedural ethos. 
  The current recovery approach, discussed in Section Two, has not managed 
to become an ethos, since currently a procedural ethos is in place within psychiatric 
services. In order to understand how we can change the ethos of psychiatric services 
towards a recovery ethos, it is vital to understand how the ethos has changed down the 
years. That will be the focus in this section.  
The superstitious ethos: from the Middle Ages until the late eighteenth 
century, care of the mentally ill was characterised by neglect and abuse in 
consequence of a prevailing view that mental illness had supernatural causes. This is 
not to say that there were not pockets of care and concern, only that the ethos was 
characterised by a focus upon the supernatural. The neglect and abuse of this period 
was perhaps based, as discussed in earlier sections, on the mad as fundamentally 
different and other and as not possessing reason or the faculty of reason. Unable to 
relate to what was viewed as unreasonable, this period neglected the mentally ill. In 
equal measure, however, it also abused its mentally ill. The mad, the unreasonable, 
were to be chained, were to be exorcised of demons, were to be ‘treated’ with 
bleedings and the like. At the time this was not seen as abuse, but from our present 
day perspective many of the practices were abusive. The private mad houses, in 
particular, were very abusive as a consequence of seeing the ‘mad’ as fundamentally 
different and the state realised it would need to intervene and regulate. This focus on 
the mad as fundamentally different helps to explain the beginnings of the emphasis 
upon professional ways of fostering recovery, since the mad – it was thought at the 
time – could not be expected to have any reasonable views on the matter themselves. 
The utilitarian ethos: The regulation of the modern state in the area of 
psychiatric services led to the modern asylum and to the removal from society of large 
numbers of those deemed mentally ill. The utilitarian ethos was concerned with the 
benefit to the majority of society incurred by the removal into asylums of a minority 
of those deemed mentally ill. The removal into asylums, fostered by the utilitarian 
ethos, created dependency in psychiatric care. For, in placing people in the asylums, 
there was little expectation that people would come out and they were usually placed 
in a ‘total institution’ for a prolonged period of time. The result was the dependency 
of those being cared for. This dependency produced a vicious cycle: those who were 
dependent became progressively less able to do anything for themselves and hence the 
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need for more dependency-producing measures and the concomitant increase in learnt 
helplessness.  Dependency was underpinned by an uncritical acceptance of a 
utilitarian ethos, one that saw ever-increasing numbers removed from society and 
placed in the asylums. The individual and their needs became increasingly irrelevant 
to the perceived need to generate the best outcome for the majority and that outcome 
would be generated by increased regulation and control and paradoxically increased 
dependency. 
The clinical- expert ethos: The utilitarian ethos lasted for much of the 
nineteenth century but at some point, difficult to locate exactly, the role of the expert 
within the asylum became critical.  Perhaps because of the numbers of people, the 
need to categorise and prioritise care, the need to make sense of the increasing power 
residing in the medical superintendent, the role of the ‘expert’ in psychiatric care 
became central.  The clinical-expert ethos, which lasted well into the twentieth 
century, saw an uncritical acceptance towards the views of that expert – generally a 
psychiatrist – and an inability to challenge that viewpoint and with it an associated 
acceptance of paternalism. The clinical-expert ethos had an underpinning assumption 
that the expert had a duty of care to their patients and this extended to all aspects of 
care with an associated understanding that there was no place for clients to exercise 
their views or voice their concerns. The clinical-expert ethos also meant that the 
expert in psychiatry needed to look like an expert from other areas of medicine: hence 
the need for a body of knowledge and recognised control over that body of 
knowledge. From our previous discussion of history, particularly the rise of 
psychoanalysis during this expert period, we can see how psychiatry had no 
alternative but to take control of psychoanalysis in some form if it wanted to extend 
the clinical-expert ethos, because it could be argued that psychoanalysis as a body of 
knowledge has little direct connection with traditional medical practice. The only 
obvious connection is that it meant an extension to the era of the expert psychiatrist.  
In this ethos, recovery meant recovery as determined by the psychiatric professional 
against professionally determined standards. These professional ways of viewing 
recovery within the clinical-expert ethos tended to rely upon purist approaches, 
whether they were biological or psychological in origin, rather than eclectic 
approaches. 
The procedural ethos: This is the current ethos of psychiatric services and is 
characterised by an emphasis upon processes, procedures and protocols that are 
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fundamentally derived from a number of simple principles. For example: firstly, the 
principle of justice – namely how do we ensure prompt referral, fair treatment and 
reasonable access for all those deemed to be in need using all treatment approaches 
equally? Secondly, in terms of the principle of autonomy, how do we promote 
autonomy within the confines of a system where the Mental Health Act (1992) can be 
applied?  These may seem reasonable principles, but as I will show in Chapter 4, the 
focus on principles, and procedures which rest upon them, tends to result in less focus 
on what the client can do to help their own recovery. This focus on principle-based 
procedures has generated a particular understanding of recovery, namely an eclectic 
approach to fostering recovery13 to deal with radically differing views on how best to 
help someone recover. The procedural ethos has arisen from a convergence of the 
clinical-expert ethos ( and differences between those experts) and the new recovery 
approach.  Confronted with the need to listen to the client’s perspective and to adopt 
client-centred approaches, the clinical-expert ethos  changed to become a procedural 
ethos where ‘expertise’ was increasingly centred in protocols, guidelines and research 
generating ‘evidence-based practice’. The expert  became an interpreter and, in some 
sense, a custodian of those pathways and evidence. The recovery approach that is 
concerned with individualising care had to contend with a system that had become 
concerned with rules and protocols. Research and particularly the Randomised 
Control Trial (RCT) presents a good example of this quandary14. The RCT is seen as 
the gold standard in research, but its results about the efficacy of medication, for 
example, do not show how this particular client will respond, it simply gives a 
statistical probability of how clients in general will respond and what side effects in 
general they will experience. Procedures have always been a part of psychiatric 
services and they always will be. What is new is that now procedures are the 
dominant feature of the system. The expert had previously decided when someone 
needed to be placed in hospital; increasingly this decision was placed within the rules 
of legislation or policies, for example the Mental Health Act. The result was a 
procedural ethos, but one which continued to use the language of the recovery 
approach. 
                                                          
13 An eclectic approach to fostering recovery holds that client self-help and  professional approaches to 
recovery should all be treated equally in each phase of a client’s recovery and that in a procedural ethos 
this is done through procedures and protocols.  
14 Fulford & Howse (1993) provide a useful ethical analysis on the role of research with the clients of 
psychiatric services 
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   The expert, worried by increasing litigation and concern about ‘ultimate 
responsibility’, has been quite content to allow procedures to become the final arbiter 
of responsibility. In a risk averse climate, this has meant the role of the expert has 
changed to become more an interpreter of a body of knowledge, itself subject to 
numerous guidelines and protocols. 
  Society has been changing too. The old deference towards perceived 
authority figures has been breaking down. Nothing is now taken at face value. The 
psychiatric expert, more than most, has had to contend with a better-informed public 
and client base. This has meant the expert has had to share some responsibility – if 
only for educational issues – with those they see and care for.  
 
Summary 
  This chapter provides a brief historical background to the concept of 
recovery. This is in order to show that the notion of recovery has changed over the 
centuries from a focus upon purist, professionally determined understandings of 
recovery to a current eclectic approach to fostering recovery within psychiatric 
services.  
  Section One argued that the notion of recovery from mental illness is 
closely connected to the history of psychiatric attempts to help people. I have shown 
that in psychiatric history there have been alternating biological and psychological 
illness models of recovery, which have used a purist professional approach to 
fostering recovery. Quite apart from the empirical issue of whether these approaches 
worked, they do represent a dominant discourse for the concept of recovery and they 
helped to associate professional psychiatric approaches with recovery. So successful 
has been the connection between professionalism and fostering recovery that many 
people see professional views on fostering recovery as  providing a complete account 
of  recovery. 
    The recovery approach, with its emphasis upon a client self-determined 
approach to recovery has developed in response to the strong identification of 
professional approaches with recovery. As was shown, the recovery approach is a 
blending of several streams: wellness approaches, supernatural/magical approaches, 
anti-psychiatry and existentialism. The recovery approach can be seen to fall into 
three phases of development that were termed early, middle and late. The early phase 
was characterised by the emergence of the recovery approach amongst survivors of 
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the psychiatric system, where recovery meant not simply recovery from mental 
illness, but recovery from the effects of the psychiatric system. The middle phase was 
characterised by the challenge of the recovery approach to the dominant professional 
discourse with its objective and expert-driven care. This challenge occurred at many 
levels: political, social, academic and clinical. The term ‘recovery approach’ entered 
common discourse during this period. The later phase, which is the current phase, is 
concerned with consolidation of the earlier phases and with the recovery approach 
becoming a dominant discourse. This it has succeeded in achieving, but psychiatric 
services continue to function in ways that have not fully accepted client perspectives. 
This is because of the prevailing ethos within psychiatric services being based on a 
procedural ethos, which itself provides a framework which supports eclecticism. In 
this ethos, the recovery approach simply becomes another part of the eclectic mix, 
requiring procedures. 
  The chapter has traced the way the ethos of psychiatric services has 
changed during the past two hundred years. It was shown that in the late eighteenth 
century the ethos was one of superstition towards those with mental illness. This ethos 
changed as the asylums were built and filled, to become a utilitarian ethos. The large 
asylums were ‘total institutions’ and regulated all aspects of inmates’ lives. The 
utilitarian ethos changed in the late nineteenth century to become the clinical-expert 
ethos. This ethos was characterised by a reliance on the clinical judgement of the 
expert and the passive nature of the patient. This ethos came under challenge from the 
recovery approach and has changed in the past few decades to become a procedural 
ethos, and the role of the expert (though still important) has become subservient to 
policies, procedures, ethical codes, rules, legislation and a form of eclecticism: the  
paradigm case was that of the Mental Health Act, which affects a small number of 
people, but which is closely determined by rules and procedures. The  argument has 
been that in a risk averse climate the expert has permitted rules and procedures to 
become the final arbiter of decisions. The expert clinician has done this partly as a 
way of preventing legal action, but also as a way of ensuring that their expert 
judgement is seen as part of accepted practices rather than as something they should 
be held accountable for.  
     The next chapter will clarify the concept of recovery and how it will be used for 
the rest of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Clarification of the Concept of Recovery 
This chapter will provide some conceptual clarification of the concept of 
recovery within psychiatric services, which will then be used for the remainder of the 
thesis. I will be arguing that basically the term ‘recovery’ in this thesis describes an 
improvement in mental health of a client with mental illness. While it is possible for 
clients and professionals to broadly agree on the criteria for ascertaining what needs 
to improve in recovery from mental illness, there remains considerable disagreement 
about who determines what should be included in those criteria. It will be argued that 
both professional and client perspectives need to be included.   
 Firstly, issues of definition in connection with recovery need to be 
considered. This is important because of the confusion that surrounds the word and 
the way in which it is used in practice.  The language we use in discussing recovery is 
important if we want to make ourselves clear. Clients and professionals routinely talk 
about a client’s recovery, or the client’s need to recover and of individuals who have 
recovered. In this instance the recovery approach is not included since I will return to 
it later. This array of terms can be very confusing, particularly when we find different 
things are meant by the term.  
  To recover is defined in The Little Oxford  Dictionary (1986, p.454) as to  
“regain possession or use or control of; come back to life or health or normal state or 
position”. To recover in this sense means complete recovery, in regaining possession 
of and coming back to a normal state if we are referring to the client’s overall mental 
health. This should be contrasted with recover in the sense of regaining particular 
skills or competencies. Overall recovery, or recovery restricted to one skill, can be 
either partial or complete. When we use words like ‘recovered’ we are  meaning some 
final end point has been reached and this should be contrasted with words such as 
‘recovering’ which does not have that sense of finality, but is more about a degree of 
improvement.  
  Recovery from mental illness is not necessarily linear (indeed, it is not 
usually so). My focus is not on recovery as a final end state, since recovery will 
continue in  an open-ended way. The point is that recovery needs to be seen as part of 
a continuum in contrast to a categorical understanding of recovery (that is either/or). 
In a continuum, there is more or less of something rather than a categorical 
distinction. 
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The realities of the psychiatric professions are such that here I am more 
interested in the process of recovery so the popular notions of recovery as an end 
point have less relevance. Recovery in this thesis is defined as  involving 
improvement (in the area under consideration) where the level of recovery at r² is seen 
to be an improvement on the level of recovery at r¹ judged using particular  criteria.1 
To speak of recovery is to speak of a client having reached point  r² on the continuum 
subsequent to being at point r¹ along the illness-health continuum (see Figure 2.1 
below).  
 
IllnessÆÆÆÆÆÆ recovery ÆÆÆÆÆÆrecovered/health 
                  r¹                                        r² 
Figure 2.1 Recovery Continuum                  
 
As Figure 2.1 indicates, there is an implicit sense of a continuum involved in 
recovery from illness to health with all the (infinite) intermediate positions. The 
continuum does not need to involve directionality, (for some people there may indeed 
be a decline) but to talk of recovery is to talk of moving towards health. The 
movement along the continuum need not be consistently in one direction, there can be 
relapses, but from a broad perspective recovery is an advance towards health. 
  Having established that recovery is fundamentally a process concerned with 
the improvement of mental health, the issue to be addressed is the need to identify 
what criteria in mental health measure the improvement or recovery of mental health. 
 
Recovery Criteria  
 There are two broad criteria for determining if someone is recovering from 
mental illness. There is general agreement on these broad criteria for recovery, but 
disagreement over who determines whether the criteria are being met, namely 
disagreements between client and professional perspectives2.  Recovery involves: (1) 
a reduction in the symptoms of mental illness; and (2) an improvement in the 
individual client’s functioning3.  Disagreements in the area of recovery criteria are 
generally due to differences in perspective rather than differences over the actual 
                                                          
1 See Recovery Criteria below 
2 Secker et al. (2002) has a useful discussion on the differences between professional and client views 
on recovery in the context of employment. 
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recovery criteria. This difference is most marked between a client and professional 
perspective, but there are differences in perspective within these two groups. In the 
last chapter we discussed some of the differing professional perspectives. Some of the 
intra-group differences for clients will be clarified in a later section of this chapter. 
Sometimes professionals can adopt a client perspective and sometimes clients can 
adopt a professional perspective, but it is still possible to broadly talk about a client 
perspective and a professional perspective. Proponents of the recovery approach have 
strongly advocated  a particular understanding of the recovery criteria in a way that is 
meaningful to clients.  This will be discussed later in this chapter. 
  We need to differentiate between such criteria and ways of fostering 
recovery4, since they are often confused. Fostering recovery is simply the way we can 
help recovery to occur; in the case of professional approaches, by using biological, 
psychological and social interventions. Additionally, fostering recovery can also refer 
to client self-help approaches. Part 3 of the thesis will present the recovery ethos for 
psychiatric services which provides an overarching philosophy for fostering recovery 
using client and professional approaches. Briefly, the best way to foster recovery is to 
use psychological, social, biological and self-help approaches at appropriate moments 
to help move someone along the illness-health continuum. The way decisions are 
made about which interventions should occur at any point are determined, not by 
procedures based on eclecticism, but by people using virtues and other factors to be 
explained later.  I have termed this a pluralistic approach to fostering recovery. 
  I have referred to the illness-health continuum and next I will consider this 
continuum in more detail.  
 
Recovery and the Illness-Health Continuum 
  Recovery is a journey for the client, involving both internal and external 
factors. Internally there are psychological and physiological processes; externally 
there is the client’s ability to function in the world. This journey occurs along the 
illness-health continuum. ‘Journey’ simply refers to the movement along that 
continuum. ‘Illness-health continuum’ refers to the way that the events and 
experiences implicated or involved in the mental illness can be seen to lie along a 
                                                                                                                                                                      
3 I discuss the concept of functionality in more depth in Chapter 3. 
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continuum from severe illness at one end  to absence of illness and complete recovery 
of health at the other. 
  Essentially, when someone has a severe mental illness there are a number of 
events and experiences that occur (see Chapter 3 for further discussion). There are 
biological and chemical events inside the brain and at a subjective level, depending 
upon the type of illness, many unpleasant psychological experiences. The kind of 
symptoms and functioning a client experiences will be determined by the point the 
client occupies along the illness-health continuum. As the client continues their 
journey along the illness-health continuum, if recovery is occurring, the symptoms 
will start to lessen and functionality will start to return in ways that are meaningful to 
the client and the professionals.  
 
Crisis        acute        rehabilitation        active recovery        self care        citizenship 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Æ  
Figure 2.2 Recovery Process in the Form of Recovery Stages 
 
  Figure 2.2 is a schematic of an ideal recovery journey. It is presented in 
linear form as comprising a number of recovery stages, which is different to practice 
where the path would be non-linear and involve recursive loops. This idea of a 
gradual, even, incremental continuum for recovery is contrasted with the following 
Figure 2.3. 
 
Client Illness   +   Clinical Intervention   =   Client Health 
Figure 2.3 Recovery Process 
 
  In Figure 2.3 there is a categorical change from illness to health following a 
particular clinical intervention (almost like the idea of a magic bullet solution).  
However, Figure 2.2 accords more with individual experience and with empirical 
studies that support the idea that recovery is a gradual process. 
  Before moving to a consideration of professional and client perspectives 
on the recovery criteria, it should be noted that there do seem to be particular critical 
                                                                                                                                                                      
4 As already mentioned the recovery ethos can be applied to all mental illnesses. In this sense the 
recovery criteria can apply to all mental illnesses. However, different health domain interventions will 
be needed to foster someone’s recovery from specific disorders such as schizophrenia or depression.  
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points in a client’s recovery journey when recovery can be promoted or not (see 
Chapter 8 for further details).  
 
Client and Professional Perspectives on the  Recovery Criteria 
  The criteria for recovery may appear clear but professionals and clients 
have a tendency to see them differently, that is, from a different perspective.  
  The professional perspective on recovery tends to emphasise the role of the 
professional in determining whether someone is recovering from mental illness using 
professional judgement, standardised assessment tools and research. While there are 
many examples of professional approaches to fostering recovery, they all tend to 
emphasise a particular understanding of symptom reduction and functionality 
improvement (while not necessarily agreeing on causation).  Warner’s (1997) criteria 
for determining recovery from schizophrenia are a good example. He sees recovery as 
being about a loss of symptoms of psychosis and return to pre-illness levels of 
functioning and ability. This judgement is predominantly based on the professional 
using their expertise. In the clinical-expert ethos this would have been almost entirely 
dependent on the professionals’ judgement.  
  Clients vary in their perspective on recovery. However, the recovery 
approach, which represents the most systematic attempt to make sense of recovery 
from the client perspective, has a perspective which is different from the professional 
perspective in that there is a broader understanding of what constitutes symptoms and 
functioning. While some clients would use the professionals’ understanding of 
symptoms and functionality, others would include quite personal ‘symptoms’ (which 
are perhaps more correctly seen as problems the illness has caused) such as waking up 
in an anxious state at three in the morning or being unable to concentrate on cooking 
their evening meal. In terms of functionality, clients often see their illness in a 
functional way, as things which they can no longer do; whether, for example, this 
involves no longer being able to read their favourite book or go fishing as they used 
to.  
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 Since there is a much wider diversity of views within the recovery approach 
literature (as opposed to professional perspectives5) as to what should be included in 
the recovery criteria, these will be the focus of the following discussion.  
  There are four descriptions of recovery in current use from the literature  
that reflect the dominant discourse around the recovery approach. Each of these 
descriptions offers, implicitly or explicitly,  a number of views on the content of the 
criteria for determining whether someone is recovering.  In the ‘recovery literature’ 
these descriptions are presented as ‘definitions’ of recovery, but they are, more 
properly speaking, descriptions of how recovery should be fostered or developed with 
some comments on the recovery criteria added either implicitly or explicitly. That 
there are so many different views in these descriptions might be thought to indicate 
that there are few, or no, common recovery criteria. However, all these views can be 
brought together under the two recovery criteria already mentioned. The purpose of 
identifying these descriptions is firstly, to show how muddled much of the current 
recovery literature is between recovery criteria and ways of fostering recovery; and 
secondly, to show the way that the client perspective can be accommodated by the 
criteria of symptoms and functioning. Thirdly, it indicates the need for a broader 
understanding of symptoms and functionality than is conventionally appreciated in the 
professional literature. 
These descriptions are presented in reverse chronological order since this 
provides a mechanism for appreciating how the Mental Health Commission 
description (Description 1), which is currently used in psychiatric services, has been 
based on earlier descriptions6.  
 
Description 1 (The Mental Health Commission) 
  Recovery is a journey as much as a destination. It is different for everyone. For  
some people with mental illness, recovery is a road they travel on only once or 
twice, to a destination that is relatively easy to find. For others, recovery is a 
maze with an elusive destination, a maze that takes a lifetime to navigate. 
                                                          
5 There are different professional approaches to fostering recovery – i.e. biological, psychological and 
so on. There is, however, a broad agreement  in using those health domains on the criteria for 
determining whether recovery is occurring. 
6 There are many other descriptions of recovery, but the descriptions presented here are seen as 
‘classic’. Ralph (2000) has many more of these recovery descriptions. 
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Recovery is happening when people can live well in the presence or 
absence of their mental illness and the many losses that may come in its wake, 
such as isolation, poverty, unemployment and discrimination. Recovery does 
not always mean that people will return to full health or retrieve all their losses, 
but it does mean that people can live well in spite of them. 
Some people have experienced recovery without using mental health 
services. Others have experienced recovery in spite of them. But most will do 
much better if services are designed and delivered to facilitate their recovery. 
Virtually everything the mental health sector does can either assist or impede 
recovery (1998, p. 1). 
This description of recovery has been, and continues to be, enormously influential 
within psychiatric services. The essence of the description can be reduced to three   
propositions: 
1. Everyone is an individual and on an individual journey with regards to their 
mental illness recovery; 
2. Recovery occurs when people can live well with or without symptoms of 
mental illness and the losses it brings; 
3. Psychiatric services (and other mental health services) have a vital role in 
assisting people with mental illness to recover. 
The fundamental message of this description is that recovery is something the client 
determines for themselves using their own interpretation and experiences with the 
assistance of psychiatric services where appropriate, since recovery involves “living 
well” and this is something the client decides upon.  The  three main propositions will 
be considered more closely.  
  It seems that the first proposition is a true statement; it is not an empty 
statement, since until recent times the notion that mental illness affected people in 
unique ways would have been strongly resisted. It is a statement which is making a 
claim about mental illness, but which is neither a criterion of recovery nor a way of 
fostering recovery. As will be clear as the thesis progresses, this first proposition is 
one I find very attractive. The third proposition also appears hard to criticise. 
However, there are those (i.e. Curtis (1998) and Deegan (1997) in some of the 
following descriptions) who limit the significance of psychiatric services in recovery7. 
                                                          
7 However, in the New Zealand context, this third proposition is somewhat limited in that, until  the 
Ministry of Health’s  Primary Health Strategy (2001) was published, there was an expectation that 
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This proposition is not a criterion, but a means of facilitating recovery. However, the 
main critique of the description can be levelled at the second proposition: that 
recovery occurs when people can live well in the presence or absence of the 
symptoms of mental illness and all its losses. This is a view that is concerned with the 
criteria for recovery and not with ways of fostering recovery. “Living well” can be 
seen as connecting to functioning since “living well” at one level is simply a way of 
saying someone is functioning well.  However, the proposition also connects to the 
other recovery criterion, namely the presence or absence of symptoms. By connecting 
living well with symptoms as the proposition does, there is still an acknowledgement 
that improvement in both recovery criteria is important. Even if all that is really meant 
by this is that living well with symptoms is better than living badly with symptoms, 
giving  greater prominence  to functioning over symptoms is a constant refrain from 
the recovery approach literature. 
 
Description 2 (Curtis) 
 Recovery is a process, not a place. It is about recovering what was lost: rights, 
roles, responsibilities, decisions, potential and support. It is not about 
symptom elimination, but about what an individual wants, how s/he can get 
there, and how others can help/support them to get there. It is about rekindling 
hope for a productive present and a rewarding future – and believing that one 
deserves it. Recovery involves people having a personal vision of the life they 
want to live, seeing and changing patterns, discovering symptoms can be 
managed and doing it, finding new ways and reasons, doing more of what 
works and less of what doesn’t. Recovery is about reclaiming the roles of a 
‘healthy person,’ rather than a ‘sick’ person. Recovery is about getting there 
(Curtis, 1998, p. 17).   
This description has been influential amongst consumer groups and within 
rehabilitation services and picks up on many of the points made in the three 
propositions of  description 1; namely an emphasis upon the individual journey as a 
way of facilitating recovery (i.e. “a process not a place”); and an emphasis upon 
                                                                                                                                                                      
psychiatric services would provide services to only 3% of the population with serious disorders and 
that primary services in the form of General Practitioners would service the rest.  While primary 
services need to be included as part of  ‘other mental health services,’ because most primary services 
are provided by General Practitioners, who share the medical world view of psychiatry, the same 
justice- dominated procedural ethos applies. 
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recovering what was lost and not symptom elimination8. There is an 
acknowledgement that recovery is about discovering the way “symptoms can be 
managed and doing it” which is also an acceptance of the need for improvement in 
respect to this criterion. This is because symptoms that have been discovered and 
managed are clearly an improvement on those that have not, even if they are 
symptoms “only” from a client perspective.  However, the description makes no 
mention of the place of psychiatric services and instead emphasises the individual’s 
own responsibility for self empowerment. Self empowerment can be seen as 
connecting to the functionality criterion. It is for the individual to have a “personal 
vision” and to reclaim the roles of a healthy person rather than a sick person and be 
hopeful. This component would seem to connect more with self-help approaches to 
fostering recovery.   
  As a description, it could be argued that it places too much emphasis upon 
the individual and too little upon the various services and supports which are 
available. For those individuals able to shoulder the weight of personal responsibility 
– and able in Fromm’s sense to have no fear of personal freedom to exercise that 
responsibility – such a description would probably be adequate. However, for those 
individuals who have particularly severe symptoms, or who lack the necessary 
personal vision and discipline, such a description would probably add to their losses 
in that they would potentially see themselves as having lost the ability to recover by 
themselves.  
A similar description from a year earlier and influential for both descriptions 
1 and 2 has been Description 3.  
 
Description 3 (Deegan) 
  Recovery is, in part, emerging from an individual, rather than being 
imposed upon an individual. The goal of recovery is to meet the challenge of 
the disability and to re-establish a new and valued sense of integrity and 
purpose within and beyond the limits of disability. The aspiration is to live, 
work and love in a community in which one makes a significant contribution 
(Deegan, 1997, p.18). 
                                                          
8 In other work, Curtis has continued to emphasise these points, see Curtis ( 1997, 1999).  
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This description also alludes to themes similar to the other two descriptions but 
emphasizes the ways in which recovery can be brought about. It does this by stressing 
the need, once again, to see recovery as something that can and should be understood 
in a self-determined, and presumably subjective, way as opposed to an objective and 
external way. 
 This description9 is strongly connected to the criterion of functionality and it 
makes a link between functioning and self-help approaches to fostering recovery. This 
is clearly a way of saying that functionality is pre-eminently important. The issue 
here, it seems to me (and will be addressed later in the thesis), is the question of 
responsibility. How much should the individual be held responsible for their own 
health and how much should others and the psychiatric service be held responsible for 
those who do not appear to recover? The description seems to side-step those 
difficulties and perhaps that reflects the reality that this description makes a number 
of assumptions about individual capability being very high in terms of facilitating 
recovery. Part 3 of this thesis will attempt to answer some of these questions. The 
description, like the Curtis (1998) description, strongly assumes the individual is 
responsible for their own health by a “new and valued sense of integrity and purpose 
within and beyond the limits of disability” (p. 18). 
  This description essentially focuses – though implicitly – on the functioning 
criterion. It tends, in a muddled way, to mix that functioning criterion with how the 
client can foster their own recovery. 
  The final description that predates all of these previous descriptions is by 
Anthony10 (1993a, p. 2) and is arguably the formulation that has influenced many of 
these subsequent descriptions (including that of the Mental Health Commission). 
 
Description 4 (Anthony) 
Recovery, as we currently understand it, means growing beyond the 
catastrophe of mental illness and developing new meaning and purpose in 
one’s life. It means taking charge of one’s life even if one cannot take 
complete charge of one’s symptoms. Much of the chronicity that is thought to 
be a part of people’s mental illness may be due to the way the mental health 
system and society treat people with severe mental illness. Contributing to 
                                                          
9 Other work by Deegan also emphasises the importance of functioning, see Deegan (1996)  
10 Anthony (1993b) has written more extensively about the nature of recovery from mental illness. 
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people’s chronicity are factors such as stigma, lowered social status, 
restrictions on choice and self-determination, the lack or partial lack of 
rehabilitation opportunities, and low staff expectations. Drastic system 
changes are needed if we wish to support people’s recovery, rather than hinder 
people’s recovery (Anthony, 1993a, p. 2).  
This description can be seen to contain four main propositions: 
1. Recovery involves moving beyond illness; 
2. Recovery involves taking charge of one’s life even if one cannot take 
complete charge of one’s symptoms;  
3. The way psychiatric services and society treat people with a mental 
illness is a barrier to recovery; 
4. Psychiatric Services need to change to support rather than hinder 
people’s recovery. 
The four propositions present a mixed bag in terms of recovery criteria and ways of 
fostering recovery. The first two propositions are closely aligned to the recovery 
criteria. In the first proposition,  recovery is achieved through “moving beyond 
illness”, presumably both in the sense of functioning and symptoms.  
The idea that recovery involves taking charge of one’s life in Proposition 2 
connects with propositions from other descriptions (particularly the idea from the 
Mental Health Commission of everyone’s journey being unique). Taking charge of 
one’s own journey as an assertive actor rather than a passive recipient of care seems 
an important ingredient to facilitating recovery. Anthony does not suggest one will 
necessarily have “complete control of one’s symptoms”. On the face of it, this might 
seem to reject the symptom criterion, but I think he is  simply saying there is more to 
recovery than symptom reduction. I would agree with Anthony’s assertion that clients 
need to take control of their life, but this can be seen as meeting the functionality 
criterion, though perhaps not in ways professionals would usually indicate.  
  Propositions 3 and 4 are concerned with barriers to achieving recovery and 
appear to place greater responsibility for recovery outside of the individual than either 
the Curtis (1998) or Deegan (1997) descriptions provided. The notion that 
responsibility sits with the individual or with psychiatric services in an absolute sense, 
as opposed to being seen more accurately as shared between the two is something that 
will be re-examined in subsequent parts of the thesis.  
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  This discussion indicates there are a number of different descriptions of 
recovery that can broadly be understood as coming from the recovery approach 
perspective. From that perspective, clients are seen as needing to take responsibility 
for their own health and hence for fostering their own recovery. The emphasis in this 
approach is upon client self determination and autonomy. There are important points 
of convergence, but there are also important points of divergence between these 
descriptions.  Those points of convergence include the idea that recovery involves an 
individual journey (though exactly what the journey involves differs); that those who 
have been unwell need to take some responsibility for their illness; and that recovery 
needs to be self determined rather than professionally determined. The points of 
difference between the descriptions offered here are the role of psychiatric services in 
recovery and who is responsible for recovery, both factors concerned not with the 
criteria for determining whether recovery has occurred, but with ways of fostering 
recovery. 
  The most important common feature of  these four recovery approach 
descriptions is that recovery is seen as being about increasing client self 
determination, self responsibility and self awareness.  These terms can be seen as 
elements of the functionality which is a criterion of recovery. There is indeed a 
general focus and emphasis in these descriptions on functionality, usually in a non-
explicit way. The existence of so many descriptions makes it difficult to create a 
description that everyone can accept. However, the criteria of symptoms and 
functionality can still stand, even if what clients understand by functionality and 
symptoms is more personal11 than that which professionals understand. 
 
Problems with Professional and Client Perspectives in Isolation 
  Considered by themselves, client and professional perspectives each have 
possession of a partial truth but fail to provide a comprehensive account of the 
recovery criteria. Both client and professional perspectives have problems when 
considered in isolation. 
  The client perspective tends to be subjective in that what one client 
considers necessary for living well or coming to terms with their illness, another does 
                                                          
11 Ralph (2000) in discussing the personal factors for recovery thinks that four dimensions are present: 
internal factors, self managed care, external factors and empowerment. All of these four dimensions 
can be seen in the four descriptions discussed.  
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not. This is not in itself a problem, but there are implications that are problematic. 
One of these is that client subjectivity extends to using particular terms for 
understanding recovery that makes communication with others problematic. Since 
such personal criteria are being used to understand recovery from the client 
perspective, any outcome-based research becomes difficult in that such research will 
need to use standardised outcome measures where there are agreed definitions of 
terms. Client approaches have consequently found it difficult to produce evidence that 
the recovery approach is working. This lack of evidence is particularly problematic in 
psychiatric services where there is a growing emphasis upon evidence-based practice.  
The recovery approach as the dominant client perspective has tended to lack practical 
measures of its success in bringing about recovery. This has become a problem 
because of the muddle that the various recovery descriptions have created, since they 
fail to distinguish recovery criteria from ways of fostering recovery.  There is also a 
disproportionate focus upon functionality and also the problem of clients 
communicating to others using different terms to report their functioning experiences.  
  Professional perspectives also have problems.  They tend to downgrade the 
significance of the experience of the client and see the objective assessment and 
diagnosis of disorders as central.  There is a focus on symptoms as specified in the 
main classification systems which often fails to appreciate the very personal response 
individual clients may have to their illness. There is often little focus (compared with 
the focus upon symptoms) on the clients’ functioning in any holistic sense, except for 
those clients actually involved in a formal rehabilitation service. Even when there is a 
focus on functioning, it tends to be the functioning specified in the main psychiatric 
classificatory systems. While it tends to lend itself to standardised assessments, such 
an approach misses the unique experience of the individual client.  
  The purist approaches to fostering recovery which stress a particular 
professional or client perspective in isolation, have deservedly fallen from favour12. 
As we will find in Chapter 4, this has led to a stress on eclectic procedures based on 
principles for decision-making in psychiatric services.  
 
 
 
                                                          
12 In the same way that the ‘purist’ professional approaches to the various health domains have also 
fallen from favour. 
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Summary    
  This chapter has argued that the best way of understanding the concept of 
recovery is by seeing it as being fundamentally about improvement in the recovery 
criteria of symptoms and functioning for someone with a  mental illness. However, it 
is important to acknowledge that professionals and clients have differing perspectives 
on the recovery criteria.  Professionals tend to emphasise improvements in symptoms, 
whereas clients emphasise improvements in functioning. These criteria for recovery 
need to be differentiated from ways of fostering recovery.  Historically, there has been 
an emphasis upon professional approaches to fostering recovery, which has recently 
changed to a client-based method in the  recovery approach. There is a strong case 
made for seeing recovery as a process rather than as an end point along the illness-
health continuum.  
 The next chapter  will clarify some of the key terms used in psychiatric 
services and indicate the need to have a changing emphasis in the use of those terms. 
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CHAPTER   3  
Conceptual Basis of Psychiatric Services: The Need for a Changing 
Emphasis 
 This chapter will discuss the conceptual foundations for psychiatric services 
that  are most consistent with a pluralistic approach to facilitating recovery. Such a 
discussion  will provide a basis for a pluralistic approach to fostering recovery 
developed in Part 3. This chapter will indicate the current conceptual foundations for 
psychiatric services, the problems with these concepts, and how these foundations 
need to have a changed emphasis if we want a pluralistic approach to facilitating 
recovery.  
 Section One is an account of the current conceptual basis of psychiatric 
services and an indication of the problems with these concepts.  Section Two will 
indicate the ways in which this conceptual basis needs to change to be consistent with 
pluralistic approaches. Section Three will discuss the conceptual understanding of the 
mind-body problem that is most consistent with a pluralistic approach to facilitating 
recovery. 
 
Section One: Current Conceptual Basis of Psychiatric Services and Their 
Problems  
               It is my contention that conceptually, current psychiatric services are based 
on the notion of mental disorder and that the distinction between mental disorder and 
mental illness is not fully developed or appreciated within those services. In order to 
appreciate this distinction I will assume that there are mental disorders from which it 
is possible to recover.1
These distinctions are discussed later, but briefly mental disorder is a 
‘categorical concept’ whereas mental illness is a ‘continuum concept’ that is 
concerned with someone’s response to mental disorder.  A concept is called 
‘categorical’ if membership of that category depends on a certain threshold being 
reached so that membership is all or nothing. In contrast, membership of a ‘continuum 
concept’ is a matter of degree. This focus upon mental disorder has a clear historical 
                                                 
1  Szasz (1961) argues that mental illness does not exist and that mental illness is due to people 
misunderstanding social rules. However, Szasz fails to distinguish between mental disorder and mental 
illness and his ideas seem to be a product of the 1960s, that is, part of a temporary fashion. There is a 
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origin (discussed in Chapter 1) in that psychiatrists wanted the same kind of 
exactitude in diagnosis and treatment as that available in physical medicine, and 
emphasising mental disorder was seen as the way to achieve that. At various historical 
points this exactitude has seemed to be best served by either biological or 
psychological approaches.  The focus upon mental disorder has been strengthened by 
the categorical approach to classification in the two main psychiatric classification 
systems2. This strengthening has been the result of an increasing number of disorders 
being recognised along with their associated criteria. 
  Unfortunately, the increasing number of mental disorders with their 
associated criteria has led to the adoption of a crisis model of care. That is, it is the 
presentation of these disorders in a crisis state that has become the focus of 
psychiatric services, even though most of the clients of psychiatric services (at any 
particular time) are not in crisis. This focus on crisis is due to the increasing numbers 
of people becoming ill and the way psychiatric services have consequently taken the 
role of treating and caring for those most seriously ill, which in practice means the 
critically ill.  
 The Ministry of Health’s Mental Health Act (1992) definition captures the 
focus that psychiatric services have on mental disorder in a crisis. This definition of 
mental disorder is arguably the most familiar definition and probably the most widely 
used.  Mental disorder is defined as:  
 
An abnormal state of mind (whether continuous or intermittent) characterised 
by delusions or by disorders of mood or perception or volition or cognition, 
of such a degree that it: (a) poses a serious danger to the health or safety of 
that person or of others; or (b) seriously diminishes the capacity of that 
person to take care of himself or herself (p. 31). 
 
Such a definition focuses upon the iconic crisis notions of risk to self (through 
suicide, vulnerability or deliberate self harm) and others, and misses or ignores the 
many other risks that are involved in client recovery from mental illness. I am 
                                                                                                                                            
general agreement today that mental disorder does exist and that it is important to distinguish illness 
from disorder.    
2 By main classificatory systems I refer to the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder (1994a) and the World Health Organisation’s International 
Classification of Disease  (1992) 
 47
referring to such risks as not receiving treatment quickly enough, the side effects of 
medication, becoming dependent on psychiatric services and so on.    
 As will be discussed in Part 2 of this thesis, psychiatric services adopt a 
‘legislative imperative’ in that services designed for people who are critically unwell 
and in need of the Mental Health Act are applied to all clients just in case they 
subsequently need the Act.  Conceptually, the central problem with this arrangement 
is that while the Mental Health Act definition of mental disorder is agnostic about the 
cause of mental disorder, it does tend to move responsibility for recovery towards the 
psychiatric professionals and away from the client.  In other words, it may allow for 
different types of professional intervention, but it tends to limit the client’s attempt to 
improve their own health, which is a central component of a pluralistic approach to 
facilitating recovery. To make sense of how the focus on mental disorder ignores or 
obscures attention to mental illness, it is necessary to show how these terms are 
different and how they relate to the associated term of mental dysfunction. 
The concepts of illness, disorder3 and dysfunction are often used 
interchangeably. This is unfortunate since they are not synonyms either in a physical 
or mental context. These three concepts mean different things. They also have a 
different relationship to the concept of recovery understood in the pluralistic approach 
to  fostering recovery.  These three terms (illness, disorder, dysfunction) are related to 
both mental health and  to the notion of recovery. These connections will be explored 
in Sections One and Two. 
 
Disorder and Illness 
              Central to this thesis is the distinction between mental disorder and mental 
illness4. Borrowing from Boorse’s (1975)  paper “On the Distinction between 
Disease5 and  Illness”  helps to show what these differences are. Boorse (1976) 
defines disorder as: 
a type of internal state of the organism which: (i) interferes with the 
performance of some natural function- i.e. some species’ typical 
                                                 
3 Disease and disorder should be seen as interchangeable terms with disorder gaining ground in 
psychiatric practice. Disease is used in the International Classification of Diseases, whereas disorder is 
used in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder.  
4 Physical disorder can similarly involve a physical illness in response to that disorder. However, unlike 
physical illness, mental illness involves using the same functions (i.e. thinking, feeling, judgement etc.) 
as the disorder which gave rise to it. 
5 Boorse prefers the term ‘disease’, but for consistency I use the term ‘disorder’.  
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contribution to survival and reproduction – characteristic of the 
organism’s age; and (ii) is not simply in the nature of the species, i.e. 
is either atypical of the species or, if typical, mainly due to 
environmental causes (p. 62-63).   
For Boorse, disorder is value free and factual, whereas there is always something 
undesirable about illness which is about values. Illness is a concept, moreover, whose 
criteria are highly subjective. Boorse (1975) says that “a disease is an illness only if it 
is serious enough to be incapacitating and therefore is: (i) undesirable for its bearer; 
(ii) a title to special treatment; and (iii) a valid excuse for normally criticisable 
behaviour” (p. 15).  He goes on to indicate some particular difficulties with applying 
these criteria in mental health, but that does not stop him from trying.  The problem 
for Boorse ( as I will show in the next section on mental health) is that he sees 
disorder as value free and factual, and hence contrasts this with the subjective illness 
concept.  Boorse’s main problem is that no mental notions are value free since there is 
inescapably a subjective dimension to all mental notions and this applies equally in 
the context of both mental disorder and mental illness.  
The three criteria that Boorse gives for differentiating disorder from illness 
would seem to apply not only to biological but also to mental phenomena. The central 
point of distinction, however, is one that Boorse fails to mention or acknowledge: 
namely the categorical nature of disorder and the continuum nature of illness.  As 
already indicated, mental disorder relies upon a categorical distinction between 
various mental disorders (and between having and not having a disorder) based on 
discrete criteria, that creates threshold boundaries. Mental illness, in contrast, is a 
response to disorder and is necessarily a matter of degree6. 
The distinction between illness and disorder is not represented in the recent 
history of psychiatric care and treatment, where the emphasis has been on disorder. 
The psychiatric employment of the notion of mental disorder can be seen as an 
attempt to find and identify objective clusters of symptoms indicative of a currently 
viewed disorder process where the disorder process is to be understood in functional 
terms7. Since the birth of modern approaches in the eighteenth century, psychiatric 
                                                 
6 It might be asked whether illness can exist without disorder? I think that illness can at some point 
exist even though the original disorder has gone; but there will always be a need for there to have been 
a disorder at some point to trigger the illness experience.    
7 There is a difference between the validity and reliability of mental disorders as discussed by Read et 
al (2004). Reliability is concerned with the ability to agree consistently on the criteria for mental 
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care has been mostly concerned with diagnosing and treating particular disorders.  
This approach culminated in the clinical-expert ethos where the expertise of the 
clinician was valued over everything else. The problem with the disorder-based 
approach is that it stresses the responsibility of the professional in their ability to use a 
categorical classification system and ignores (or views as unimportant) the 
responsibility of the client. The disorder-based approach, since it is based on a 
categorical understanding of disorder, does not fit into the experiential sense of a 
continuum. The notion of mental illness gains in importance over time since the 
client’s attitudes and expectations towards disorder become more central to the 
possibility of recovery. While it is important to appreciate the continuum nature of 
illness, it is true that in ordinary conversation we sometimes use the notion in a 
categorical way when we say of someone that they are predominantly healthy or ill. 
Boorse is committed to a categorical difference between disorder and health 
since any deviation from a norm (in the sense of species specific functioning) moves 
that person from health to disorder. This position appears to have a number of 
problems, but these are only problems when we fail to distinguish between disorder 
and illness, since disorder in current psychiatric practice is a categorical concept 
whereas illness can be considered a continuum concept.  
 
What is Mental Health? 
               My aim in this section is to show that mental health is an evaluative concept, 
best understood as being something that people subjectively determine for themselves 
but that has an objective basis in mental dysfunction which can be assessed by others.  
Mental health has been extensively defined but without any apparent consensus.8  
There appears to be a personal dimension in people’s views of mental health that 
makes consensus unlikely even if it were desirable. If agreement is to be achieved, 
however, it will need to address this personal component. . 
 One of the most important contributions to the debate has been from Boorse 
(1976).  In this paper, he argues against three commonly used ways of making sense 
                                                                                                                                            
disorders. Validity is centrally concerned with whether those disorders actually exist. It is possible that 
the current  classification system has high reliability and low validity with regards mental disorder. 
However this thesis assumes the notion of mental disorder has some validity ( although some mental 
disorders may have more validity than others). 
8 “Health is a dynamic state of complete physical, mental and social well being, and not merely the 
absence of disease or infirmity” (World Health Organisation 1998). This definition is one of the most 
well known, but flawed, definitions.  
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of mental health: 1) Affirmations of value  (that is, identifying health with what we 
value); 2) Abstraction from established diagnostic classes (that is, indicating what 
health is by showing which disorders it is not); and 3) Social judgements of behaviour  
(that is, how people judge other people’s behaviour as healthy). Boorse’s argument is 
strong and convincing against these approaches. However, his own approach relies 
upon seeing health in objective ways, in that it assumes that  it is possible to make 
statements about health that are independent of personal experiences. According to 
Boorse, “An organism is healthy at any moment in proportion as it is not diseased” (p. 
62). In what follows, I outline Boorse’s position in more detail and then indicate some 
problems with it.  
Boorse sees health as the absence of disorder as already indicated  in his 
definition of disorder. He  believes the implications of his  definition of disorder are 
that disorder should be seen as value free in that it is a matter of fact whether a 
disorder is present. However, as Boorse’s own argument indicates, it is impossible for 
this to be value free.  
 Boorse attempts to make a case for health as an objective concept but in 
making his argument he cannot help but use evaluative  terms that are not objective. 
For example, he says “One can sometimes infer internal malfunction immediately 
from biologically incompetent behaviour.… Even some psychotic people, as well as 
the great mass of those with neuroses and character disorders, function successfully at 
the minimal level required for basic biological goals” (1976, p. 76- 77, my italics).  
 Mental health is an evaluative9 term that people use in ways that are 
meaningful to them personally. The evidence for the subjective nature of mental 
health is the diversity of views on what constitutes health. There has been a long 
tradition in psychiatry of emphasising the fact-value distinction10as a way of 
indicating the difference between discussing disorder and health.  I think this 
distinction is helpful in that health is essentially something we value. However, while 
people subjectively determine what health means to them, there is a need to address 
the recovery criteria of symptoms and functioning which have a more objective basis.  
There are objective criteria for determining whether someone has particular 
symptoms of mental disorder and whether they are functioning as individuals. The 
                                                 
9 There is a growing body of literature that supports the evaluative nature of mental health and 
psychiatric care. Fulford (1995a) has been a strong proponent of this view point. 
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real issue is how these factors relate to health. If someone has significant symptoms of 
disorder and problems with functioning, it would be difficult to consider them 
healthy.  The objective criteria for determining mental health are based on the 
functioning of the individual since symptoms only become problematic when they 
affect functioning. 
Part of Boorse’s (1976, 1977) argument is connected to function (or 
dysfunction) in connection with mental health11. Boorse argues that when the internal 
state of an organism interferes with the natural functioning of that organism we can 
consider it to be dysfunctional, providing that the dysfunction is not common to the 
whole species.  In this area he appears on stronger ground in making a case for an 
objective component.  There surely is a connection between mental health and the 
presence of appropriate function.  Function includes such mental activities as 
thinking, feeling, perception, volition, remembering, judgement and insight12.  It is 
also referring to the many activity functions, such as walking or talking, which people 
perform as a result of these mental activities. If someone does not have these 
functions to any significant degree it would seem reasonable to say that they do not 
have good mental health and that they are dysfunctional. However, while some 
functions, such as walking, are objectively verifiable, others, such as thinking, have a 
more subjective component, in that other people can only assess them with the 
assistance of the client themselves.  The client’s experience of functioning is central, 
hence my contention that functionality uses both objective and subjective 
components. (This is reflected in the   recovery criteria discussed in Chapter 2.) 
For the purposes of this thesis we can say that mental health is an evaluative 
concept based on the client’s (subjective) experiences of functioning and the 
professional’s (objective) assessment of that functioning13. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
10 See Fulford, Broome, Stanghellini and Thornton (2005) for an interesting analysis of why the fact–
value distinction is so strong in psychiatry.  
11 Fulford (1995b) similarly makes a link between disturbances of functioning and the existence of 
disorder.   
12 See Wakefield  (1992a, 1992b) for a useful functional account of mental disorder.  
13 It is worth emphasising that while mental health has this focus on functioning, mental disorder tends 
to emphasise the professional assessment of symptoms and functioning; while mental illness 
emphasises the client’s assessment of functioning and symptoms. 
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Mental Disorder and Consensus in Psychiatric Services 
                Psychiatric services currently have a focus on mental disorder based on a 
categorical approach to diagnosis14. This categorical approach has a tendency to 
eliminate disagreements between professionals about what the client is experiencing 
in the interests of achieving consensus. In other words, the diagnostic classification 
system attempts to find a procedural consensus by firstly identifying certain signs and 
symptoms, then matching them with the criteria for particular disorders and hence 
confirming (or not) that a particular mental disorder is present. Consensus is very 
useful, particularly in crisis and acute presentations where actions to alleviate client 
distress are necessary. However, enforced consensus in later stages of a client’s 
recovery may not be so helpful since the client may have a different perspective from 
that of the psychiatric professional. Part of the need to change current psychiatric 
services is to enable disagreements and differing perspectives to have more 
prominence. In Section Two I explain why it is important to include the client’s 
perspective. 
 
Section Two: Inclusion of Client Perspective 
             We have seen in Section One that current psychiatric services are 
conceptually bound to the notion of mental disorder. While mental disorder is a useful 
construct, the extreme focus on it by psychiatric services has tended to limit the 
usefulness of those services and some change of focus is necessary. That change of 
focus needs to have two components, both equally important if we are to move 
towards a pluralistic approach to fostering recovery. Firstly, we need to increase the 
emphasis on mental illness in contrast to disorder, while at the same time recognising 
that illness is connected to the pursuit of health. This should herald a new appreciation 
of the dynamic (that is the way the client moves back and forth along the illness-
health continuum) and experiential nature of mental illness. Such experiences will 
probably increase the recovery consciousness of the client, that is their self- 
awareness of the experience of recovering15. Secondly, we need to acknowledge that 
the notion of mental disorder does have a place and utility in psychiatric services even 
though it should no longer be the dominant notion. 
                                                 
14 There are dimensional approaches to diagnosis, however, the categorical systems are clearly 
dominant at present within psychiatric services, hence my focus on them. 
15 I assume that consciousness exists, which  writers such as Priest (1991) would reject.  
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 Illness-Health Continuum 
              Increasing the focus on mental illness means an increased focus upon client 
subjectivity and personal experience. This increased focus on subjectivity means that 
clients come to value their own experiences more. There is a psychological 
connection between valuing and responsibility, in that we tend to take more 
responsibility for things we value. This is important if we want clients to take more 
responsibility for their own health, since the focus shifts from what the professional 
can do (in mental disorder) to what the client can do for themselves. Clients can take 
more responsibility for their own health  when the continuum is stressed, since the 
numerous intermediate steps between illness and health become apparent, unlike the 
discrete boundary changes between the notions of disorder and health. This 
continuum is central to the gradual growth and development of recovery.  
 
 
Putting Mental Disorder in its Place 
              Mental disorder – based on one of the categorical classification systems – has 
become the central focus and rationale for psychiatric services. Mental disorder is 
largely determined, or at least diagnosed, by psychiatric professionals. The role of the 
client can easily become quite passive and secondary to that of the psychiatric 
professional.  Recovery under such circumstances can seem to be primarily about 
what the professional can do rather than about what the client can do. In large part 
because of this focus on the professional, psychiatric services tend to concentrate on 
the two criteria for recovery (from Chapter 2) namely the symptoms of mental 
disorder and, to a lesser extent,  the client’s ability to function from a professional 
perspective. 
Recognising the distinction between mental disorder and mental illness is a 
first step towards changing the focus of psychiatric services to being more open to 
issues connected to the client’s functioning and role in assisting with their own 
recovery. 
Appreciating the role of the notion of mental disorder is connected with 
realising its strengths and weaknesses. According to most reliable evidence, there do 
seem to be mental disorders from which it is possible to recover. Diagnosing and 
treating mental disorder is an important part of recovery but not the whole story. A 
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greater focus on mental illness will enable the fuller story in terms of function and 
responsibility to be told. An ability to diagnose and treat mental disorder is 
particularly important in crisis and acute presentations, but it is also important in 
chronic disorders. In chronic mental disorders (and many mental disorders tend to 
have a chronic nature), there is a need for greater prominence to be given to mental 
illness with the emphasis on the client’s response to the disorder. Since illness (unlike 
disorder) is a continuum-based concept and lies on the same continuum as mental 
health, “Putting mental disorder in its place” as a phrase comes to mean appreciating 
the strengths it has and also realising that greater prominence needs to be given to 
mental illness and the illness-health continuum. 
The understanding of mental health, mental disorder and mental illness 
provided in this chapter is broadly pluralistic in that the various conceptions are 
combined in a way that allows the dominance of one approach at any moment, while 
still respecting the other approaches16. For example, in a crisis state, the realities of 
mental disorder are dominant, whereas when the client is actively recovering it is 
mental illness and health that become dominant. 
Having clarified  terms such as ‘mental health’, ‘mental disorder’ and 
‘mental illness’ and their connection to recovery, it is necessary to indicate how ‘the 
mental’ connects to the brain, since there are some understandings of this relationship 
which are incompatible with the pluralistic approach to fostering recovery. Given that 
the mind-brain relationship is conceptually central to the nature of psychiatric 
services, some attention on this matter is important. 
 
Section Three: Relationship between Mind and Brain 
              What is the relationship between the mind and brain? Mental disorder, 
mental illness and mental health all appeal to some notion of the ‘mental’. This 
section will demonstrate how a pluralistic approach to fostering recovery requires an 
understanding of the relationship between the mind and the brain that fully respects 
the full range of internal events and experiences for the client.   
                                                 
16 I will have more to say later on pluralism, but at this point I will indicate the differences between 
pluralism and eclecticism. Pluralism, like eclecticism, accepts the need to respect differing approaches 
(i.e. the various professional approaches to the health domains and client self-help approaches) but, 
unlike eclecticism, sees the need for the decision-making to be based on professional and client 
judgement, rather than eclectic procedures.  
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It could be argued that the ontology of psychiatric services is particularly 
focused on the mind-body relationship. At different times in the history of psychiatric 
services there have been periods when either mind or body has been emphasised, 
often at the expense of the other. Some of the philosophical notions relating to the 
mind-body problem will be useful in this investigation. 
There has been a movement based on identity theory17 towards saying that 
psychological experiences (and events) are nothing but brain events and that a direct 
correspondence exists. Identity theory as a form of reductive materialism wants to 
collapse all psychological factors into physical processes. While such an approach 
allows for psychological factors, it ultimately wants to see them in physical terms. 
This approach says that while we may not yet understand exactly what those   
correspondences between physical and psychological processes are, one day we 
might. A more extreme physical theory holds that when neuroscience is sufficiently 
advanced we will be able to talk of eliminating certain psychological processes 
entirely. Eliminative materialism18 holds that there is no need to use psychological 
language as a form of explanation. 
From the psychological perspective, there is an approach which sees mental 
phenomena as ineffable, mysterious and perplexing. This approach is based on the 
notion of phenomenological qualia19  and is essentially Cartesian with an emphasis 
upon the mental as somehow distinct from the brain substratum. Such an approach 
tends to emphasise phenomenologically unique experiences. 
I think both eliminative materialism and phenomenological qualia-based 
approaches are impossible to integrate within a pluralistic conception of recovery. 
Eliminative materialism makes it impossible to work with psychological events and 
experiences as an explanatory level in itself; whereas qualia make it difficult to work 
with biological and chemical events in the brain. The identity theory approach could 
be used within a pluralistic account even though it is probably not a good model in 
that it makes such strong claims about the future reduction of psychological into 
                                                 
17 There is an extensive literature on identity theory. For example, two recent publications are Beall 
(2000) who discusses the nature of the identity theory from a philosophical perspective; and David 
(2001) who discusses the nature of identity theory and links this with the correspondence theory of 
truth. 
18 Eliminative materialism is probably best captured in the work of the Churchlands:  Patricia 
Churchland (1986) discussing neurophilosophy and Paul Churchland (1979) the plasticity of the mind 
from a neurological perspective. 
19 There is an extensive literature on qualia. For example, Teller (1992) has discussed the importance of 
subjectivity and how it cannot be reduced to physical properties. 
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physical properties20. In attempting to foster recovery, we need to tread a middle road 
between the positions of eliminative materialism and qualia. A more integrative and 
reasonable position conceptually is one that embraces a form of mental emergence 
and commonsense functionalism. 
Emergence theory  is not a new theory. It has been around for at least sixty 
years as discussed by Ghaemi (2002). Such an approach rejects mind-brain identity, in 
that a mental state is not identical with a brain state. In this theory there is believed to 
be another level of explanation, which describes mental states that emerge from the 
brain state that forms its foundation. In such an approach, psychological experiences 
and events cannot be reduced to biological events and chemical events and so on. 
There is something about psychological events and experiences that is not explainable 
in the biological understanding and description. At a conceptual level, the emergent 
properties of the mental, such as thinking, feeling, judgement and the like, are more 
than the sum of the respective parts that have combined to make them. For example, 
while the mind may be dependant on neurochemicals acting upon the neurons within 
the cellular structure of the brain, to understand the mental still requires a different 
level of explanation from that offered by either chemistry or biology.  
Such an account does mean we can retain a materialistic understanding and 
explanation of the brain while still providing a psychological explanation in its own 
terms for psychological experiences and events.  Emergence theory underlies the 
essential nature of a psychological theory of description in a way that the identity 
theory does not.  
There are many schools of thought with regards the mind-body relationship. 
The approach most compatible with both an emergent theory of mind and with 
pluralistic accounts of recovery  is that offered by functionalism. There are many 
views on functionalism and therefore I will be assuming a form of common-sense 
functionalism21 for the purposes of this section.  
Functionalism is an approach to the philosophy of mind in which mental 
states are specified in connection with their causal role in relation to stimuli, 
behaviour and other mental states but it remains agnostic about what those internal 
processes and events are. The defining characteristic of common-sense functionalism 
                                                 
20 Olsen (2000) offers an analysis of why the identity theory of mind should not be used as the basis for 
understanding mental disorder. 
21 This view is represented in the work of Braddon-Mitchell &  Jackson (1996) 
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is that the relations between different mental states, and between them and perception 
and action is known as a matter of common-sense.  
Functionalism holds to the view that mental states are internal states within 
us and that these internal states are the causes of behaviour.  Functionalists broadly 
agree with the position that there are input events that cause mental states in people; 
that there are output events which are the behaviours caused by mental states; and that 
there are internal events which describe the internal interactions between those mental 
states. Functionalism provides a means of conceiving  the way the mind works, which  
can usefully provide a mechanism for explaining the disruption that is mental 
disorder.  
Coupled with emergence theory, this common-sense functionalism can 
provide a conceptual basis for a pluralistic conception of recovery that circumvents 
the pitfalls of either extreme physical or extreme psychological approaches to dealing 
with the mind–body problem. While this account does not discuss at length the mind- 
body problem, it has certain implications for the nature of the mind-body relationship. 
There is a psychological level of explanation that is important for psychiatric services, 
and the concepts involved are not reducible to the physical, but the psychological does 
act upon the physical. This is consistent with taking both psychotherapy and 
psychopharmacology seriously.  
 
Summary 
              This chapter has clarified the concepts of mental health, mental disorder, 
mental illness and mental dysfunction indicating that, while related, they are best 
viewed separately as different concepts. It has shown that current psychiatric services 
are disorder-focused and indicated that there are a number of problems associated 
with this when dealing with recovery. In particular, there is the problem of accounting 
for the range of individual experiences within a categorical disorder-based approach 
(which will become clearer in subsequent chapters). The solution indicated is to 
change the emphasis within psychiatric services to include a greater prominence for 
mental illness. Mental illness, unlike mental disorder, is continuum-based and 
connects to the notion of mental health along the illness-health continuum. 
Finally, the single most significant conceptual issue in psychiatric services is 
the mind–body problem and the tendency, given psychiatry’s history, of lurching 
towards either physical or psychological poles of that problem. A case has been made 
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for a broader appreciation, based on emergence theory and functionalism, which 
prevents a lurch towards either extreme. 
The next chapter will explore the current ethos of psychiatric services 
focused on procedures where mental disorder is the consensus-building device used to 
make decisions about care and treatment. 
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CHAPTER  4 
The Pervasiveness of the Procedural Ethos 
The ethos of psychiatric services has changed a number of times historically, 
most recently from the clinical-expert  to the procedural. This procedural ethos will be 
discussed in this chapter.  As discussed in Chapter 2, even though the nominal 
philosophy of psychiatric services is meant to be based on recovery, according to the 
last published  plan for psychiatric services in the Ministry of Health’s Te Tahuhu 
(2005), the way in which recovery is now facilitated is based on eclecticism,  
underpinned by the procedural ethos, which is due to the eclectic procedures being 
reified.  
  Eclecticism is a way of combining the different domains of health (i.e. 
biological, psychological and social) in a procedural manner during the course of the 
client’s treatment.  The biopsychosocial model best exemplifies the eclectic approach. 
This approach, which is traditional within psychiatric services, provides a way of 
making decisions based on procedures that give equal weight to different domains at 
all stages. In this thesis I argue for a pluralistic approach to facilitating recovery 
which is contrasted with an eclectic approach. Pluralism also accepts the need to work 
with all the health domains, but, unlike eclecticism, does not hold  the domains as 
equally important at all stages of the client’s treatment.  Pluralistic approaches accept 
that decisions cannot be left to procedures, and instead other decision-making 
approaches will be needed to determine which should be the dominant domain at any 
specific moment. 
Eclecticism is very widespread within psychiatric services.   Interestingly, 
although an ethos can have a major impact on services, it has received little attention 
from ethicists, bio-ethicists and philosophers (in the Anglo-American tradition), at 
least in terms of the ethos of psychiatric services.  This is strange since an ethos refers 
to the characteristic spirit and beliefs of a community or society, which can include, 
but is not limited to, its ethics. An ethos is, in a sense, the climate in which ethics 
lives.1
 The procedural ethos appears to be quite a general philosophy, which has 
come to pervade much of the public service in health and education both in New 
                                                 
1 See  Jonsen (1990) for a sympathetic treatment of the importance of ethos. See Illich (1976) for a 
critique of the clinical-expert ethos and for indicating the problem with procedures and the need to 
move the recovery of health to centre stage. 
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Zealand and overseas. This procedural ethos is underpinned by the fundamental 
liberal views within our society, characterised by a respect for individual choices in 
that the state agrees not to favour one conception of the good life over another. In the 
context of psychiatric services, this fundamental liberal approach is given contextual 
meaning through the main intellectual tools and approaches also having a procedural 
focus. The psychiatric classification systems, such as the American Psychiatric 
Association’s  (DSM, 1994a) and the eclecticism based on the biopsychosocial model 
are procedural both in intent and in the way they are used. So, for example, in 
working with someone who has schizophrenia, the DSM provides biological, 
psychological and social criteria as a procedure for determining whether someone has 
the categorical disorder of schizophrenia. The biopsychosocial model provides the 
broad procedures (in terms of respecting all  three health domains) for determining 
how  those criteria for schizophrenia should be used. These procedures are essentially 
concerned with rules based on symptoms and function, while the rules rest on a 
number of moral principles. There appear to be a combination of principles,  mainly 
autonomy, beneficence and justice, which will be discussed later.  
  Procedures are necessary for many aspects of life and my concern is not 
with isolated, specific, localised procedures but with the ethos that reifies procedural 
understanding over everything else.  The argument in this chapter is three-fold: in 
Section One it is that a procedural ethos has become the de facto philosophy of 
psychiatric services; in Section Two it is that the procedural ethos in psychiatric 
services has a particular form characterised by rules and specific principles in relation 
to mental disorder; in Section Three it is that this procedural ethos is underpinned by a 
reliance on an eclectic approach to facilitating recovery based on the biopsychosocial 
model and the classificatory systems rather than a pluralistic approach.  
 
Section One: Procedural Ethos as the De Facto Philosophy     
              There are a number of factors that have contributed to the development of the 
procedural ethos as the de facto philosophy within psychiatric services. These factors 
have included broad societal changes in which authority figures have become 
increasingly challenged in their roles. This has led to the end of the clinical-expert 
ethos. The main single factor, however, in the development of the procedural ethos 
has been the inability to find consensus in most ethical and clinical matters within 
 62
psychiatric services and a consequent need to find procedures that can command that 
consensus and that work2.   
  There has certainly been increasing attention paid to finding a framework 
for reaching decisions that everyone can agree to use within psychiatric services. In 
previous times there has been more societal consensus around values that informed 
clinical decision-making. The mostly Christian value assumptions of the Victorian 
period have disappeared, together with any substantive ethical theory such as 
utilitarianism or Kantianism that can replace those values and have all the answers. 
With this lack of consensus has gone any chance of agreement around a particular 
ethical theory. However, while this may be true in the sense of a broad ethical belief 
system, there does appear to be some consensus around liberal values and, in 
particular, the importance of autonomy and self determination within Western 
societies3. These liberal values have influenced the kind of clinical decision-making 
that is made by psychiatric services but, as will be seen in Section Two, these liberal 
values have a unique flavour in psychiatric services. So, while there are a number of 
different clinical approaches within psychiatric services (e.g. biological, 
psychological and social) there has developed a belief that they should all be equally 
respected in that they are offering a unique perspective on the individual client’s 
mental disorder. This approach is known as eclecticism. While none of the approaches 
is seen as offering a ‘royal road’ to the truth within psychiatric services, considered in 
isolation they are all thought to offer something important. However, while there are 
these differing approaches within psychiatric services, there is broad agreement that 
they should all be focusing upon mental disorder. This consensus around working 
with mental disorder should be contrasted with the lack of consensus around a 
substantive theory. This lack of consensus in an approach has led to the focus not on a 
substantive theory (whether clinical or ethical) but on a procedure for reaching 
decisions. The fact that there has developed a need to respect, rather than ignore, this 
diversity within society and psychiatric services more specifically is due to the liberal 
                                                 
2 It is worth commenting here on the issue of pragmatism. Part of the attraction of the procedural ethos 
has been that it appears to work. The problem for pragmatism is that the fact of something appearing to 
work does not, in itself, provide sufficient justification for doing it. A recent publication by David 
Brendel (2006) seems to make this mistake by arguing for a form of pragmatism in psychiatric 
services. As I see it, the missing justificatory element is the recovery ethos. 
3 While there is some debate about the foundations of liberalism, there is broad agreement, as 
discussed by Gray (1986)  that freedom, particularly the positive freedom connected to self realisation, 
is fundamental to liberalism. 
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values which are central to our society and way of life. This respect for diversity 
within society and psychiatric services results in the view that the goods people 
pursue are best left to the individual. The state’s role is seen as a minimal one of 
ensuring that in upholding the freedom and liberty of individuals it prevents 
individuals abusing that freedom through depriving others of their freedom4.  The 
liberal values of self determination, autonomy and liberty provide the consensus 
societal view out of which ethical and clinical theories have emerged.   
 Liberal assumptions have given rise to procedures that have become reified 
over time. There are many examples but perhaps one of the most clear is that of 
discharge procedures. Psychiatric services have discharge procedures for both 
community and inpatient services. Originally these procedures were not particularly 
liberal in that only the expert could discharge clients, and many clients found it hard 
to be discharged. Increasing liberal tendencies in society led to more professionals 
being involved in the discharge process and, associated with that development, clients 
were much more able to self-discharge. The exceptions were clients who presented a 
risk to themselves or others, hence the need to have the psychiatrist involved in 
decisions about the discharge of clients from inpatient areas where risk was more 
obviously involved. Other professionals are less involved in discharge from inpatient 
areas and clients are discouraged from self-discharge. This apparently innocuous 
procedure has unfortunately become reified. Invariably, even when it inconveniences 
clients and staff, the psychiatrist is seen as being needed as a final decision-maker 
when there is good evidence that, under some circumstances, other professionals and 
clients can perform the role equally well. This is an example of a reified procedure, 
where reified procedures provide the foundation for the procedural ethos within 
psychiatric services. 
 At the same time as this proceduralisation was occurring, bioethics was 
emerging as a discipline. Bioethics has proceeded by developing considerable 
consensus around issues such as self determination and autonomy that are central to 
liberal values.5 This consensus within bioethics needs to be contrasted with the 
                                                 
4 As  Charlesworth  (1993) has argued, the fact of living in a multicultural, diverse liberal society does 
not prevent authoritarian and paternalistic ethical practices. In psychiatric services this would be 
particularly true. Berlin (1969)  provides a valuable contribution to the debate in distinguishing 
between two conceptions of liberty; namely a positive and negative sense. Someone may have negative 
liberty (freedom from) without necessarily having the positive sense (freedom to).  
5 Those consensus views around self determination are  represented by Beauchamp and Childress 
(1994) and by  Childress (1981,1982).   
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previous point in terms of the lack of consensus around particular clinical or ethical 
approaches, where societal consensus has not been achieved. While there have been 
voices at the margin who have disagreed with this emphasis within bioethics on 
autonomy they have not, until quite recently, gained much traction. For example, 
Pellegrino and Thomasma (1988) have argued that autonomy has become too central 
to practice and some balancing back towards beneficence is necessary. Moreno (1995)  
has provided a comprehensive account of how significant consensus has been for the 
development and formation of bioethics as a discipline. In a sense, consensus within 
bioethics provides another underpinning of the procedural ethos by indicating its 
liberal assumptions. Bioethics, particularly in the United States where it originated, 
has had a significant impact on clinical practice and hence the development of a 
procedural ethos.  In bioethics there has been broad consensus about the fundamental 
liberal assumptions upon which the discipline rests. However, in attempting to 
implement those assumptions practically, there is a need to use particular procedural 
tools such as, for example, consent forms. Over time, many of these procedures, such 
as the use of consent forms, have almost floated free of the original liberal 
assumptions that gave rise to them and in so doing have contributed to the procedural 
ethos.   
  This combination of eclectic procedures (on how to identify mental disorder 
and treat it) and liberal values with a decreasing emphasis upon the role of the expert, 
have culminated in a de facto philosophy of psychiatric services where procedures 
have become reified. Reification refers to the way in which procedures over time 
become an end in themselves rather than a means to an end. 
  Taken together, these factors have contributed to the development of the 
procedural ethos within psychiatric services. That ethos is not unique to psychiatric 
services  but within psychiatric services it does have a unique presentation. It is this 
unique presentation we must consider next.  
 
Section Two: Nature and Style of the Procedural Ethos 
              This section will discuss the nature of the procedural ethos generally and then 
indicate the style of the procedural ethos within psychiatric services, indicating the 
central role of the Mental Health Act. It will then show the types of procedures in 
psychiatric services and how these cumulatively produce a procedural ethos rather 
than a collection of procedures. The nature of the rules that underpin the procedures 
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already examined will be discussed, and it will be shown that these rules, in turn, are 
underpinned by principles. The ‘four principles’ approach offers the best way of 
understanding the way those principles work in psychiatric services by indicating the 
difference between theory and practice. In practice, the principle of justice has 
become dominant, while the principles of autonomy and beneficence have become the 
most widely used.  
 
Nature of the Procedural Ethos 
                Before considering the unique qualities of the procedural ethos within 
psychiatric services it is important to consider the nature of the procedural ethos more 
generally. 
  A procedure is a “mode of conducting business; a series of actions” (The 
Little Oxford Dictionary 1986, p. 428).  An ethos is “the characteristic spirit of 
community or people or system” (The Little Oxford Dictionary, 1986, p. 186). A 
procedural ethos can be thought of, therefore, as the spirit of a community 
characterised by its mode of conducting business in terms of a series of actions. This 
series of actions can be seen as rules, processes, protocols, standards and guidelines.  
A procedural ethos is characterised by the community’s reliance on such activities for 
most or all of its defined purposes. There are three defining characteristics of the 
procedural ethos: firstly, a reliance upon rules and procedures for making decisions; 
secondly, a ‘procedural creep’ where more procedures are constantly created; and 
finally, other forms of decision-making become less valued. The paradigm case of 
rules is legal procedures. The difference is that, while broadly all legal matters are 
procedural, not all procedures are legal, since some are guidelines, protocols and 
policies. 
   A procedural ethos is not the same as individual, localised, specific 
procedures.  Psychiatric services, like other large organisations, made up of many 
people, will always require specific procedures.  A procedural ethos has arisen within 
the psychiatric context because of two overriding issues, as discussed in Section One: 
firstly, the need to generate ethical consensus when in a diverse society there are 
many different values; and secondly, the need to create consensus between competing 
views on the nature and cause of mental disorder.  Additional contributing factors for 
the development of the procedural ethos have been the risk averse nature of modern 
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society, the need for experts to cover themselves against possible legal action and the 
importance of ensuring everyone is treated in the same way. 
  There are a number of distinctions that we need to make among procedures. 
Procedures can be informal or formal in nature. Formal procedures are those that are 
established through guidelines, protocols, formal standards and the like; informal 
procedures are custom and practice ways of doing things, rule of thumb approaches, 
which have not been written down but that still have considerable traditional influence 
and power. The roles of various professional groups, amongst which there is 
considerable overlap in psychiatric services, can often have a strong set of informal 
procedures around what they can and cannot do. When these are analysed they are 
often seen to be custom and practice rather than an established policy. Within a 
procedural ethos we might expect that there would be many informal procedures and 
that these would be competing with established formalised procedures. These 
informal procedures can become formalised over time. In a procedural ethos we 
would expect to see ‘procedure creep’, that is, a constant process of informal 
procedures being created in areas where there previously were no procedures and then 
an ongoing process of converting informal into formal procedures.  
  We also need to make a distinction between procedures as social and 
psychological products. Procedures are social products at one level, hence they can be 
seen as ways of assisting relationships in a diverse society to work better. It is no part 
of my task to provide a sociological account of the role of procedures. They are, 
however, also psychological products and any account of procedures needs to provide 
some understanding of their significance in psychological terms.  There are three 
possible psychological purposes served by procedures. Firstly, they provide a vehicle 
and mechanism for identity formation. When procedures are a matter of choice, we 
choose the procedures that tell others (and ourselves) the sort of person we are or 
would like to be. Secondly, they provide structure and stability in the flux of life, 
which helps us to anchor our deepest beliefs and convictions. Finally, they assist with 
human relationships by providing a minimal requirement for our interactions with 
others. This final point can be seen to overlap with a developmental account of 
procedures.    
  A further refinement of seeing rules as psychological products is to view 
them in developmental terms within the individual. Since recovery is fundamentally a 
developmental process, it will be useful to consider rules and their connection to 
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moral development. Riesman (1950) has presented one way of considering the moral 
development of individuals. He has portrayed four moral types: 1) The tradition-
directed individual and/or society; 2) The inner-directed individual and/or society; 3) 
The other-directed individual and /or society; and 4) The autonomous individual and 
/or society. The idea is that morality starts as a set of culturally defined goals and 
rules which are more or less external to the individual or imposed on him or 
inculcated as habits. These goals and habits become internalised; that is, the 
individual takes them over as his own and regulates his conduct in conformity with 
them by developing a conscience. It can be argued that a procedural ethos has a 
tendency to entrap those in that service into earlier forms of moral reasoning, as will 
be explained in the next chapter. The phrase ‘banality of evil’ was coined to explain 
how seemingly ordinary people could commit horrendous acts of evil during the Nazi 
period in Germany. On this reasoning, though in a very extreme form, it was because 
they were functioning in an earlier, more primitive, reasoning stage.   
  Having discussed the nature of the procedural ethos in quite general terms it 
is now necessary to show how the procedural ethos has a unique presentation within 
psychiatric services. 
 
Style of the Procedural Ethos in Psychiatric Services  
               It can be argued that society as a whole has become more focused on 
procedural matters in the past few decades.  More people are participating in the legal 
processes within society and this tendency extends to healthcare. Many legal issues 
impinge and impact on the delivery of healthcare: from public health legislation to the 
Privacy Act and legislation pertaining to who can prescribe and administer medication 
and so on. Even within the hospital environment, legislation around health and safety 
affects most aspects of the delivery of care. There are hundreds of legislative Acts that 
have some relevance to the running of healthcare. The psychiatric service shares all 
these societal and healthcare influences with regards to procedures and has one of its 
own which is unique. The Ministry of Health’s Mental Health Act (1992) is the 
legislation that details the procedures involved in placing a client under the Act 
because of their mental state. Contrary to popular belief, the Act is rigorous and to 
meet the criteria necessary to trigger the Act involves meeting a number of checks and 
balances. Changes to the Ministry of Health’s Mental Health Act in 1992 made the 
Act more ‘consumer friendly’  by building in more checks and balances than previous 
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Acts. Essentially, the Act can only be applied if someone poses a threat to themselves 
or others because of their mental state. If a client is under the Act, it means they can 
be treated or kept in hospital without their consent. This might appear to allow 
considerable latitude for interpretation by expert clinicians, however, due to the 
judicial oversight of the Act and its implementation, through common law practice, a 
particular understanding has arisen as to what constitutes “danger to oneself or 
others”. 
                Again, contrary to popular belief, most clients of psychiatric services do not 
need or fall under the conditions of the Mental Health Act. Yet the rigor of the 
procedures involved in the administration of the Mental Health Act has been 
transferred over to all those other clients to some extent. Why should this be? It may 
at first sight appear a strange development that the procedures intended to safeguard 
the rights of clients who are deemed to be a risk to self or others can be transferred to 
the vast majority of clients who do not need the Act. I believe there are three main 
reasons for this “legislative imperative”. Firstly, there is the view that all clients can 
potentially come to need the Act. In other words, while the majority of clients are not 
under the Act, the belief is that their mental state may change so that they will need it; 
so we have all the procedures in place just in case we need them. The major problem 
with this position is that relatively small numbers of clients who enter psychiatric 
services informally (i.e. not under the Act) go on to need the Act subsequently. 
Indeed, the numbers are only slightly higher than for the general public. This reason 
from potentiality appears therefore weak. The second reason is that society is risk 
averse and only focuses on psychiatric services through the media when something 
goes wrong6. What this means is that if we have procedures in place that can cover 
maximal risk, then by definition, they will cover minimal risk and hence reduce the 
possible interest from the media. The problem is that most clients in psychiatric 
services are minimal risk, whereas we have a system with procedures designed to 
cover clients who pose significant risk. This second reason provides an explanation 
for the dominance of the justice principle in psychiatric services. Client risk to others 
has become more central than client risk to self in psychiatric services.  As a 
consequence, the justice principle has become dominant over the principle of 
beneficence. The final reason for the extension of the legislative imperative to all 
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clients in psychiatric services is the practical one, that the clinicians who work with 
the ‘risky’ clients are also the same clinicians (by and large) who work with clients 
who represent small risk. The practical procedures are simply transferred over from 
the one group to the other, since the same clinicians are involved. 
  According to Beauchamp and Childress (1994) procedures are one variety 
of rules; other varieties include authority rules (which the previous clinical-expert 
ethos advocated) and substantive rules (to use Beauchamp and Childress’ term) such 
as truth telling, confidentiality and fidelity.  
 While I agree that we have these three varieties of rules, I disagree with their 
view that we resort to procedural rules when we run out of substantive or authority 
rules. I believe psychiatric services represent a special case (because of the mental 
health legislation) in that the procedural rules have become dominant over other forms 
of rule-giving because of this legislative imperative. 
 
Types of Procedures in Psychiatric Services   
               There are three broad types of formal procedures within  psychiatric 
services. Firstly, there are legal procedures that, as already indicated, tend to provide 
the dominant framework for constructing procedures. There are numerous particular 
legislative areas that influence psychiatric and other mental health services, for 
instance: human rights legislation, the Privacy Act and the Criminal Justice Act. The 
Mental Health Act provides the legislative imperative.  Secondly, administrative 
procedures are procedures not explicitly connected to clients. There are a number of 
these:  staff-related, grievance, allocation, funding, etc. These processes are many and 
varied and on the increase. For example, there has been a noticeable increase in 
administrative procedures since the District Health Board framework was introduced 
in  2000. Finally there are client-related or clinical procedures, such as admission, 
keyworking, discharge, cultural processes, protocols for restraining clients and 
secluding clients, guidelines for the safe administration of medications, guidelines for 
assessment, diagnosis, prognosis, transfer of care, etc. A procedural ethos usually 
makes procedures the final arbiter through the reification of procedures. Additionally, 
there will be a huge informal procedural infrastructure, with most custom and practice 
rules being invisible except to those working or receiving treatment in a service. 
                                                                                                                                            
6 Morrall (2002) believes that the media and society is right to be concerned about the dangerousness 
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Given the long historical period during which psychiatric services were asylum-based, 
it should come as no surprise that custom and practice rules are particularly strong and 
influential and indeed, one of the defining characteristics of the service7. It is also one 
of the reasons why psychiatric services have found it so difficult to change: change 
involves introducing new formal procedures and this often leaves the powerful 
informal structures untouched. 
  There is one possible argument against the idea that a procedural ethos is 
dominant within psychiatric services at the present time. It might be argued that while 
there are many procedures in current psychiatric services these do not add up to a 
procedural ethos. In other words, many procedures do not equal a procedural ethos. 
This criticism appears plausible but it misses the point. The procedural ethos is about 
far more than the sum total of procedures – all of which, considered in isolation, may 
be justified. There are four reasons why I think this criticism is wide of the mark. 
Firstly, a procedural ethos covers all areas involved in a service, both in the sense of 
formal procedures and informal procedures. For example, in the case of the restraint 
of clients, there are formal procedures specifying the numbers of staff needed and 
how they should do the restraint; there are, however, also informal procedures 
concerned with ensuring that the right gender balance is on duty or available on call. 
It is difficult to get a sense of all the informal custom and practice rules which exist in 
any given service. The sense of being all-pervading and everywhere is a key feature 
of a procedural ethos. Secondly, the attitude towards procedures is one of relying on 
them as a final arbiter, rather than holding a critical and discriminating perspective 
towards them. Thirdly, it may not (and probably is not) consciously apparent to most 
people that they are working in (receiving treatment in) a service characterised by a 
procedural ethos. People are often blind to the ethos within which they exist, seeing it 
as value free, objective and timeless. This invisibility of the procedural ethos makes it 
difficult to resist the socialisation of new staff or clients into the procedural ethos.   
Finally, the procedural ethos affects the culture of the service, not just the formalised 
procedures but also the mores and language of the service, which is much harder to 
define. In looking at psychiatric services, all these evidential factors are present 
pointing to an ethos as opposed to a collection of procedures. 
                                                                                                                                            
of people with some mental disorders. 
7 The asylums developed many custom and practice procedures as a way of coping with large numbers 
of clients and staff without resorting to formalised procedures.  
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The Nature of Rules  
                All the procedures found in psychiatric services rest on rules. This 
subsection examines what the nature of those rules is in the psychiatric context.    
  Clinical, administrative and legal procedures are all fundamentally rule-
bound ways of organising activities, reaching decisions and agreeing on standards. 
There have been many ways of understanding and interpreting rules, for example 
there are descriptive and prescriptive ways. In a prescriptive sense, rules are 
essentially ways of specifying a particular course of action. A paradigm case is 
driving on the left hand side of the road. Without this rule there would be chaos. A 
detailed critique of the various approaches to rules will not be provided here, but a 
brief discussion of the views of  Searle (1996) is  relevant.  Searle sets out a theory of 
social institutions based on three fundamental building blocks that contextualise the 
nature of rules within a social context. I have chosen to use Searle’s approach because 
it illustrates the social construction of rules,  which is central to understanding how 
rules are developed in the psychiatric context. The first building block, according to 
Searle, is the use by society of physical objects (natural or man made) to serve social 
functions. For example, a collection of bricks in a certain order is assigned the social 
function of being a hospital and gains significant social status from such a 
designation. Searle is careful to distinguish between objects that are assigned a 
function that is immediately obvious (e.g. a chair) and those that are not (e.g. money). 
Intention becomes critical to this differentiation. The second building block is the 
development of a set of rules with associated actions that make possible what Searle 
calls “institutional” facts derived from those social functions. So a particular 
collection of bricks may be termed a hospital, but there are constitutive rules that 
make it a hospital; namely that it admits people who are sick as determined by a 
suitably qualified person in order to help them. The third building block is that there 
has to be a mechanism by  which the social functions and rules are able to derive 
recognition and acceptance. In other words the  “hospital” only becomes a hospital 
when the social function and rules have achieved recognition and acceptance by a 
sufficiently wide number of people.  
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  Searle’s understanding of rules can be related to psychiatric services 
because psychiatric services, as a human service agency, is concerned with 
relationships in a way which is consistent with the social construction of rules.   
 The rules within psychiatric services are based on principles, and currently 
these principles reflect the dominance of the liberal consensus. Before considering 
these principles in more detail it will be helpful to comment briefly on the connection 
between procedures and principles. 
  Procedures, which are the dominant expression of rules in psychiatric 
services, are based on moral principles. While there have been a number of ways of 
making decisions using methods which rely upon some kind of procedure, this 
discussion will use the principle-based approach  developed by Beauchamp and 
Childress (1994) for three main reasons. Firstly, it is very widely used within 
psychiatric services. Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, it highlights a problem 
common to all such approaches: namely the difference between theory and practice. 
While it certainly was not part of Beauchamp and Childress’ intention to indicate the 
discrepancies between theory and practice, their approach, like all principle-based 
approaches, is vulnerable to this difference between the theoretical understanding of 
the ideas and their application in practice. Thirdly, it can help to show the way 
particular principles (namely justice) have become dominant within the procedural 
ethos. 
 
The Four Principles  
               The rules that have been discussed within the procedural ethos of psychiatric 
services are based on a number of principles. While there are many ways of 
interpreting these principles8, the framework provided by Beauchamp and Childress 
has become one of the most influential. Since its first edition in 1979, Beauchamp and 
Childress’ book, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, has established itself as one of the 
most important books on healthcare ethics ever published. Indeed, so enormous has 
been its impact that it is often viewed uncritically as the approach to ethics in health 
situations. While there have been many factors contributing to the development of the 
procedural ethos (the dethroning of the expert; the proliferation of procedural 
approaches; the increasing legislative framework to modern society; and the 
                                                 
8 Gillon (1994) provides another approach to interpreting principles.  
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increasing need to find consensus in reaching decisions)  Beauchamp and Childress’s 
Principles has become the most widely known, understood and accepted principle-
based framework within psychiatric services and, in that sense, a factor in the 
development of a procedural ethos within psychiatric services.   
  The four principles approach, as representative of principle approaches in 
general, will be shown by differentiating between their use in theory and practice.  
 
 The Four Principles Approach in Theory  
                 Beauchamp and Childress lay out an approach to ethics in healthcare that is 
simple, elegant, eclectic and flexible, all of which ingredients have inevitably led to 
clinicians finding them attractive.  The principles approach (the authors are reticent in 
their use of ‘theory’ to describe their endeavours) is based on what they term ‘the 
common morality’, by which they mean socially approved norms of human conduct. 
According to Beauchamp and Childress, the common morality exists before we are 
instructed in its relevant rules and regulations. They see their approach as representing 
a ‘coherence’ version of  theory that is determined by considered judgements (based 
on the common morality)  where there is interaction between theory and individual 
cases. They contrast such an approach, based on considered judgements, with 
deductive and inductive accounts. By deductive they mean approaches that move in a 
deductive fashion from rules to particular judgements. By inductive approaches they 
mean proceeding to justification based on individual cases. Casuistry is the pre-
eminent example of this approach that was dominant during the clinical-expert ethos. 
 The four principles approach has four clusters of principles. These are 1) 
respect for autonomy (a group of norms respecting the decision-making capacities of 
autonomous persons); 2) non-maleficence (a group of norms avoiding the causation of 
harm);  3) beneficence (a group of norms for providing benefits and balancing 
benefits, risks and costs); and 4) justice (a group of norms for distributing benefits, 
risks and costs fairly). Historically, according to Beauchamp and Childress, 
beneficence and non-maleficence have been the dominant principles, whereas 
autonomy and justice have been neglected. Interestingly, the justice principle now 
appears to be a dominant principle within psychiatric services. 
  The four principles in the Beauchamp and Childress model are to be seen as 
prima facie, by which they mean that it is an obligation which should be fulfilled 
unless it conflicts on a particular occasion with an equal or stronger obligation. Two 
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other important components of their approach are the need to specify and balance 
principles. By ‘specification’ they mean the way we carefully indicate how a principle 
should be applied (as opposed to being an abstract principle). In doing this, we are 
exhorted to take into account efficiency, institutional rules, law and clientele 
acceptance. In other words, specification is about providing the context to the 
principle. For example, we might agree that clients should be given as much 
autonomy as possible but what that means will vary with the context. In an acute or 
crisis setting, autonomy promotion will mean something quite different from 
autonomy promotion in a rehabilitation context.  By ‘balancing’ they mean a process 
of deliberative judgement in which we consider the relative weights of norms. They 
see balancing as useful for individual cases and specification as more useful for policy 
development. In their account, they have a special place for the virtues and see 
principles and virtues as being complementary. Indeed, they try to operationalise their 
principles by linking them to corresponding virtues. Part 3  will argue that Beauchamp 
and Childress have, so to speak, put the cart before the horse9 and that it should be 
virtues that generate principles and not vice versa. 
 
Four Principles Approach in Practice 
               Whatever the theoretical understanding of the four principles, in clinical 
practice these intended understandings and usages have been changed in subtle but 
important ways as they would be for any principle-based theoretical approach. The 
clinical realities of service provision in psychiatric services, like much of healthcare, 
has found the four principles approach congenial because of its apparent simplicity, 
user friendliness and its ease of application to the messy world of clinical practice. 
However, in using the four principles, important caveats in the original and intended 
use have been forgotten, misunderstood, ignored or misapplied. The skeletal structure 
of the four principles remains as a mantra that needs to be considered, but the notion 
of prima facie, as opposed to absolute, rules is often blurred or misapplied in practice, 
which means principles are often seen in an absolute sense (which makes balancing 
them superfluous). This is particularly important when discussing the recovery 
approach where there is a strong emphasis on rules, such as offering clients choices, 
                                                 
9 Beauchamp and Childress (1994) are not the only ones to put the cart before the horse in the way I 
have mentioned. The Mental Health Commission (2001, p.36) in discussing the philosophical 
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empowerment and self advocacy10. If these rules are seen as examples of the 
autonomy principle, it is easy to see how absolute commitments to these rules could 
be dangerous. For example, seeing choices and empowerment in absolute terms for 
critically unwell clients could result in someone with suicidal thoughts leaving an 
inpatient unit because that was their choice and allowing them to exercise that choice 
could be seen as empowerment. 
  Specification is poorly articulated in practice and is one of the reasons for 
the development of the procedural ethos through the creation of service specific 
policy. While Beauchamp and Childress’ account of specification is somewhat vague, 
it is possible to see some clarity in their use of the term.  The lack of adequate 
specification has resulted in institutional needs determining which principles will 
dominate. The lack of specification has also meant a growth in informal procedures 
based only loosely on principles. In the case of psychiatric services, procedural justice 
is the major specified principle, whereas in non-governmental organisations, 
autonomy has become the major specified principle. 
  Another practical reality in using a principle-based approach is the way 
balancing has come to be used in practice. In practice, the principles have assumed a 
hierarchy. In non-governmental organisations and private practice this has meant 
autonomy has become dominant over other principles. For example, many non-
governmental organisations and private services, in order to keep the autonomy 
principle dominant, would transfer clients to psychiatric services if paternalism 
(through Mental Health Act legislation) were necessary. This means that while 
balancing of one principle against another may occur, the outcome is generally 
predictable. In psychiatric services justice is the dominant principle. This hierarchy 
finds its way into procedural policies and protocols that over time come to reflect this 
imbalance between the principles.  
  A further consequence of the dominance of the principle approach within 
psychiatric services is that professionals and clients do not always see themselves as 
applying the principle-based approach at all. The principle-based approach is often the 
invisible framework that is used to reach decisions (indeed much like the procedural 
                                                                                                                                            
foundations of recovery, assumes that there are only principle-based approaches, of the utilitarian and 
deontological variety. No mention is even made of virtues.  
10 While these activities are not, properly speaking, principles, they are related to the principle of 
autonomy. The Mental Health Commission (2001, p.25) lists a number of, what it terms, principles of 
recovery which are similar to the activities I have mentioned. 
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ethos itself).The reason for this is partly connected to the socialisation of 
professionals in the principle-based approach. Many of these professionals and clients 
might explicitly refer to another way of making decisions,  but the ability of the 
principle-based approach to lend itself to consensus-forming decisions tends to be 
given greater weight. 
  
Unintended Consequences of using the Four Principles 
                While principle-based approaches – like the four principles – do not see one 
principle as being more important than another in theory, practice would seem to be 
another matter. There are three unintended consequences of using a principle-based 
approach to make decisions. The first unintended consequence is that one  principle 
tends to become dominant within particular services. Justice has become dominant 
within psychiatric services, while autonomy has become dominant within non-
governmental organisations and private practice. The reason for this is that psychiatric 
services tend to deal with clients in a more severe state and hence the focus is on 
ensuring, ultimately, such clients do not pose a risk to society. A further reason is that 
overriding autonomy in society is generally broadly only permitted to prevent harm to 
others. Even J S Mill, one of the great architects of liberalism, did not consider self-
harm a sufficient warrant.11 While overriding autonomy is permitted within 
psychiatric services to prevent client self-harm, the focus by society on justice is 
reflected in the dominance of this principle within psychiatric services. Non-
governmental organisations and private practice transfer disturbed clients to 
psychiatric services, which allows them to continue with autonomy as the dominant 
principle. The second unintended consequence is that autonomy and beneficence, 
while they are non-dominant principles within psychiatric services, are the most 
frequently used, which is reflected in policies and protocols. The third unintended 
consequence is that because autonomy and beneficence are the most frequently used 
principles, the so-called autonomy-paternalism split is often seen as the central issue 
in psychiatric services. However, as I will show in Part 3, there are better ways of 
                                                 
11 JS Mill (1991) in On Liberty discusses the ‘harm principle’ in which it is seen as unwarranted to 
force someone to do something for his or her own good. The harm principle is inherently vague 
however as a concept: How do we define it? Surely there are paternalistic interventions that are 
justified, for example forcing people to wear seat belts or placing fluoride in water? Mills’ ultimate 
appeal to the harm principle makes it difficult to accept such paternalistic interventions  
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making decisions than relying on principles which see the autonomy-paternalism split 
as central.  
 The combination of liberal values and paternalism is, in its form of 
presentation, unique to psychiatric services. However, it is the legislative imperative 
which shows the uniqueness  of the application of principles within psychiatric 
services. The legislative imperative is concerned with the way in which procedures 
designed to deal with clients under the Mental Health Act legislation are applied to 
other clients not under the Act. Clients under the Act tend to be in a crisis state and 
hence their mental disorder tends to be severe. 
  As the dominant principle it is the factor of procedural justice that requires 
more discussion within psychiatric services.  
 
Procedural Justice 
                There are many models of justice12. One of the problems with the principle 
of justice, unlike the other principles, is that it tends to take on a political stamp and 
discussions often move away from particular clients to questions of political justice at 
a more abstract level13. While issues connected to distributive and reparative justice 
are important and play a role in psychiatric services, I would argue that it is 
procedural justice which is the most important way of understanding justice within 
psychiatric services. 
  Procedural justice concerns the fairness of the processes by which decisions 
are made. Fair treatment is often identified with those procedures that generate 
relevant, unbiased, accurate and consistent, reliable and valid information.  
  Procedures are fair if they are consistently applied. Firstly, like cases should 
receive like treatment14. Additionally, any distinctions should reflect genuine aspects 
of personal identity rather than extraneous features of the differentiating mechanism 
itself. Secondly, those carrying out the procedure should be impartial and neutral. 
Thirdly, those directly affected should have a say in the process (in a participative 
sense). This is particularly important for weaker parties whose voice may go unheard. 
Finally, the process needs to be transparent and decisions need to be reached through 
open procedures that are visible and not secret. 
                                                 
12 There is an extensive literature connected to procedural justice. However, mention will be made of 
Bone (2003) who indicates the difficulties of using contractarian theories of procedural fairness. 
13 Similar problems will be evident in our discussion of the ‘psychiatric community’ in Chapter 8 
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  Procedural justice is enormously important for all procedures but 
particularly for that relatively small number of clients under the Mental Health Act. 
Unfortunately, what is procedural justice of a participative variety for clients under 
the Act, becomes something quite different when applied to the vast majority of 
clients who are not under the Act. There is evidence that procedures set up to work for 
clients under the Act are being applied to all clients just in case. ‘Just in case’ use of 
procedures is very widespread, from inappropriate use of holding orders to 
inappropriate use of  threatened community treatment orders. For example, section 
111 of the Mental Health Act (known as the nurses’ holding power) has often 
inappropriately been prescribed in the case notes ‘just in case’ clients attempt to leave. 
In these cases, clients not meeting the threshold for the application of the Act are 
informed that the Act will be used if behaviours do not change or if there is a 
worsening in the client’s presentation. It could be argued that this is a perversion of 
procedural justice and that it represents a lack of justice to the large majority of clients 
not under the Act.   
  While justice  may be the dominant principle in psychiatric services, using 
principle-based approaches as the main vehicle for understanding recovery from 
mental illness is not helpful. Principle-based approaches have been widely critiqued, 
but in connection with recovery from mental illness in psychiatric services, the fact 
that it provides the underpinnings to the procedural ethos makes it particularly 
suspect. 
  Principle-based approaches have helped to create a combative approach to 
understanding differences between procedures, based on the dominance of autonomy 
within non-governmental organisations and private practice and procedures, based on 
the dominance of  justice within psychiatric services. This has tended to entrench 
views and polarise positions along the autonomy-paternalism continuum and prevent 
the development of any sense of a common community. This is also because of the 
frequency with which the autonomy and beneficence principles are used for making 
procedures within psychiatric services, thus, once again emphasising the autonomy-
paternalism split.  As will be shown in Chapter 8, this lack of a common sense of 
community within the psychiatric and other mental health services is particularly 
problematic. Additionally, the principle-based approach has also contributed to the 
                                                                                                                                            
14 Interestingly, Aristotle thought it equally important that unlike cases be treated in an unlike manner. 
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development of eclecticism within psychiatric services through the requirements of 
procedural justice for all health domains. That is, using the principle-based approach 
has meant, as a matter of justice, that health domains such as the biological, 
psychological and self-help approaches should all be seen as equally important for all 
occurrences along the illness-health continuum.  
 
Applying the Justice Principle to Mental Disorder 
                The principles of justice, beneficence and autonomy, through the 
development of various procedures, have been applied to mental disorder (about 
which some consensus can be formed as discussed in Chapter 3) in modern 
psychiatric services. These  principles can often be in conflict but when they are, 
invariably it is procedural justice that appears to be dominant within psychiatric 
services. The principles of autonomy and beneficence are the most widely used 
principles within psychiatric services. Justice, as a principle, is more complicated in 
the way in which it is applied. The legislative imperative has meant that the interests 
of the broader community are seen as being (on occasions) more important than the 
client’s interests. However, perhaps the most significant sense in which justice as a 
principle is seen in psychiatric services is via the procedural eclecticism which wants 
to do justice to all the various intervention modalities, including client self-help, that 
can assist with mental illness. It is to this misapplication of the justice principle, as I 
see it, that we now turn. 
 
Section Three: Eclecticism 
                The procedural ethos that has developed within psychiatric services is 
underpinned by a particular understanding of eclecticism. That eclecticism is based on 
the biopsychosocial model and the psychiatric classification system. 
  The eclecticism that has come to characterise psychiatric services is 
essentially due to a misguided belief that all the various health domains are equal and 
thus entitled, through the principle of justice, to be given equal consideration.  
  As discussed in Chapter 2, the form of eclecticism that has developed in 
psychiatric services is one that provides a procedure for facilitating recovery, based 
upon symptoms and functioning.  As already indicated, it is unhelpful to have an 
eclectic approach to facilitating recovery. The reason that eclecticism can be 
unhelpful in psychiatric services is that eclecticism has tended to be based on the 
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biopsychosocial model15. This model has been briefly mentioned earlier but here I 
will provide a fuller account since it can be easily understood and described. 
  The biopsychosocial model developed in psychiatric services as a response 
to the lack of agreement within those services towards a particular approach. As was 
indicated in Chapter 1, during the clinical-expert ethos there were differing views 
between biologically and psychologically inclined experts as to the best way of 
dealing with psychiatric disorders. When it became evident that purist approaches 
from either a biological or psychological perspective were inadequate in treating 
mental disorder considered in isolation, greater attention was focused on other 
approaches.   
  The biopsychosocial model proposed that there were a number of domains 
that needed to be considered when addressing mental disorder: the biological, the 
psychological and the social. Arguably, the need to do justice to the other health 
domains was a strong motivator for those professionals committed to eclecticism. One 
of the key factors, as discussed by Ghaemi (2002), was the relationship between these 
domains. That is, they were to be seen as equally important. The other key component 
of the biopsychosocial model was that it was concerned with experts, not with the 
client helping himself or herself. In other words, it was concerned with an eclectic 
model of professional intervention. 
  However, it is important to note that recent attempts by psychiatric services 
to become recovery focused (in line with the Ministry of Health’s National Mental 
Health Plan) have meant that client perspectives have been included, but in an eclectic 
manner. That is, the biopsychosocial model has been widened to include the client’s 
perspective as another equal health domain.  
  The notion of the client’s perspective is one which needs some clarification. 
Psychiatric services, with their focus upon mental disorder, have always wanted the 
client’s perspective but for the purposes of matching symptoms to the criteria of 
various mental disorders. This sense of a client’s perspective needs to be contrasted 
with the notion of the client’s view of their situation and disorder beyond the simple 
                                                 
15 Eclecticism within psychiatric services came to prominence in particular through the work of  Meyer 
(1948) which propounded a theoretical biopsychosocial approach, and through the work of  Engel 
(1978) in which the model was applied. Eclecticism has therefore become linked with the 
biopsychosocial model. However, there are other possible approaches to eclecticism. The approach I 
am using here is one that sees client-determined and professionally determined approaches to fostering 
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requirements of matching a categorical classification system. Such a broader sense of 
client perspective includes a client view on ‘symptoms’ and ‘functioning’ as we saw 
in Chapter 2. 
  The psychiatric classification systems are concerned with describing the 
criteria for a number of discrete mental disorders. The history of the classification 
systems16 coincides with the emergence of the biopsychosocial model with its eclectic 
assumptions. The classification systems, while agnostic about the causes of mental 
disorder, are essentially eclectic in that they do not stipulate which approach should 
be used to facilitate recovery. Indeed, the classificatory systems tend to assume a 
stress-vulnerability perspective17 on the causes of mental disorder that is essentially 
agnostic about causes and relies on a multifactorial approach based on several health 
domains. The eclecticism of the main tools of psychiatric services tends to mean that 
there can be a level of consensus about the problems the client has, once the mental 
disorder has been identified. However, that consensus has come at a cost. That cost is 
a progressive lessening of respect for decision-making which is not based on eclectic 
procedures. 
 
Summary      
              This chapter has presented an argument that a procedural ethos is currently 
the dominant spirit and way of working in psychiatric services, or, in other words, the 
de facto philosophy of psychiatric services. That procedural ethos is characterised by 
a reliance on rules activated through numerous protocols, standards, guidelines and 
policies. There is a distinction between procedures in a localised, specific sense and a 
procedural ethos, and specific procedures will always be required. It was argued that 
the procedural ethos was implicated in all activities within psychiatric services.  
A case was made that, in psychiatric services, rules had taken a certain form 
because of the legislative imperative and the principle of justice had become 
dominant, though the principles of autonomy and beneficence were the most widely 
                                                                                                                                            
recovery as equally important, though in different ways. Professionally determined approaches can be 
equated to the biopsychosocial approach.  
16 The International Classification of Diseases (ICD) first included mental and behavioural diseases in 
1938. The current ICD –10 was published in 1992. The first Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (DSM) was published in 1954 and the current DSM IV in 1994. 
17 The stress-vulnerability approach was originally presented in Zubin and Springs (1977) paper on 
schizophrenia. In this model everyone has a number of vulnerabilities, which, when combined with 
stresses can lead to  mental disorder. 
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used principles underpinning procedures. Reference to the four principles approach 
showed that there was a distinction between the theoretical and practical applications 
of principle-based approaches. This distinction between the practical and theoretical 
understanding of a theory is important because the procedural ethos is a practical 
reality and hence the importance of the practical way a theory is used. 
  It was shown that underpinning the procedural ethos was a particular 
understanding of eclecticism, determined by the biopsychosocial model and the 
psychiatric classification systems that relied particularly on the justice principle.     
  The next chapter will present some practical examples of the problem with 
the procedural ethos within psychiatric services.  
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 CHAPTER 5 
The Problem with the Procedural Ethos          
There are problems with adopting the procedural ethos if we want to assist 
clients to recover from their mental illness. There are conceptual difficulties – as we 
have seen – with the focus by psychiatric services upon mental disorder which have 
influenced the way in which psychiatric services have adopted an eclectic approach to 
fostering recovery as opposed to a pluralistic approach. Quite apart from these 
conceptual difficulties ( which have been addressed in earlier chapters) there is a 
range of practical problems with the procedural ethos which make it unsuitable as a de 
facto philosophy of psychiatric services. It is these practical shortcomings which this 
chapter will address. 
               The following sections will all focus upon the practical problems involved in 
having a procedural ethos in psychiatric services for clients, professionals, psychiatric 
services themselves and the wider society. Section One will focus on clients of 
psychiatric services. Section Two will focus on psychiatric professionals. Section 
Three will consider the difficulties for psychiatric services themselves with the 
adoption of a procedural ethos. Section Four will consider the problems for the wider 
society. Finally, Section Five will consider general problems with the adoption of a 
procedural ethos. The focus on these five areas will show how profound the impact of 
the procedural ethos has been and they also represent the components of any 
pluralistic approach to understanding psychiatric services. Clients and psychiatric 
professionals are the groups most affected in the adoption of a procedural ethos, so 
the primary focus will be on these groups. 
 
Section One: Effects of the Procedural Ethos on Clients of Psychiatric Services 
               The aim of this section is to show the effects of the  procedural ethos on the 
clients of psychiatric services. These effects will be briefly listed before working 
systematically through them one by one. While there are a number of factors that 
affect clients of psychiatric services in response to a procedural ethos, fundamentally 
clients tend to assume less responsibility than is necessary for recovery  which can, in 
turn, affect many other factors. One of these factors is trust, which is potentially 
jeopardised through the reliance on procedures rather than on therapeutic 
relationships, since procedures tend to focus on minimal expectations rather than 
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ideals. Additionally, there is the problem of admission to and discharge from 
psychiatric services, which is also affected by a procedural ethos. Also a procedural 
ethos tends to result in the client’s voice being largely ignored because those working 
in psychiatric services create most procedures. Finally, the principles of justice and 
autonomy ( which underpin the procedural ethos in, respectively, psychiatric and 
other  mental health services) can be in conflict, both between psychiatric and other 
mental health services and within psychiatric services. 
               As previously shown, recovery involves clients assuming increasing levels 
of responsibility for their own health. A procedural ethos tends to limit the amount of 
responsibility clients can either exercise or adopt. The procedural ethos does this by 
encouraging and rewarding externalised decision-making. By externalised decision-
making is meant that decisions are based on guidelines, recommended best practice, 
policy, protocols and evidence-based research. This is not to critique such methods of 
reaching decisions in themselves, only the uncritical reliance on them for making 
decisions. During the clinical-expert ethos, the responsibility for the recovery of the 
client lay with the expert. The procedural ethos has replaced this and, as a 
consequence, responsibility for the recovery of the client has shifted in large part to 
the procedures (in whatever form) currently in place within the service. By 
externalising decision-making in this way, the internalised responsibility that clients 
have for their own health is seemingly lessened.  The problem is that while 
procedures can help a client recover, particularly in the early stages of an illness when 
the client is critically unwell, they can undermine a client’s recovery by inhibiting or 
preventing the client from making decisions for themselves in areas which cannot be 
proceduralised easily. This occurs particularly with regard to personal issues, for 
example, the types of relationships the client wants with people, how to pick the right 
moment to re-enter the workforce and whether to join a support group. These sorts of 
decisions are hard to proceduralise. The danger is that a focus for recovery becomes 
those things which can be proceduralised easily, such as the order of using different 
types of medication, assessment of symptoms and the like, while the kinds of things 
that cannot be proceduralised (or at least not easily) are seen as less important. 
Recovery involves decisions in all these areas, both the easily and non-easily 
proceduralised. Even were good procedures to exist for these more personal issues, 
the danger might be that clients would come to rely upon them in an externalised 
sense and this would also undermine their assumption of responsibility.     
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               Part of the problem is one of ownership. If clients base decisions on 
procedures that they have not created, they simply have no sense of ownership of 
them and therefore take little responsibility for using them.  Those who work for 
psychiatric services have created most of the procedures within psychiatric services. 
Consequently, it is these psychiatric professionals who have the sense of ownership 
for these procedures, not the clients.  Even when clients (or previous clients) have 
created procedures, other clients following them slavishly are still not assuming 
responsibility themselves. Copeland (1997) provides a detailed set of procedures for 
clients to identify their own healthy behaviours, early warning signs and wellness 
recovery plans, including crisis plans. The crisis plan for this programme is a form of 
advance directive indicating what the client wants for their care if they become ill in 
the future. While it is possible for clients to take responsibility for decisions based on 
external procedures, when those procedures exist within the context of a procedural 
ethos this becomes very difficult. The reason for this, as we saw in the last chapter, is 
that a procedural ethos is all encompassing, affecting both formal and informal 
procedures. In the case of procedures for advance directives, it is particularly difficult 
for clients to take responsibility, since there are many formal and informal procedures 
external to the client. Following a set procedure for writing an advance directive may 
have all the appearance and little of the substance of an advance directive18. From my 
own experience as a psychiatric professional, an example of this would be a client 
who is currently competent, who makes decisions based on advanced directive 
procedures and takes responsibility for their own future care if they become ill but 
who can not access the advance directives paperwork without professional oversight. I 
will leave aside problematic elements with the advance directive in psychiatry per 
se19. Instead, as currently practised, implementing an advanced directive procedure 
mostly becomes an exercise in deciding who should fill out forms. In many services, 
these advance directives need to be countersigned by the client’s psychiatrist and key 
worker whether formally or informally. Part of the recovery journey for clients is to 
take more responsibility for their own health, though how much responsibility will 
vary from person to person. Some clients may always need some input from 
psychiatric professionals, some will not. In the case of procedures connected to 
                                                 
18 See Mental Health Commission (2002)  for information on how the advance directive is meant to be 
used.  
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advance directives, it is likely to be the psychiatrist and key worker who have the 
sense of ownership and hence responsibility connected to the advance directive, rather 
than the client. My overall point here is not to critique the use of advance directives 
but to show how easily the procedural ethos can subvert a therapeutic objective.  The 
advance directive is not necessarily bad, but its ability to assist the client is lessened 
by the way it is bureaucratised. 
               Trust is also potentially jeopardised by a procedural ethos.  Clients need to 
trust that psychiatric professionals have their best interests at heart when they lessen 
their responsibility to assist a client to recover. As O’Neill (2002) has  illustrated in 
her Kantian argument for the centrality of trust in healthcare over autonomy, in 
gaining increased autonomy we have lost some of the necessary trust that human 
agencies need in order to survive. This is because the understanding of autonomy has 
focused on the acquisition of rights as its prime purpose. This has undermined trust 
through two main outcomes. Firstly, clients have become focused on their rights over 
their responsibilities. This has contributed to the procedural ethos, as rights were 
translated into policy, protocol and legislation documents. The second outcome has 
been that psychiatric services and professionals have become more risk averse. As the 
list of client rights expanded, there was a corresponding professional and 
administrative industry designed to make sure professionals and services were not 
deemed negligent in ensuring those rights were provided. O’Neill (2002) believes that 
an understanding of autonomy entailing human obligation is the best way of ensuring 
trust reasserts its place in healthcare. In psychiatric services, trust is a vital component 
of the relationship between the psychiatric professional and the client. The reliance on 
procedures, as opposed to other considerations (such as personal or professional 
virtues) does potentially undermine this since it tends to represent an understanding of 
autonomy without the entailment of obligations. This development has occurred 
because, in focusing on the proceduralisation of rights, the corresponding 
responsibilities, whether of clients or professionals, have been somewhat overlooked. 
Obligations are essential for client recovery in mental health: clients need to assume a 
number of responsibilities along the recovery journey and professionals need to be 
able to trust that clients will indeed assume those responsibilities. For their part, 
clients need to be able to trust that professionals have their best interests at heart and 
                                                                                                                                            
19 Savulescu  and Dickenson  (1998) provide a detailed discussion of the ethical issues involved in 
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that when there is a lessening of responsibility by professionals this still contributes to 
the client’s recovery journey.  This trust is based on a certain type of relationship, 
namely one characterised by mutual respect and regard. If either client or professional 
lacks integrity and honesty in their dealings with each other, trust will be jeopardised. 
Clients will cease to see the psychiatric professional as a therapeutic agent and instead 
view them suspiciously as some kind of social control agent, monitoring their mental 
state in order to apply the Mental Health Act if necessary. Professionals for their part 
will view clients suspiciously as people who could complain about their care and, in 
short, create difficulties for them.   Where trust is low, suspicion tends to be high.  
Currently, the procedural ethos has generated a high degree of suspicion that is 
therapeutically unhelpful. 
               Procedures create a minimal set of expectations around our conduct with 
others. This is enormously helpful when we are new to something and struggling to 
make sense of it.  The problem is when we see the minimum as not only necessary but 
also sufficient. In seeing the minimum as sufficient, we lessen the possibility of 
striving for ideals and for ‘pushing the limits’. Clients who are recovering from 
mental illness need, at some level, to strive for the ideal of health. Part of our ability 
to strive for ideals is the ability to go beyond minimum standards of conduct.  With 
the reification of procedures in the procedural ethos, ‘pushing the limits’ becomes 
unnecessary since the standards of the procedure can be met by minimal endeavour. 
This is a significant problem for recovery from mental illness. Part Three will discuss 
how this problem can  be addressed. 
              Another problematical issue is that it has become more difficult to be 
admitted to psychiatric services. This is partly because of resources but also because 
psychiatric services are meant to focus upon the severely ill. The threshold for 
admission into the service (both inpatient and community) has been raised. The result 
of this tendency is that when people are admitted they are quite unwell (often 
critically unwell) and need considerable input from psychiatric services. In order to 
gain admission, clients need to meet quite stringent entry criteria. These criteria are 
concerned with having a serious mental disorder which can be treated. An initial 
interview would be used to see if a prospective client met those entry criteria using a 
set of clear admission criteria with procedures in place for ensuring prompt treatment 
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for those needing it. This tends to mean that psychiatric professionals assume 
considerable responsibility for the early phase of a client’s recovery. Once having 
gained admission into the psychiatric services, there are a number of procedures in 
place for determining the journey towards recovery. It is probably accurate to say that 
inpatient facilities have more procedures in place than community facilities, but both 
work with a procedural ethos. The problem here is not with procedures for admission, 
but with the uncritical acceptance of rigid procedures which prevent treatment for 
those not currently meeting entry criteria but who will, if untreated, go on to develop 
a serious mental illness which requires admission. There is evidence20 that early 
intervention can prevent illness deterioration and speed up recovery once unwell. 
Unfortunately, although most psychiatric expertise is tied up within psychiatric 
services, such expertise cannot (generally) get involved in early intervention since this 
is seen as a responsibility of primary services. This is not simply a matter of wrong 
procedures, since every procedure will have criteria and cut off thresholds. The 
problem is the inability to use any decision-making approach not based on 
procedures. 
               While procedures for admission can be problematic, of greater concern is the 
discharge of clients in a timely and therapeutic manner from the service. There is a 
tendency for psychiatric services to keep clients for too long. This makes it difficult 
for clients to assume the necessary levels of responsibility for their own recovery 
since a certain degree of dependency is created. One of the central features of failing 
to discharge clients in a timely manner is the creation of dependency in the client.  
Dependency can be therapeutic at a certain stage of recovery but it can undermine the 
recovery journey if it is allowed to continue beyond the stage at which it is needed.  
Sustained dependency in healthcare, as opposed to a temporary dependency, is nearly 
always untherapeutic21. By sustained dependency is meant dependency which 
continues for a prolonged period of time and in which the client starts to recover 
abilities and competencies lost while they were more critically unwell but where 
responsibility for the client’s well being still lies with the professional. Temporary 
dependency is dependency for a short period while the client is more critically or 
                                                 
20 There is considerable literature and research to support the need for early intervention, particularly 
with psychosis. Jackson, Edwards, Hulbert and McGorry (1999) pull together much of this research in 
a readable and accessible form. 
21 The merits of temporary dependency in healthcare are defended by Campbell (1991), who thinks 
autonomy has been overemphasised.  
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acutely unwell. There are a number of reasons for a client remaining longer than they 
should within services. For example, there might be no one for professionals to refer 
on to, professionals might like the client, there might be a lack of appropriate 
accommodation for discharge from inpatient facilities, the professional’s desire  for 
control of the client, the client’s desire in some cases for someone to take control and 
responsibility etc. The effect of all these factors is usually dependency. This 
dependency simply means that the client’s current level of recovery is held in place 
longer than it should be. The abilities and competencies they could acquire if 
discharged continue to be exercised by psychiatric services. For example, the client 
may be able to return to full time work but employers are reluctant to employ 
someone still receiving psychiatric service input. There are many other examples. 
This inability to discharge clients at the appropriate point in their recovery, whatever 
the nominal reason (see above), is due to the way in which the procedural ethos 
operates. The problem is not with the discharge procedures per se, though I think 
objectively considered there are too many, but with the uncritical reliance upon them 
for making decisions. Since psychiatric services will often be held responsible if 
something goes wrong, even for clients discharged from the service, there is a 
tendency not to discharge. The problem is that, currently, there are few options for 
discharge that count as appropriate follow up, other than referral to General 
Practitioners. The result is a bottleneck effect as large numbers of clients ready for 
discharge ‘clog’ up the system. Underlying this fear of discharge is, one suspects, the 
belief that the client will not carry responsibility should something go wrong, but that 
it will be the psychiatric service which discharged them which is held responsible. 
Also, there is a  misplaced understanding of the justice owed the community. Justice 
in this sense is for ensuring that someone ‘problematically risky’ or simply potentially 
problematic is not discharged unsupervised into the community. This is a misplaced 
sense of justice, however, since most psychiatric clients pose no increased risk (above 
the general population level) of harm to the community22.    
  A procedural ethos can lead to the ‘client’s voice’ being disregarded and 
ignored. Although there has been a serious attempt to increase the sense of hearing the 
‘client’s voice’ in the past decade or so it is still tokenistic rather than substantive. It 
                                                 
22 Ministry of Health (2003) contains interesting information on the connection between homicide and 
mental illness in New Zealand in the past few decades, showing that the mentally ill are generally no 
more likely than  members of the general public to commit homicides. 
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has tended to take the form of proceduralising the client’s voice, as seen in the last 
chapter. In this regard, it is doubtful that employing people in roles such as consumer 
consultants will have much effect on increasing the sense of the ‘client’s voice’ unless 
they are funded separately and have considerable skills in procedural work. Most of 
the procedures in psychiatric services have been created by those employed by the 
service or the funders of the service. The result is that the procedural ethos reflects the 
values of providers and funders rather than the recipients of care. Other areas of 
healthcare also share this problem, but, in some cases, have the advantage of a skilled 
and visible advocacy group that is well funded.  Also, a client might experience a 
procedural ethos as being bureaucratic and rule bound rather than humanistic and 
responsive if their voice is not heard. 
 It might be thought that the procedural ethos in the non-governmental 
organisations and private sector, with their emphasis upon autonomy, would be more 
client-centred and hence attentive to the client’s voice. The reality is, as mentioned 
earlier, that most procedures are created by those employed by such services. 
However, (in non-governmental organisations) it could be argued, services have been 
more successful in promoting the view that client-centred equates with procedures 
which facilitate and promote self determination based on the autonomy principle. In 
practice also, there is a tendency to transfer to the public system clients requiring 
paternalistic interventions or the overriding of personal autonomy, which permits such 
non-governmental organisations and private services to maintain a focus upon self 
determination. Self determination and being client-centred are not the same thing: it 
could be argued that there are occasions when being client-centred means accepting 
paternalism or the overriding of personal autonomy, when it is justified.   
The client can sometimes be caught in the middle of differing forms of the 
procedural ethos, between the psychiatric and other mental health services. However, 
as already indicated, when justice and the autonomy principles come into conflict 
directly there tends to be a reliance on the justice principle. This occurs internally 
within public psychiatric services when these principles come into conflict and 
likewise it tends to occur when psychiatric and other mental health services come into 
conflict.  The result for the client can often take the form of any previous work in 
those other mental health services being ignored or undermined as new procedures 
(connected to justice) are implemented within the  psychiatric services. The absence 
of a consistent guiding principle behind the procedural ethos can therefore undermine 
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its practical usefulness. It would be helpful if there were one ethos that connected all 
the various psychiatric and other mental health services consistently.  
 
Section Two: Effects of the Procedural Ethos on Psychiatric Professionals 
               The aim of this section is to show the effects of the procedural ethos upon 
psychiatric professionals. Psychiatric professionals are not, however, an homogenous 
group: psychiatrists, psychologists, psychiatric nurses, occupational therapists, social 
workers and psychotherapists have slightly differing needs and responses to the 
procedural ethos, but there are a number of problematic issues that they share. Later, 
there will be brief discussion of the particular problematic aspects for psychiatrists 
and psychiatric nurses, who are the professionals most closely linked to the Mental 
Health Act. 
               The common problematic aspects are connected to a lack of reflective 
practice and the growth of professional expertise.  There are difficulties of being able 
to trust clients in terms of responsibility when a procedural ethos exists and the danger 
of psychiatric professionals (particularly psychiatrists and nurses) becoming the 
enforcers of various procedures. Additionally, there are problems with paperwork and 
form filling within a procedural ethos. Finally, there are the difficulties of interacting 
with services which have a procedural ethos, dominated by autonomy, from the 
perspective of the public psychiatric services.  I will once again work through these 
issues one by one.  
   A procedural ethos tends to reinforce externalised decision-making, as 
discussed already. A reliance on external means of reaching decisions (such as 
guidelines, protocols and the like) has implications for how seriously we view 
internalised models which emphasise reflection. Reflective practice23 has generated a 
considerable literature in the last decade that is concerned with the individual 
critically thinking through issues for themselves, based on their own practice. There 
are a number of different models of reflective practice but the work of Schon (1983) 
has been particularly influential. Schon (1983) distinguishes between ‘reflection in 
action’ and ‘reflection on action’. Reflection in action is the kind of immediate 
thinking about a situation that arises in the course of practice. It relies on the 
practitioner identifying patterns from previous encounters and also noticing any small 
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changes and doing it all quickly and on the spot. Reflection on action is subsequent, 
retrospective reflection on the action. To do this well in either way requires 
considerable expertise and experience. This is a continuum well expressed in the 
nursing literature (though applicable to other disciplines) in the work of Benner 
(1984). She differentiated between four levels of expertise in clinical practice: novice 
– someone who is new to a clinical area and who needs rules and regulations to follow 
in order to understand how things are done in that environment; proficient – someone 
who has an understanding of the area but still needs to follow rules and regulations 
quite carefully; competent – someone who has mastered the rules and regulations and 
can respond to new situations provided they are relatively predictable; and finally the 
expert – someone who can dispense with some rules and regulations in order to 
immediately home in on the clinically significant factors. The expert is also able to 
both recognise previous patterns in terms of the presentation but also respond to novel 
situations even when the presentations are non-predictable and unusual. To become an 
expert in this sense involves considerable reflection since following predetermined 
procedures will not enable a creative response to a new situation. There is, in 
procedures, a rigidity that can entrap individuals and lessen the possibility of a 
spontaneous response. In a procedural ethos, where procedures are reified, this effect 
tends to be emphasised24. 
 All services have a range of expertise in the various professional groups. I 
would contend that the procedural ethos gets in the way of the growth of expertise. It 
does this by its reliance on external, as opposed to internalised, decision-making25. 
While there is expertise, it occurs in spite of, rather than because of, the procedural 
ethos. Over time, it is likely the procedural ethos will lead to increased numbers in the 
earlier stages of professional development (novice, proficient and competent). The 
implications are less expertise and more clinicians in the earlier stages of professional 
development that need rules and procedures to understand their environment. The 
result is yet more procedures and reliance on procedures and hence a reinforcement of 
                                                                                                                                            
23 For example:  Kember ( 2001), Cooney (1999)  and  Graham (2000) all provide useful information 
and evidence for the usefulness of reflective practice.  
24 Carson (1997) has described what he calls the ‘poverty of proceduralism’ by which he means that in 
healthcare it is the relationships between people, strengthened by reflection which is vital and that this 
sensitivity cannot be captured by procedures. 
25 There are connections between external and internal decision-making and the psychological notions 
of internal and external locus of control. Generally, as individuals become more autonomous they tend 
to desire an increased internal locus of control. 
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the procedural ethos.  Schon (1983) thought that knowledge could be differentiated 
between high and low or ‘high ground’ and ‘swampy ground’. Some knowledge was 
not in dispute and more tangible, such as scientific laws, whereas ‘professional’ 
knowledge  (in health, education or architecture for example) relied on embedded 
knowledge which had an intuitive quality hard to pin down in definitive statements26. 
That professional knowledge still involves adherence to procedures but that adherence 
in itself is insufficient and hence there is also reliance upon internalised reflection.   
 Professionals need to trust that clients will assume responsibilities if they, as 
professionals, let go of them.  Professionals in the earlier stages of development are 
more likely to follow procedures rather than take ‘the risk’ of lessening their 
responsibility. This is because in a risk- averse climate it is the removal of particular 
responsibilities rather than their continuance that may lead to legal action or 
disciplinary action. In a service which was dominated by an ethos characterised by a 
focus upon the recovery of the client, legal action and disciplinary action would be 
more concerned with the inappropriate continuance of professional responsibility 
getting in the way of clients’ assuming responsibilities necessary for their recovery. 
The current procedural ethos, for example, militates against appropriate early 
discharge by psychiatric professionals ‘hanging on’ to clients just in case they relapse, 
once again emphasising continued professional responsibility over its removal.   
  Connected to the concepts of trust and responsibility is the concept of risk.  
In an increasingly litigious society, there is a tendency for professionals to practice 
defensively. Risk comes in different forms. Classically, in psychiatric practice, risk to 
self (which is restricted to include risk of  suicide and significant vulnerability) are 
contrasted with risk to others. These are, however, only some of the risks to clients 
and others as a possible consequence of mental illness27. Risk to self or others is seen 
as providing a basis for citing the Mental Health Act on the assumption that someone 
is no longer competent28. As already discussed, because of the ‘legislative 
                                                 
26 Benner and Tanner (1987) have an interesting analysis on the way expert nurses use intuition to 
improve their practice. 
27 Risk to self and others is a technical understanding of risk based on the Mental Health Act. 
28 Buchanan and Brock (1989)  argue that two factors need to be considered when deciding for others: 
1) setting and accurately applying standards of competency to choose and decide; and 2) achieving a 
balance between (i) protecting and promoting the patient’s well-being, (ii) protecting and promoting 
the patient’s entitlements to and interest in exercising self determining choices, and (iii) protecting 
others who could be harmed by patient’s exercising of harm-causing choices. This formulation, while 
commendable, is not without problems. There remains the problem of identifying a harm and who 
should be allowed to decide these things. Roth et al. (1977) indicates there are five tests of competency: 
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imperative,’ procedures applicable to a small group of clients under the Mental Health 
Act are transferred to all clients of psychiatric services. So it is with regard to risk 
which is arguably the basis of the Mental Health Act. All other types of risks are seen 
as unimportant. Those other risks include: risk to the client of dependency, risk of the 
lack of recovery through professionals not letting go of responsibilities, risk of side 
effects of treatments, etc. These risks are more real for most clients most of the time 
than the iconic notion of risk to self and risk to others.  
  Psychiatrists and nurses have particular responsibilities for clients under the 
Mental Health Act. This is because two roles created in the 1992 mental health 
legislation tend to be occupied by these professional groups. The two roles are: 
responsible clinician29 and duly authorised officer. All clients under the Act need to 
have a responsible clinician. The Act specifies that this must be either a medical 
practitioner or another suitably qualified and competent professional. In practice, this 
means psychiatrists and very occasionally nurses or psychologists occupy this role. 
The role is concerned with co-ordinating and planning care for those under the Act. 
The role of duly authorised officer is almost always occupied by a senior mental 
health nurse. This role is meant to interface with the public, in terms of giving advice 
about the Mental Health Act and also provide an initial reference point for placing 
people under the Act. Very strict procedures are in place for ensuring procedural 
justice for clients needing the intervention of staff occupying these two roles. While 
these roles are meant to assist therapeutically, there is a perception that they are there 
to interpret and enforce the Mental Health Act. While the Act applies to relatively 
small numbers of clients at any one time, potentially any client can (if they meet the 
criteria) be placed under the Act. While it is true that potentially any member of the 
public can be placed under the Act, it is practically and conceptually easier to do this 
for someone currently already in the service as a client. The procedural ethos around 
justice within psychiatric services, because of the role of these two professionals, has 
been transferred onto all clients within the service. This creates problems for these 
professionals of being perceived as appendages of the justice system rather than as 
therapeutic agents. It could be argued that the strictures of the procedural ethos from 
the criminal justice system have been applied to clients under the Act within 
                                                                                                                                            
1) evidencing a choice, 2) reasonable outcome of choice, 3) choice based on rational reasons, 4) ability 
to understand, and 5) actual understanding. 
29 See Ministry of Health (2002) for more information on this role. 
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psychiatric services and then to all clients of psychiatric services respectively in a 
descending manner.  
 The procedural ethos has tended to create many forms and documents that 
need to be completed. This has been a particular problem for clinicians who see their 
primary role as interacting with clients rather than filling out forms. There are 
different types of form filling and note keeping: i) Forms designed to justify the role 
of the professional; ii) Forms designed to monitor and assess the mental state of 
clients; iii) Forms designed to account for how professionals spend their time; and so 
on. Forms (as in i) that have no intrinsic purpose other than justifying the existence of 
a professional are hard to defend. An example might be clinical notes, saying the 
same thing, from different professionals who all attended the same case conference. 
Note-writing which gives no information about the client but documents what the 
professional has done in great detail could also be seen in this light. Forms and note-
writing which are concerned with the client’s mental state are more central to the 
business of psychiatric services, provided once again these are not duplicated 
assessments by different professional groups. Forms  are vital to the service but 
generally irrelevant to the individual client. Some balance in how much time 
professionals spend accounting for their time needs to be struck with the time spent 
actually seeing clients. Again, the problem is not the existence of paperwork but the 
inability to use decision-making which is not centred on procedures, in this case 
procedures around filling out forms.  
  The procedural ethos underpinned by the justice principle in the public 
psychiatric services must interact with the procedural ethos underpinned by the 
autonomy principle in the non-governmental organisations and private services (the 
‘other mental health services’). The nature of this relationship is hard to fathom. It is 
the case that the non-governmental organisations and private services frequently use 
psychiatric services when clients they are seeing become unwell or relapse. This is 
understandable since psychiatric services are where the most extensive inpatient 
facilities are and most of the staff who are able to implement and administer the 
Mental Health Act.  Unfortunately, these services (non-governmental and private) 
view paternalism as being a necessary evil. These views (which are anecdotally quite 
widespread though not empirically tested) affect psychiatric professionals working in 
psychiatric services quite deeply. After all, the services they offer are viewed as 
unethical  by some practitioners and clients in those other services. The paradox is 
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that often no differentiation occurs between the overriding of autonomy through 
potential risk to others (where justice is the dominant principle) and paternalism 
through risk to self (where autonomy and beneficence are the dominant principles). 
There seems to be a greater acceptance of paternalism than of the overriding of 
autonomy for the sake of justice. There is, then, effectively a degree of competition 
between the autonomy-based services and the justice-based service.  This competition 
seems to turn on the conflict between the interests of the client (in the sense of self 
determination) and the wider interests of society. As indicated already, when justice 
and autonomy are directly in conflict, it tends to be justice which is dominant. This 
applies between non-governmental and private services and the public psychiatric 
services. This conflict is nearly always unhelpful. Rather than seeing their services as 
complementary, there is a tendency for professionals to see them in competition. This 
tends to prevent the development of any sense of community between these various 
services. 
 
Section Three: Effects of the Procedural Ethos on Psychiatric Services 
  While clients and psychiatric professionals may have difficulties with the 
procedural ethos, psychiatric services themselves also have problems with the 
adoption of a procedural ethos. I will list these difficulties before discussing them in 
more detail. These problems are the proceduralisation of recovery that has a tendency 
to make the service less responsive to the individual client, the downplaying or 
dismissal of other forms of decision-making and the ever-present procedural creep. 
  The procedural ethos has led to the ways recovery is fostered being partly 
proceduralised. The stage approach to recovery mentioned already (see Figure 2.2, 
p.35 ) can impact on the way in which we see clients recovering and, in that sense, it 
can be proceduralised. This is not a critique of the stage approach to recovery, 
discussed in Chapter 2, which is often a useful guide, provided it can be adjusted for 
individual clients. The first problem is that this stage approach can be seen as a set of 
procedures which clients have to pass through in order to recover. The stage approach 
is not meant to be seen as rigid stages clients have to pass through; it is meant more as 
a guide.  Unfortunately, particularly with professionals early in their career when rules 
and procedures are needed, these recovery stages can be reified.  For people who take 
this view, anything which deviates from the stages of recovery will be seen as non-
conducive to recovery. The implications are numerous: for example, that a particular 
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client needs to spend a certain amount of time in various recovery stages, that we 
cannot refer someone on to rehabilitation services because that stage does not apply 
yet, and so on.  Furthermore, there is a lack of  consensus around what a ‘normal’ 
recovery journey might look like. Given that one of the strengths of the procedural 
ethos is that it rests upon principles that have arisen out of the liberal consensus, it is 
easy to see the attractions of consensus. Unfortunately, while there is a developing 
consensus around what can help someone recover, (for example, diagnosing a 
particular mental disorder) there is no consensus around what a ‘normal’ recovery 
journey30 should look like.  The ‘recovery approach’ as already discussed (Chapter 1) 
emerged from the consumer groups who had ‘survived’ the psychiatric hospitals. As 
notions of recovery were taken up by psychiatric services in piecemeal fashion over 
subsequent years, it became increasingly evident that psychiatric services and other 
mental health services (private and non-governmental) wanted to own this notion of 
recovery and control it. The proceduralisation of recovery was one way of doing that. 
However, in stressing a procedural approach to recovery, the lifeblood of what makes 
recovery as an approach so exciting and potentially fruitful, namely that it is partly 
about an individual’s quest narrative for health, is lost. What becomes important are 
the procedures: in the sense of who is implementing the procedures and who is 
responsible for which procedures. This is not to say these procedural aspects are 
unimportant, only that they should not necessarily be the focus or the final decision-
maker. In making procedures the focus of recovery, the system and the services 
become less responsive to individual clients. This is because procedures lack 
flexibility and have a certain necessary ‘fixed’ quality. Individual clients cannot be 
fitted easily (if at all) into a neat set of stages with accompanying procedures. The 
result is that clients can experience the service as unresponsive and officious. Clients 
can often start to lose hope in their recovery when they meet a bureaucratic response 
to a human request31. That lessening of hope can impact on their motivation and their 
perseverance, all of which can undermine their individual journey of recovery.  
  Additionally, in making procedures the focus of decision-making, we lessen 
and downplay the role of other forms of decision-making, of which there are many. 
Part 3 will focus on these other ways of making decisions, however, while less 
                                                 
30 See  Lapsley et al. (2002)  for evidence as to how individual recovery from mental illness can occur 
through various stages. 
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significant than the ways mentioned in Part 3, there are two which are relevant here: 
professional and evidential decision-making. 
  Professionals have traditionally stressed professional knowledge, expertise, 
and training honed by professional virtues. This approach was dominant during the 
clinical-expert ethos. While clients will always hope that professionals act in their 
best interests, the corollary of the clinical-expert ethos was that the ‘expert always 
knows best’. This paternalistic notion has progressively become less acceptable and it 
is a central reason for the gradual waning of the clinical-expert ethos. The problem for 
many services is that they still have many professionals who subscribe to this 
perspective and find it difficult to change. In some respects, what services need is the 
professional decision-making ethos shorn of its overt paternalism. Instead of this 
‘professional ethos’, the procedural ethos has effectively meant that the professional is 
an interpreter of the procedures.  
  Evidence-based practice has also become a very important decision-making 
tool. Buttressed by scientific research and evaluation methodologies, it provides 
information from which informed decisions can be made. Unfortunately, while 
evidential decision-making is a useful tool for making decisions, it has become 
entangled with the procedural ethos. This is the result of many factors but, in 
particular, the proceduralisation of the research process through ethics committees, 
grant applications, funding processes and the like. The point is that evidential 
decision-making is still a hope rather than an actuality. Services do claim to be 
evidenced–based, but what does this really amount to within the context of a 
procedural ethos?  I would contend that it means that evidence is largely used to 
support the procedural ethos. This is a large claim but to support it I will mention the 
following: i) The disproportionate number of audits and evaluations as compared to 
research studies performed in psychiatric services that tend to support existing 
procedures or suggest the need for new procedures;  ii) The low proportion of site- (or 
service-) specific research performed and the high proportion of clinical trials on 
medication that are not site-specific but multi-site. These studies all provide assistance 
with decision-making at an international level, which then is imposed downwards 
onto specific services. While such studies may be evidential, how evidential for a 
specific population group is still debatable; iii)  The service-specific research that is 
                                                                                                                                            
31 There is evidence from the literature that hope is a central feature of recovery. See Deegan (1992) for 
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performed tends to add to service clinical pathways or to practitioner’s academic 
qualifications (arguably helping to create more experts grounded in the procedural 
ethos). 
  Finally, psychiatric services provide evidence of  ‘procedural creep’ on a 
significant scale as part of the procedural ethos. Psychiatric services have traditionally 
always relied on a powerful informal means of making decisions and organising 
activities. From the earliest times in the asylum era, there was a whole collection of 
rules of thumb and custom and practice ways of working which dominated practice. 
For example, while there was little or no evidence to support the benefits of 
segregating disorders into different areas of the asylum, it became a part of custom 
and practice that this occurred32. The various roles of doctors and nurses in the later 
asylum period are full of examples of custom and practice in role demarcation: what 
doctors do and what nurses usually are not allowed to do. Rules of thumb were 
evident in the way, for example, that particular treatments were applied. In the 
absence of good service-specific research, there were rules of thumb for applying 
particular treatments and in which order. For example, in working in the community it 
might be theorised about which is the best order for particular client interventions: i.e. 
medication first, followed by counselling, support, vocational rehabilitation, etc., or 
some other ordering of interventions.  Such theories as there are, are usually based on 
rules of thumb and nothing more. The research at a specific local level is generally 
absent33. 
  Formal procedures also tend to have a hierarchy within psychiatric services. 
After rules of thumb and custom and practice approaches there are expert guidelines. 
These can look very similar to custom and practice approaches, except that they are 
written down. After expert guidelines there are recommended best practice guidelines, 
which usually involve some benchmarking of guidelines against agreed standards and 
research. Then, there are protocols, policies and finally, legislation.  Interestingly, the 
procedural ethos is essentially shaped like a pyramid, with a large number of informal 
                                                                                                                                            
an understanding of how important hope can be to clients. 
32 See  Williams (1987) for a description of segregation practices in the New Zealand context.  
33 The reverse of this is also true: i.e. where evidence contradicts existing custom and practice it tends 
to be ignored. The example of providing supportive counselling in the community by community 
mental health nurses indicates it is no better than standard treatment and yet it continues to be 
practised. 
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procedures at the base with progression up the pyramid towards a relatively small 
number of significant pieces of policy and legislation.  
  It is the nature of the procedural ethos to be continually creating informal 
procedures which then move through to formal procedures. This procedural creep is a 
fundamental aspect of the procedural ethos. It also gives the clue as to why it is so 
hard to change: change involves changing formal procedures and in the procedural 
ethos it is the informal procedures which are the foundations and these are not 
touched by formal change. 
 
Section Four: Effects of the Procedural Ethos in Psychiatric Services on Society 
  The aim of this section is to  show the difficulties for society produced by a 
procedural ethos in psychiatric services.  
  There are two problems  involved for society in accepting a procedural 
ethos within psychiatric services. Firstly, is society’s attitude towards risk. Risk is 
often perceived in absolute ways rather than incrementally. Psychiatric services 
obviously do not exist in isolation. They are part of society and reflect society’s needs 
and concerns.  That wider society is generally frightened of people with mental 
illness. In the clinical-expert ethos, society relied on the expert to do ‘the right thing’ 
and ensure such people posed no risk to society by putting them away in asylums. In 
the procedural ethos, it is the procedures (and the attitude towards them) which 
determine how people with mental illness will be treated. As already mentioned, 
society has particular fears about individuals who pose a risk to society due to mental 
illness. This fear often transfers over to all people with a mental illness, even those 
who pose no risk to society.  The procedural ethos in psychiatric services responds to 
this need of society by elevating the principle of justice over other principles.  
Psychiatric services have an obligation to ensure, through procedural justice, that 
people with mental illness pose no or little risk to society. The problem with this for 
society is the inability to be sufficiently inclusive towards clients of psychiatric 
services with this absolute attitude towards risk, which is paradoxical since 
psychiatric clients are part of society. 
 The second difficulty for society of psychiatric services adopting a 
procedural ethos concerns responsibility.  The wider society seems to have the view 
that psychiatric services are completely responsible for someone once they are 
admitted into their service with a mental illness and there should be procedures for 
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guaranteeing this responsibility. However, if society does not accept that 
responsibility can not be absolutely placed with  psychiatric services, there will be an 
increased risk to society through clients not feeling included in society and not being 
permitted to take appropriate responsibility for their own health.  Fundamentally, the 
social contract between psychiatric services and the wider society needs to be 
rewritten. Instead of a contract which gives the expert the right to do whatever is 
necessary to protect society and treat the individual, we now have a contract which is 
based on a rigid understanding of procedures and protocols. Neither of these 
approaches is helpful for recovery, and instead we need a new contract which 
acknowledges the responsibilities of psychiatric services, clients of psychiatric 
services and the wider society.  
  Responsibility is connected to self determination. As clients start to recover, 
they do need to assume increasing responsibility for their own health, and society 
needs to understand the implications of this. It will mean that psychiatric services 
cannot be held responsible for every single action that a client or former client makes. 
It will mean that there is a graduated scale of responsibility, a continuum rather than 
the categorical understanding which currently informs the debate (due to the 
continued focus on categorical understandings of mental disorder). The responsibility 
of psychiatric services will focus increasingly not on whether procedures were 
followed, but on calculated risk decisions to withdraw responsibility for particular 
activities and transfer them to clients. 
  Calculated risk (or informed risk-taking) is connected to the idea that in 
order to recover from mental illness, risks do need to be taken, by the client, the 
professionals and the service. Society too needs to accept that some degree of risk-
taking is necessary rather than the risk averse stance it currently adopts. Calculated 
risk involves some basic risk/benefit analysis, with higher risks needing to be justified 
by higher expected benefits. 
  Unfortunately, the procedural ethos militates against this kind of 
risk/benefit calculation occurring in psychiatric services because it cannot be easily 
proceduralised. In its place, as we have seen, is the notion in society that risk and 
responsibility in connection with mental illness are absolute. As will be shown in Part 
3, there are better ways of making decisions than relying upon procedures in an 
absolute way.  
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Section Five: Problems with the Overall Pervasiveness of the Procedural Ethos 
 The problems for clients, professionals and psychiatric services of a 
procedural ethos are compounded by the acceptance of the procedural ethos in the 
wider society. Since these problems do not exist in isolation, they all interact and 
reinforce one another. The result is a procedural ethos which is stronger and more 
resilient. There are, however, two other problems with the overall pervasiveness of 
the procedural ethos. 
  Firstly, because it is so pervasive, over time individuals are promoted who 
share those fundamental values – that is the procedural ethos based on principles 
underpinned by the liberal consensus – which yet again serves to reinforce, emphasise 
and entrench the procedural ethos.  Secondly, it tends to mean individuals not so in 
tune with using procedures as the final decision-maker – both clients and 
professionals – will not flourish. For clients, this has implications for recovery in that 
if they are not able to follow a structured proceduralised approach, they may not do 
well and likewise professionals may find that they also struggle with the rules and 
regulations even though their interpersonal and technical skills are good.   
 
Summary 
  This chapter has identified practical problems with the procedural ethos, 
which have come to characterise psychiatric (and other mental health) services, 
though differently, in New Zealand as their de facto philosophy. Essentially, those 
problems are based around notions of responsibility.  There are problems for the 
client, professional and service of adopting a procedural ethos. Furthermore, there are 
problems for the wider society in accepting a procedural ethos in connection with 
psychiatric services, since it has a tendency to reinforce that ethos. 
  The problem for clients, as discussed, was the difficulty in their assuming 
responsibility for their actions  in a procedural ethos since there was a tendency to 
emphasise external decision-making over internal decision-making. This 
responsibility in turn tends to impact on the trust between professionals and clients 
and the expectations of their recovery, since procedures tend to emphasise minimal 
expectations. 
  Professionals working in a procedural ethos also tend to emphasise external 
over internal decision-making, which tends to mean reflective practice is not 
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emphasised. This in turn affects the spread of competencies in professionals in the 
novice to expert sense since reflection is a vital component of expertise. 
  Psychiatric services tend to proceduralise recovery and down play other 
forms of decision-making. There is the ever present problem of procedural creep. 
Additionally, psychiatric and other mental health services operate with differing 
principles: within psychiatric services there is an emphasis upon justice, while in the 
private and non-governmental sector, autonomy is the dominant principle. This has 
given rise to a certain level of conflict between psychiatric and those other 
(particularly non-governmental and private) mental health services. 
  The wider society supports the procedural ethos and particularly the 
emphasis upon procedural justice; so there needs to be a new social contract between 
society, psychiatric services and the professionals and clients of those services, in 
terms of responsibility. 
  Finally there are some general problems with the procedural ethos in terms 
of its pervasiveness, with a tendency to promote those who agree with its tenets over 
time creating problems for those clients and professionals who emphasise other ways 
of working.    Part 3 will consider how the adoption of a ‘recovery ethos’ would 
change psychiatric services in deep and lasting ways. 
         
 104
CHAPTER  6 
The Recovery Ethos Part I:  
The Virtues  
 
  This chapter argues the case for the recovery ethos in psychiatric services 
using the virtues as a way of making decisions for both psychiatric professionals and 
clients. It presents only part of the argument for the recovery ethos. Chapters 7, 8 and 
9, in which the client-professional relationship, recovery narratives and the psychiatric 
community are respectively discussed, are also part of the recovery ethos. As has been 
discussed, the procedural ethos with its reliance on  principle-based approaches has 
become all-pervasive in psychiatric services. However, there are significant problems 
with this procedural ethos in terms of assisting clients to recover, since it leads to an 
externalisation of decision-making and difficulties for clients in assuming increasing 
levels of responsibility, to mention only two problems. The principles of justice and 
autonomy have become dominant in terms of the underpinning of those procedures, 
but in different areas: justice in the publicly funded psychiatric services and autonomy 
in the non-governmental and private mental health services.  This has given rise to 
conflict, or at least misunderstanding, between these various services, which has made 
it almost impossible for them to have any sense of a common purpose or objective. It 
has been argued that the procedural ethos and its methods1 are seriously misguided 
and that we need a new way of conceptualising the ethos of psychiatric services.  
  There is an important practical difference between a recovery ethos2 and a 
procedural ethos. Much of this difference will be elaborated in subsequent chapters. 
To briefly recap, the procedural ethos has become the de facto philosophy in 
psychiatric services insofar as decisions are made using procedures of one kind or 
another and that procedures are reified.  The procedures are intimately connected to 
the principles of justice, beneficence and autonomy. These principle-based procedures 
have accepted eclecticism for determining ways of promoting recovery.  Eclecticism 
(in the sense of decisions based on the fair treatment of the various health domains) 
has become a decision-making tool within psychiatric services underpinned by  
                                                          
1 Rorty’s (1992) paper ‘The advantages of moral diversity’ develops an interesting argument to the 
effect that in order for a procedural principle based approach to work, virtues such as respect and 
tolerance need to be well developed through moral education, thus emphasising the primacy of the 
virtues. 
2 As already indicated the recovery ethos can apply to all mental illness. This is because the recovery 
ethos is about how decisions are made about which health domain intervention to use (i.e. biological, 
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procedures of which the classification system is the most obvious, where the focus is 
on the treatment of mental disorder. 
  The recovery ethos does not rest on moral principles. While the recovery 
ethos may use procedures,3 these would not be reified as they are under a procedural 
ethos. The recovery ethos is fundamentally committed to the recovery of the client’s 
mental health through a pluralistic approach to fostering the client’s recovery. That 
pluralistic approach cannot be addressed through procedures as the final decision-
maker, since each client and each situation is unique4. Rather than resting on moral 
principles, the recovery ethos relies upon the decision-making capability of clients 
and professionals using an appeal to the virtues. The other attributes of the recovery 
ethos will be indicated  in subsequent chapters. Rather than focusing exclusively on 
the notion of mental disorder, which lends itself to consensus decision-making, the 
recovery ethos can work with both the notions of mental disorder and mental illness. 
However, for reasons that should be apparent, the notion of mental illness with its 
underpinnings in a continuum is easier to adapt to a recovery focus than the 
categorical notion of mental disorder. 
  The rest of this chapter will see psychiatric professionals and their clients 
addressed separately. This is because the virtues appropriate to the two groups, while 
similar, do not coincide. 
  The case for the virtues in the recovery ethos will be developed in the 
following sections.  Section One  will present a general rationale for using the virtues 
rather than procedural approaches to promoting recovery from mental illness. Section 
Two will focus on the virtues for psychiatric professionals and will have three 
subsections:  a) will argue the claim that psychiatric professionals need certain 
virtues, those that allow them to foster recovery in their decision-making (this being 
the ultimate telos of psychiatric services);  b) will address some possible objections to 
                                                                                                                                                                      
psychological and social) not about the health domain as such. Different mental illnesses will require 
different combinations of these health domains, including that of self- help. 
3 In the recovery ethos procedures will still be used, as guides, but they would not be the final decision 
making approach. Decisions would be based on what is for the good of the client rather than following 
the right procedure. A similar claim can be made for the relationship between the recovery ethos and 
science. The recovery ethos is compatible with the use of scientific procedures but, since psychiatric 
services are  a human service, scientific procedures are to be used for the ultimate good of the client, 
not reified. 
4 Which is why the recovery ethos  is conceptually based on functionalism and emergence. Pluralism 
allows for all the various health domains: biological, psychological and social, plus self help  but 
within the unique presentation of the client, all the health domains are seen as important but not equally 
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the use of the virtues for professional decision-making; and  c) will indicate what 
those professional virtues would be.  Section Three will focus on the way psychiatric 
professionals should aim to foster or encourage the development of virtues in their 
clients. There will be three subsections:  a) will provide a general discussion of the 
claim that professionals should encourage client virtues as a way of promoting 
recovery from mental illness;  b) will address some possible objections to this claim; 
and  c) will provide a more detailed discussion of what those client virtues should be.  
 
Section One: General Rationale for using The Virtues 
  The aim of this section is to argue the case for the use of the virtues in 
psychiatric services. In order to argue for the virtues we will use Aristotelian virtue 
ethics. There  are four main reasons for an appeal to Aristotelian virtue ethics as a 
way of promoting recovery from mental illness in psychiatric services. Firstly, virtue 
ethics is primarily concerned with character, that is, with the way character is 
developed and maintained over time. Secondly, the virtues involve the inner life of 
the individual, regardless of whether that individual be a professional or a client. 
Thirdly,  virtue ethics is not simply focused on right actions but also on the goods that 
people should pursue. Finally, the virtues have a common appeal that can cross 
cultural and religious barriers. Implicit in my argument is the assumption that those 
characteristics are just the ones needed to promote recovery. These points will be 
discussed one by one. 
  Before discussing these four points, however, it will be helpful to briefly 
discuss Aristotle’s understanding of virtue5. Aristotle thought that a fulfilled or happy 
life is one lived in accordance with virtue. Virtue, according to Aristotle  “is a 
purposive disposition, lying in a mean that is relative to us and determined by a 
rational principle, and by that which a prudent man would use to determine it” ( NE 
BK II 1106b9-1107a1). This definition indicates how important the notion of 
disposition was to Aristotle’s understanding of virtue. Disposition, according to 
Aristotle, is part of our nature as individuals but is not fixed at birth. In other words, 
disposition, and hence virtue, is something which can be trained.  In order to train our 
                                                                                                                                                                      
so at that moment. In other words we can not collapse any domain into another. An emergent 
understanding of the ‘mental’ based on functionalism provides the best basis for this.   
5 Aristotle (1981) The Nicomachean Ethics (NE)  is the primary source for this chapter.  However 
Hutchinson (1986), Urmson (1988) and Hughes (2001) have assisted with the interpretation of that 
primary, difficult text.  
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dispositions to become good dispositions, we need to make good choices. What 
enables us to make good or bad choices is something which Aristotle called practical 
wisdom.  As we will see later, for recovery to take place it is crucial that both client 
and professional possess the virtue of practical wisdom. For Aristotle, pursuing virtue 
is, therefore, a rational activity in which we can train our dispositions towards 
moderation.  
  The first reason for appealing to the virtues is that developing a certain sort 
of character is necessary (though not sufficient) for both recovering from mental 
illness and promoting such recovery. This can be seen to relate to clients and 
professionals respectively. Aristotle’s understanding of character can help in this 
matter. Aristotle discusses the excellence of character in relation to the doctrine of the 
mean. Hence, the virtue of courage, which is necessary for recovery from mental 
illness, can be seen as a mean between  rashness and cowardice.  
  Aristotle distinguishes between four states of character. These are, in 
decreasing merit: the totally virtuous person, the character relying upon the strength 
of the will, the character who displays weakness of the will, and the person who does 
not possess the relevant virtue. The totally virtuous person is the  man who wants to 
act appropriately and does so without internal friction. Secondly, there is the character 
relying upon the strength of the will. This is the state of the man who wants to act 
improperly but makes himself act properly. Thirdly, there is the character who 
displays weakness of the will. This is the state of the man who wants to act 
improperly, tries to make himself act properly, and fails. Fourthly, there is the person 
who does not possess the relevant virtue. This is the state of the man who wants to act 
improperly, who thinks it is an excellent idea to do so, and does so without internal 
friction. Aristotle sees the will as fundamental to the development of a particular sort 
of character. He explains the phenomenon of weakness of the will (or incontinence) as 
a conflict between the desire or appetite for immediate pleasure and rationality (i.e. 
doing what one knows is the right thing). So, unlike the intemperate man, (the one 
who lacks virtue, hence does not know what is good for him) the weak-willed person 
knows what to do but has a stronger desire for immediate pleasure. The notion of the 
strength and weakness of the will is important for understanding the discussion of 
which virtues are needed by clients and professionals in order to promote client 
recovery. A client or professional may be disposed towards a particular virtue, such as 
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honesty, but unless there is a strength of will to overcome competing appetites the 
virtue will not be developed.  
  The second reason for emphasising the virtues is that they are concerned 
with the inner life of the individual. By inner life is meant the thoughts, intentions, 
feelings, motives, choices and beliefs of clients and professionals. Virtue ethicists 
argue that in order to live well, we need to develop certain virtues or character traits 
rather than simply follow set rules or procedures. In the context of recovery from 
mental illness, it is the inner person which is primarily the focus since it is the inner 
person who needs healing or who needs to heal. 
  The third reason for using a virtue ethics approach is that it is not focused 
upon right actions but upon the good that we are trying to achieve. In the case of 
psychiatric services, that good is client recovery from mental illness. During the 
clinical-expert ethos, finding the right action was seen as the central purpose of 
psychiatric services; the right action being the one that the expert thought would cure 
the disorder. During the procedural ethos, the right action was seen as following the 
right procedure derived from a principle. Under a recovery ethos, the focus shifts to 
the agent rather than the action.  In that sense, Aristotle’s approach6 can be described  
as agent-centred rather than action-focused.  
    When Aristotle discusses the development of character or the inner life, he 
is doing so in relation to his notion of the Good.  The Good is the ultimate goal that 
we are aiming at in life (Aristotle refers to this as the telos).  The life that is happy and 
fulfilled and lived in conformity with the Good is referred to as eudaimonia. 
Eudaimonia is about the ends of human striving; it is also about the good life and the 
good towards which we should be aiming. Recovery can be seen as the common goal 
for psychiatric services. The character traits that are considered to be virtues depend 
upon this goal, and narratives (see Chapter 8) are a means of promoting these virtues 
(through moral education). 
                                                          
6 There is a considerable and growing literature on the virtues and their application to healthcare. This 
literature has taken central ideas from Aristotle and developed them into contemporary ‘virtue ethics’. 
This endeavour has many positive attributes but is has one very serious negative attribute; namely a 
tendency to place virtue ethics alongside utilitarianism and Kantianism as being another substantive 
ethical theory. Excellent examples of this tendency are:  Crisp and Slote (1997) and Hursthouse (1999). 
In a diverse modern society, agreement on any substantive ethical theory is unlikely. Aristotle in the 
Nichomachean Ethics was more interested in working upwards from the common experiences of 
ordinary people towards ethical problems than with developing a top down ethical theory. Whether 
Aristotle would be considered a virtue ethicist today is at least debatable.   
  
 
110
    The fourth reason for focusing upon the virtues is that they can potentially 
cross religious and ethnic divides. If the virtues are unhooked from particular 
religious beliefs, there is the possibility of achieving considerable agreement around 
the virtues needed by both clients and professionals  in order to facilitate recovery 
from mental illness. There is a near universal agreement across cultures that some 
character traits are virtues; for example, honesty. Aristotle’s emphasis on social 
relationships, and friendship (NE Bks VII and X ) in particular, also provides an 
illustration of this attribute. Aristotle thought friendship was necessary for human 
flourishing. He saw the main elements of friendship in terms of sharing, disinterested 
concern, liking and mutual respect. These elements are, for Aristotle, as true for the 
relationship one has with oneself as for one’s relationship to others. Therefore, if the 
main features of friendship are connected to love for the friend, we need to say that 
the virtuous person loves himself in the sense of having self-respect.  Aristotle’s point 
can be understood in relation to clients who have a serious mental illness, in that 
clients often do not like themselves because of self stigmatisation (i.e. the 
internalisation of the societal stigmatisation of mental illness). Part of the recovery 
process is learning to like oneself again and, in line with Aristotle’s argument, that is 
connected to learning to love the virtues in oneself as they are manifested. Virtues 
such as friendship and self love  can be seen to have a universal rather than a 
culturally relative appeal when applied to recovery from mental illness.  
 
Section Two: Virtues for Psychiatric Professionals 
The aim of this section is to show the way psychiatric professionals need to 
adopt a virtue-based approach  to promote recovery from mental illness in their 
clients.  
a) In addition to the four general reasons already given, there are specific 
reasons why psychiatric professionals need to take a virtue-based approach in their 
decision-making. Firstly, a virtue-based approach allows flexibility in dealing with 
specific circumstances not found in procedural approaches. Secondly, a virtue-based 
approach can assist professionals to develop a therapeutic character.   
  The procedural ethos tends to encourage decision-making based on rules, 
procedures and guidelines.  As we have already seen, the recovery criteria are based 
on symptoms and functioning from both a client and professional perspective. The 
problem is that, in the procedural ethos, recovery is promoted using eclectic 
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procedures that are applied in an inflexible manner irrespective of the circumstances. 
The  pluralistic approach to promoting recovery, where decision-making is not based 
on rules or procedures, but upon psychiatric professionals and clients using a virtue-
based approach, can respond better to the particular circumstances. The development 
of professional virtues is a critical part of enabling professionals to make decisions 
without recourse to rules and procedures as the final decision-maker. The virtues (and 
the other components of the recovery ethos to be discussed in Chapters 7, 8 and 9) 
achieve this by permitting the professional to make decisions that fit with the 
particular circumstances before them. In this sense, a virtue-based approach allows 
greater flexibility and adaptability, which is a vital part of being able to promote 
recovery pluralistically. 
  Secondly, the development of professional virtues enables the realisation of 
a therapeutic character for professionals in a more conscious and intentional way than 
can occur with a procedural ethos. While the development of character was something 
mentioned in the earlier generic reasons for an appeal to the virtues, for the 
professional such a focus brings with it the possibility of developing a therapeutic 
character. When a psychiatric professional develops a therapeutic character, there is a 
particular combination of virtues (what these are will be discussed later) that works 
for the ultimate telos of psychiatric services, namely the recovery of clients from 
mental illness. 
b) There are two main reasons why this appeal to the virtues, in the 
Aristotelian sense, may not seem convincing for promoting recovery from mental 
illness from a professional perspective.  This sub-section will briefly raise these two 
objections, offer an initial response to them and, in subsequent sections, show in more 
detail the way the virtues can respond to these concerns.  
  Firstly, the virtues are thought to be too vague and indeterminate to provide 
a basis for promoting recovery. The view here is that the virtues lack exactitude, that 
it is hard to know which virtue should be exercised, and whether people have the 
same working definition of particular virtues. Mental illness and psychiatric practice 
generally are already seen to be a vague and inexact area of healthcare. In order to 
promote recovery from mental illness we need to be increasing scientific rigour, not 
creating more uncertainty.  In other words, the thought is that the virtues are 
inherently vague and indeterminate. 
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  There is some merit in this view. Virtues are quite vague. People’s 
characters are dynamic and change over the course of a person’s life. They are not 
exact. However, if we are expecting virtues to be exact and precise we are probably 
having unrealistic expectations of them. Aristotle himself commented on how 
practical wisdom enabled us to have an appropriate expectation of the level of rigour 
and exactitude we should expect from our enquiries.   Aristotle was of the view that 
morality, for example, would never be capable of the kind of exactitude we would 
expect from mathematical thinking.  The main defence of the virtues in terms of their 
being vague and indeterminate is that this characteristic is shared with other 
approaches, such as principles. The difference is that  principle-based approaches 
have not been successful in delivering the intended exactitude in terms of helping 
clients with recovery-based decisions,  whereas virtue ethics makes no such claim to 
exactitude. Instead, virtue-based approaches have stressed the way in which virtues 
can help to guide our actions. Subsequent sections will indicate the way virtues can, to 
a sufficient degree, meet the requirement for clarity and precision.  
  Secondly, it could be said that the virtues are insufficiently practical in 
terms of helping us to make choices between particular recovery-focused actions7. 
This objection is particularly centred on how choosing a particular virtue actually 
helps with practical decision-making.  As Crisp and Slote (1997) indicate, having a 
particular virtue does not show you when to apply it. In other words, virtue ethics fails 
to show how having a virtue explicitly connects with decision-making. 
While this objection has some merit, as Hursthouse (1999) shows, the virtues 
do offer a very practical way of understanding, justifying and accounting for actions. 
The following offers one way of understanding how this could work in the context of 
recovery.  Having gone through a process of deliberation about a particular decision, 
the professional or the client will make a choice (for which they will take some 
amount of responsibility) and this will result in an action. Such an approach will not 
always generate the same action, since the action is determined by the internal 
deliberation of the professional or client drawing on both moral and intellectual 
virtues. The amount of responsibility the professional or client should take for the 
                                                          
7 There is a considerable body of literature on virtue ethics. Crisp and Slote (1997) indicate some of the 
practical difficulties of using virtue ethics. Hursthouse (1999) provides a defence of the merits of virtue 
ethics. 
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action will depend on the level of collaboration between the professional and the 
client. Chapter 7 will consider these issues in more detail. 
It is important to realise that the virtues are not incompatible with the use of 
principles. Aristotle was certainly sympathetic to the need for principles to assist with 
making decisions. The important distinction, however, concerns the origin of 
principles and the attitude of professionals and clients towards them. In other words, 
with regards the origin of principles, we need to know whether they are externally or 
internally generated. Internally generated principles – dependent upon a particular 
personal and professional stage of development – are entirely compatible with a 
virtue-based approach and address some of the possible criticisms of the virtues as 
being impractical. Finally, as seen in the previous chapters, principle-based 
procedures within a procedural ethos are seen as the final decision-maker, and the 
attitude towards them is uncritical. In a virtue-based approach, principle-based 
procedures are never the final decision-maker. 
The following discussion will show the way in which the virtues can 
practically help clients and professionals make practical decisions, in terms of 
promoting client recovery.  
c) Psychiatric professionals can assist with the recovery of clients from 
mental illness.  This sub-section will explore the virtues that those professionals need 
in order to assist with that recovery. While the role of psychiatric professionals can be 
overstated, it is probably reasonable to say that they can have a decisive role in 
helping (or hindering) the recovery of clients. Indeed, while we may assert the 
centrality of recovery as the goal for clients, it is arguably the case that healing (which 
is the ability to bring  about recovery) is the central goal for the health professional.  
  Healing has been seen as a central role for medicine at least since 
Hippocrates. Psychiatrists, as trained doctors, would accept this role. Other 
psychiatric professionals – psychologists, nurses, social workers, occupational 
therapists, and psychotherapists – have also, partly through the influence of medicine, 
defined their roles in terms of healing. Healing as both an art and a science is 
concerned with the active role of the health professional in restoring the well being of 
the client. In other words, healing is primarily about the good of the client. This focus 
on healing and the good of the client is also the fundamental attribute of the health 
professional.  
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  The psychiatric professional can include all of the above professional 
disciplines and arguably also the emergent group of mental health support workers. A 
professional, in this sense, is committed within their sphere of competence to the 
healing of the client as their primary imperative. ‘Professional virtues’ can therefore 
be shared between psychiatric professionals and they are not the preserve of any one 
group.  
  Do professional virtues as such actually exist? Or are they simply relevant 
virtues when exhibited by people in professional roles? In this connection  Pellegrino 
and Thomasma (1988) have provided the best available response in the Aristotelian 
tradition.  They do this by drawing on the notion of virtue and its relationship to the 
ends and purpose of human life. They note that “to be a virtuous physician, one must 
also be the kind of person we can confidently expect will be disposed to the right and 
good intrinsic to the practice professed” (p.116). The focus for Pellegrino and 
Thomasma is medicine, and hence the use of the word ‘physician’, but in psychiatric 
services there is an increasing recognition that all the psychiatric professionals have 
distinctive skills and knowledge sets that are important for assisting the recovery of 
the client. 
  While all the psychiatric professionals can have something to contribute 
towards the recovery of the client, they all have differing areas of expertise and 
competency, which is why a pluralistic approach to promoting recovery has been 
emphasised. There is, therefore, an assumption in discussing the following virtues that 
all these psychiatric professionals have the virtue of technical competency in their 
area of expertise and that they are aware of the limitations of their competency. This 
is important in whatever field of endeavour we are concerned with, but particularly 
important in psychiatric services where there are so many professionals involved. 
Historically, it could be argued that psychiatric services have tried to be all things to 
all people and in the process have over-reached themselves, that is, they have become 
involved in areas where they have little competency or expertise; for example, by 
advising on housing or employment or on how to be mentally healthy, given that 
psychiatric services are actually focused on mental disorder rather than health.  This 
technical competency in working with mental disorder, while necessary, will never, in 
itself, be sufficient to constitute the virtues needed to assist with client recovery. This 
is because technical mastery essentially relates to the professional’s knowledge and 
skills in working with mental disorder, rather than the way in which that knowledge 
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and skill is used. It is in this area of how we do things that the moral virtues can have 
a crucial role to play. Chapter 2 specified two criteria for recovery, namely symptom 
reduction and functioning. Technical virtues are essential in knowing what needs to 
be done to help someone in terms of their symptoms and functioning, whereas moral 
virtues become more important in understanding the way in which those technical 
virtues should be implemented. The following virtues show the virtues professionals 
need in order to have a therapeutic character. These virtues are recommended  with 
some tentativeness in that they should be seen as issuing guidelines rather than  
prescriptive procedures that need to be strictly adhered to.   
 
Responsibility 
The virtues connected to responsibility are crucial in terms of recovery. How 
clients need to embrace the virtue of responsibility in order to recover from mental 
illness will be discussed later. This section will provide a parallel account in terms of 
psychiatric professionals accepting appropriate responsibility for their actions. 
  Responsibility is the virtue of accepting moral accountability for an action, 
however, this is rarely a clear-cut matter in psychiatric services.  Psychiatric 
professionals need to accept that they have significant responsibility for the well being 
of clients in the early period of their admission, particularly if they are admitted in a 
crisis state.  This responsibility can often take the form of the professional exercising 
justified paternalism when the client is admitted under a section of the Mental Health 
Act, for example. Under these circumstances, the virtue of accepting their legitimate 
responsibility is an important virtue for professionals that will contribute significantly 
to the client’s eventual recovery.  If a professional was to reject the virtue of 
responsibility, the client would be left with accepting too much responsibility.  
  While the virtue of accepting their legitimate responsibility is important, it 
is also important that the professional is actively seeking opportunities to safely pass 
some responsibility to the client. In other words, the virtue of responsibility is also 
connected to the professional understanding of when moral responsibility should pass 
to the client.  This may involve small incremental transfers rather than wholesale 
transfers of responsibility. For example, when admitted in a crisis state, many clients 
give little thought to food and water. Under those circumstances professionals would 
initially  make most of the decisions connected with meals.  Rather than seeing food 
and water as one area of responsibility, however, we can break it down in to a number 
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of discrete activities: when someone  eats, how much they eat, what they  eat, who 
they  eat with, and so on.  Responsibility can be passed from the professional back to 
the client as soon as this appears to be warranted in each discrete area, that is, when 
the client is able to assume that responsibility safely and competently and when it is 
unlikely to interfere with their wider recovery.  This can be a difficult process for both 
client and professional and one that cannot be effectively proceduralised, but requires 
exercising the virtue by judging intuitively how much responsibility is appropriate for 
a particular moment. The professional can feel comfortable in a relationship 
characterised by a power imbalance, where as professionals they have the power and 
where it can be difficult to let go of that power in a therapeutic way. Responsibility 
for activities or functions cannot simply be handed over from the professional to the 
client. The professional virtue is to withdraw responsibility for performing a particular 
activity, to the extent and in ways that are appropriate, communicating with the client 
their need to assume that responsibility. The client then needs to assume responsibility 
for the activity. This notion of a transfer of responsibility is in contrast with the idea 
of the professional giving the client responsibility for an action. The professional can 
never give responsibility for an activity to the client, only create the conditions under 
which the client can assume that responsibility.  
  Recovery is not a linear process and hence sometimes clients can take more 
responsibility than they are capable of assuming which can contribute to a small 
relapse in their mental illness. In these circumstances, exercising the virtue of 
responsibility means that psychiatric professionals may need to assume responsibility 
for that activity again on a short-term basis.      
   
Loyalty   
  Loyalty is the virtue of staying in a relationship with people or 
organisations, even when there are disagreements and difficulties, and not choosing 
an exit strategy. Loyalty is important for psychiatric professionals in order to provide 
a safe space in which clients can try out new responsibilities. There are two forms of 
loyalty for psychiatric professionals that,  while related, are often compartmentalised 
differently: loyalty to individual clients, and loyalty to the service. Loyalty to clients 
involves the psychiatric professional staying with their allocated or referred caseload, 
unless there are therapeutic reasons for discharging from it. Some of those reasons 
might be based on gender, age, rapport between professional and client or significant 
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tension. Within psychiatric services there is a relatively high turnover of staff, 
particularly in some professional groups such as nursing. The implications of this high 
turnover are that clients can often see many different professionals in the course of 
their admission, often repeating the same information, replicating assessments and 
care plans. Such a turnover will impact on how collaborative the client is able or 
prepared to be with psychiatric professionals. Professionals need to be loyal to their 
client group, not discharging clients simply because they are difficult or take up too 
much time.  
  The second way in which professionals can exhibit loyalty is through 
loyalty to the service. This is often not seen as a clinical matter but as an issue for 
recruitment and retention. Given the importance for a client’s recovery that they have 
familiar professionals who stick by them through the course of their illness, it is 
significant that psychiatric services lose relatively high numbers of staff from all 
disciplines. However, this matter (rather like the long-term side effects of psychiatric 
medication) is not openly discussed. If psychiatric professionals are committed to 
client recovery, it follows that they need to be more loyal to their services.   
  Loyalty, as  Fletcher (1993) indicates, can be seen as a continuum with 
minimal loyalty based on the maxim ‘Thou shalt not betray me’ and maximum loyalty 
on the maxim ‘Thou shalt be one with me’. Loyalty – even within the current 
procedural ethos – is viewed as important, but tends to be of a minimal variety. For 
the client, this minimal variety of loyalty takes the form of expectations around the 
privacy and confidentiality of information that they share with the professional: 
whereas, for the professional, it often takes the form of expectations around the client 
not officially complaining about treatment or conduct. This is a very minimalist 
understanding of loyalty.  
  The kind of loyalty that will be most productive in terms of recovery is a 
loyalty based on mutual commitment to the relationship between professional and 
client where both share their expertise8. This kind of loyalty falls far short of the 
maximal variety mentioned above, but still offers a significant improvement on the 
minimal variety. 
 
 
                                                          
8 Client expertise refers to increased understanding and awareness of the experience of mental illness. 
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Sympathy and Compassion 
Sympathy refers to the primitive response towards  another person’s 
suffering. This apparently common sense notion of sympathy is one defended by, for 
example Taylor (2002), who argues that sympathy is primitive in that it just happens 
to us and cannot be broken down or reduced into more basic concepts.   
  A more famous account than Taylor’s is that offered by Hume (1978). 
Hume’s account provides an explanation – almost psychological in nature - of how 
the suffering of another person is communicated to someone else and how that other 
person comes to experience the pain they are suffering. In other words, Hume’s 
account of sympathy is essentially about the way suffering is communicated to an 
onlooker. Such an account tells us little about the nature of that suffering but only 
about the sympathetic response engendered in ourselves.  In a psychiatric context, 
such an account is not helpful. When confronted by psychic distress, we need to 
understand what that suffering means for the person suffering, not what it means for 
us.  As will be indicated later, sympathy by itself is insufficient and needs the virtue 
of compassion, in order to understand what the suffering means. 
  Without the virtue of sympathy in the sense indicated for someone’s 
psychic distress, the psychiatric professional would be unable to acknowledge and 
thereby respond to another person’s distress and suffering. Too little or too much 
sympathy could be equally unhelpful. Too little sympathy will mean that there is this 
inability to respond to the suffering in others. For the psychiatric professional too 
much sympathy can mean an important attribute of professionalism will have been 
lost, namely the ability to have a certain objectivity in assessing and responding to 
problems. 
  Sympathy is a virtue, which though learnable, is probably established early 
in life. Hence, while it is true that psychiatric professionals need the virtue of 
sympathy to acknowledge and respond to someone else’s suffering and hence assist 
them with their recovery, if someone lacks this sympathy it will not be easy to 
acquire. This probably means that it should be seen as a prerequisite for working as a 
psychiatric professional that prospective employees in this field possess basic 
sympathy.    
  Sympathy goes to the heart of the motivation for working with people who 
are psychologically distressed. What motivates people who are confronted by human 
suffering? Is there a deep concern to relieve that distress, or are there other 
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motivations? Human beings are complicated and there are often many motivations 
involved in any activity. However, while there may be other motivations present (the 
need to earn a living, status, prestige, etc.) the motive of relieving the distress of 
others would need to be present and arguably a dominant presence in any mix of 
motives. Given that sympathy is a primitive response of humans (and probably other 
species) to the presence of suffering in others, it might be claimed that it is 
constitutive of what it means to be human. Such a view, unfortunately, would seem 
too optimistic, given the intentional suffering that humans have caused to other 
humans. While it may be considered a primitive response, sympathy is far from 
having a dominant presence in human enterprises such as psychiatric services. 
Sympathy is a necessary virtue in order to have the virtue of compassion. 
Compassion is the virtue of understanding another’s suffering. Psychiatric 
professionals need to do more than simply acknowledge and respond to the suffering 
of others, they also need to understand it9. 
  
Integrity 
  While psychiatric professionals need to have sympathy and compassion for 
those they are attempting to help, an ability to show a certain loyalty to those whose 
mental illness lasts for a period of time, and the capability of facilitating clients to 
assume increasing levels of appropriate responsibility for their own well being, they 
also need to behave with integrity. Integrity is the virtue of behaving with respect, 
sincerity and genuineness in our dealings with others.  
  Integrity is the main virtue that prevents exploitation or abuse of clients.  
This is particularly important when dealing with people who may be vulnerable due to 
their mental state. Without the integrity of professionals, clients can find themselves 
prescribed treatments they do not need or placed on sections of the Mental Health Act 
that are unnecessary. It is also a precondition for the possibility of a mutual 
collaborative partnership between professional and client. 
 
Patience 
  Psychiatric professionals need the virtue of patience when working with 
people who are recovering from mental illness. Patience is the virtue of being able to 
                                                          
9 Van Zyl (2000) offers a helpful discussion on the nature of compassion and its connection to 
sympathy. 
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wait for an outcome. Its significance for recovery from mental illness is that recovery 
can be a slow and drawn out process where the professional needs to be able to wait 
for a discernible outcome. It is particularly important for the professional to learn that 
they need to go at a pace of recovery collaboratively agreed with the client. 
Historically, this pace has been determined almost completely by the professional.  
  Aristotle’s ( NE Bk IV 1125b14-34) conception of patience is perhaps 
helpful. He saw patience as being connected to anger in the sense of its being an 
intermediate state. He saw the patient man as one who “gets angry at the right things 
and with the right people, and also in the right way and at the right time and for the 
right length of time.”  In a sense it is necessary to have a certain anger towards 
overcoming mental illness and sometimes also towards helping clients who need to 
overcome an illness. While – and I think this is what Aristotle is getting at here - a 
certain level of anger is important for professionals when working with clients who 
show no inclination to help themselves and take the next step, it is important that this 
does not become an excess or deficiency of anger. An excess of anger towards clients 
who are not making the necessary effort to overcome the illness will tend to mean a 
lack of patience in the professional. Professionals who lack patience in allowing the 
client to go at their own pace will be unsupportive and unhelpful towards clients. The 
opposite deficiency, as Aristotle termed having little anger towards something, is also 
unhelpful, since being too patient can itself be a problem. A professional who is too 
patient will be too accepting of clients’ not trying or attempting to move on with their 
recovery. As with all these virtues, there is a need for the professional to find some 
middle course, that involves being neither too impatient nor too patient. 
   Patience as a virtue is important for professionals in order to support client 
recovery. The patient professional is able to go at the client’s pace but also able to 
show some necessary anger towards backsliding and laziness. 
  
Tolerance  
 For the psychiatric professional who is loyal, sympathetic, compassionate, 
patient and able to facilitate clients in assuming increasing levels of responsibility it is 
of paramount importance that they are also tolerant. Tolerance is the virtue of 
accepting difference whether that is due to people’s behaviour or mental state. 
Psychiatric professionals need this virtue in order to be able to work with clients from 
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different cultural groups and with clients with different belief systems as well as with 
clients who simply have a different lifestyle to that of the psychiatric professional.   
  Psychiatric professionals who are intolerant towards these factors in these 
ways will tend to be judgmental and hold preconceptions about the capability of 
particular types of clients to recover.  These views will inevitably impact upon the 
actual performance of clients. Such professionals will, therefore, be less therapeutic 
than their more tolerant colleagues. An example of intolerance is a professional who 
has particular views on how clean someone’s home should be, expecting everyone 
else to live by their own standards and being intolerant of anything less than that 
standard. 
  While psychiatric professionals always need to be tolerant of the people 
they are trying to help – since their societal role is a therapeutic one (unlike 
professionals employed in the justice system for example) - that does not mean being 
tolerant of all behaviours. Some behaviour does undermine any hope of recovery from 
mental illness and a therapeutic professional needs to differentiate between tolerance 
of the person and tolerance towards particular behaviours. In the example above, there 
clearly are levels of uncleanness that cannot be tolerated for health reasons. Or again, 
in the case of illicit drug use it is generally unhelpful and undermining of recovery 
and so it is important for the professional – while accepting the client has a right of 
choice – to indicate their intolerance for that type of behaviour because it is not in the 
real interests of the client. 
 
Collaboration  
Psychiatric professionals need the virtue of being able to work with clients. 
There will be further discussion about collaboration in Chapter 7 when we discuss a 
particular model for client and professional interactions. This section will highlight 
the three conceptual phases of collaboration and how they impact on the recovery 
journey.  
  First, however, it is necessary to distinguish between collaborative 
behaviours and a collaborative personality. A collaborative personality is an essential 
part of being a psychiatric professional and it is the basis of the virtue of 
collaboration. A collaborative personality is based on internal thoughts, motives and 
feelings that are collaborative in nature. In contrast, collaborative behaviours are 
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outward displays of collaboration that may or may not be based on collaborative 
virtues.  
  Initially, when a client is admitted into a psychiatric service they will look 
to professionals to assist them and take the lead either because they are in crisis or 
simply unfamiliar with the service. This period can be termed a professional-led 
collaboration, that is, the onus for initiating activities and processes falls on the 
psychiatric professional. However, the professional should still be committed to 
establishing and facilitating as much collaboration as possible with clients.  In some 
cases, for example when the client is psychotic, this collaboration will be quite 
minimal. The professional – acting in the best interests of the client – will make most 
of the decisions and in some cases – having attempted and failed to gain the active 
involvement of the client – the professional will make decisions without the 
involvement of the client. This professional-led collaboration should always be seen 
as graduated in that over time, progressively, the client will assume increasing levels 
of responsibility. For some clients, however, there will always be some element of 
professional-led collaboration about their care, because the client is either unable or 
unwilling to accept responsibility for their own care. 
  Professional-led collaboration should be seen as a precursor to true 
collaboration or partnership. In this phase of collaboration there is a mutual respect 
for the expertise that both professional and client can bring to the encounter, the 
professional possessing their  knowledge of mental disorder and the client possessing 
expertise in their own personal experience of mental illness. This partnership is 
characterised by negotiated decision-making. While the professional-led collaboration 
may have employed consultation in the earlier phase, real negotiation is necessary 
during the partnership phase since sometimes the determining factor is expertise in 
mental disorder and its treatment and sometimes the determining factor is a personal 
experience of recovering from mental illness.  In this partnership phase of 
collaboration, it becomes important for both professional and client to respect each 
other’s perspective with regards to improvements in symptoms and functioning. For 
example in rehabilitation, clients will still often be on medications of various types; 
these medications will have a variety of side effects that impact on the clients’ 
abilities to work or sustain relationships. In negotiation, the client’s experiences of 
being on the medication can be brought more centrally in to the decisions around dose 
and type of medication, thus ensuring a more individualised approach is obtained. 
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  The third stage of the collaborative approach is client-led collaboration, 
which is for those clients who are advanced in their recovery from mental illness and 
are able to assume the main responsibility for their own well being, but who still 
require some expertise from psychiatric professionals. The client will decide how they 
will use this expertise. The psychiatric professional who is secure in their role and the 
therapeutic use of their role will have assisted this increasing acquisition of 
responsibility by the client. Through their loyalty, patience and sympathy for the 
client’s well being, they will be able to make the necessary transition to being the 
junior partner in the collaborative relationship. 
  The important point about collaboration is that it should always be 
individualised. Each client’s recovery journey will be different. There can be no one 
size fits all approach to recovery and collaboration.  One client may need to spend two 
weeks in phase one of collaboration, while another may need to spend a year. The 
deliberation by both client and professional in terms of recognising the signs that 
indicate it is time to move to the next stage is a matter of practical wisdom.    
  There will be further discussion about the way collaboration changes over 
time in the discussion of developing a recovery narrative in Chapter 8. 
   
 Practical Wisdom    
Psychiatric professionals need practical wisdom in order to know where the 
boundaries are between patience and impatience, tolerance and intolerance, when and 
how to move from one collaborative stage to another and thereby increase the 
responsibility of the client. Practical wisdom is fundamentally about being good at 
thinking about what one needs to do in order to achieve one’s goal. For psychiatric 
professionals that means being good at thinking about what will help a client recover 
from mental illness.  
  Deliberation is fundamental to practical wisdom, as an intellectual activity. 
There are four aspects to consider in understanding practical wisdom, all of which 
need some form of deliberation. Firstly, the professional needs to be able to deliberate 
about what stage of the collaborative relationship has been reached (i.e. professional- 
led, partnership or client-led). This is because in the professional-led collaboration it 
is the professional’s prime responsibility to initiate activities, ensure client safety and 
to facilitate the client’s assumption of greater responsibility, provided it is safe. For 
example, the professional needs to know that they will exercise a prime decision-
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making role during a crisis or while the client is acutely unwell; this will extend to 
decisions on the requisite medication, the client’s daily activities, and needs for sleep 
and food. During the partnership phase of collaboration, the professional increasingly 
accepts the expertise of the client in knowing and understanding their own recovery 
journey. For example, the client may decide that they would like to rejoin the 
workforce. The professional knows that their current medication regime is causing the 
client to feel very sedated and tired, to such an extent that work would be difficult to 
sustain. The negotiation might well centre on how to safely reduce the medication 
dose so that the client can rejoin the workforce while ensuring the dose is sufficient to 
prevent a relapse of the mental illness. The final collaborative phase, the client-led 
collaboration involves psychiatric professionals deliberating on how to support the 
client as they pursue their goals and objectives. Deliberation in this context is 
sometimes frustrated by situations in which a client relapses and hence where the 
professional once again is required to exercise increased responsibility, if only for a 
short period of time.  
  The second aspect of practical wisdom, and largely a consequence of the 
first, is recognition of the respective levels of responsibility that the client and 
professional need to exercise. This is a pivotal component of practical wisdom since it 
involves deliberating about historical antecedents, the current situation and the future 
implications. In terms of historical antecedents, the professional needs to assess how 
the client has coped (if at all) with assuming responsibility for certain activities in the 
past.  Is there a pattern that can be discerned in terms of how the client deals with this 
particular responsibility? The current situation involves assessing the client’s mental 
state and their current level of functioning and trying to determine their current 
competency. These past and current assessments are then fed into a set of prognostic 
projections as to how the client is likely to deal with the particular responsibility in 
question. 
  The third consideration for practical wisdom, determined by the second, is 
that having made some determination on the level of responsibility a client can 
assume, this then translates into actions in terms of whether it is the client or 
professional who should accept responsibility for becoming, for example, intolerant 
towards particular actions or impatient with the pace of recovery.   
  Fourthly, all these aspects of practical wisdom are fundamentally about 
prioritising. The professional is bombarded with information. However, it is not all 
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equally important at this particular moment and the deliberations of the professional 
are centred on what is important at the moment for recovery to occur for this 
particular client. 
  Professionals sometimes get it wrong, even if they employ practical 
wisdom. Practical wisdom as an intellectual virtue cannot be separated from the moral 
virtues of loyalty, sympathy, patience, tolerance, collaboration and responsibility.  
This unity of the virtues is fundamental to understanding how they can assist with 
client recovery. 
  
Section Three: Development of Virtues in Clients 
                The aim of this section is to show how psychiatric professionals should aim 
to foster or encourage the development of particular virtues in their clients.  
  a) In conjunction with the four general reasons already given, there is a 
specific reason why psychiatric professionals should aim to foster and encourage the 
development of particular virtues in their clients,10 namely, in order to recover clients 
need to lessen their symptoms of mental illness and increase their functioning ability. 
Acquiring particular intellectual and moral virtues will greatly assist them to reduce 
their symptoms and to increase their general functioning. The exact virtues will be 
discussed later.  
  b) There are two possible objections to the use of virtues in promoting 
client recovery. Firstly, an objection is to say that virtues (unlike skills11) are not 
teachable.12 Virtues and vices are established so early in life that no amount of 
teaching or education can help us to unlearn bad practices. There is some truth in this 
argument and it is one with which Aristotle would probably agree. Virtues and vices 
are largely established in early childhood.  However, virtues are habituated ways of 
behaving and so, like skills, they can be learnt to some extent even in adulthood. The 
virtues needed for recovery from mental illness can be acquired over the long term 
and since many mental illnesses have a chronic duration, this becomes more possible. 
                                                          
10 I am not suggesting that client virtues, with regards recovery from mental illness, only come from 
psychiatric professionals, only that it is a key part of the role of psychiatric professionals to teach and 
foster such virtues in their clients. 
11 The difference between skills and virtues is not straightforward. A virtue, in a professional sense, 
would simply provide a broader and deeper understanding than a narrowly focused skill. For example, 
professional clinical competency certainly is a skill, but to exercise it well involves virtues such as 
honesty, integrity etc. MacIntyre (1981) develops the idea of a practice as providing a defining 
characteristic of a virtue. 
12 Carr and Steutel (1999) argue that virtues are teachable. 
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  A second objection is that psychiatric professionals simply have no 
responsibility for the moral life of their clients.13 This view would maintain that the 
aim of medicine is not to make people good but to make them healthy. This may well 
be true for most areas of medicine, but to recover from a mental illness does involve 
the exercise of virtues such as courage, determination, perseverance and the like. 
These virtues are discussed in the next sub-section.    c) Client recovery from mental 
illness involves acquiring or maintaining particular virtues. This section will make a 
case for particular client virtues as central to the recovery process.  Most people who 
become mentally ill would like to recover. Traditionally, this has involved clients 
adopting particular virtues, namely obedience and passivity. These virtues, during the 
long clinical-expert ethos, were highly regarded by clinicians. The ‘good’ client 
during this period was a client who listened to the expert and did what they were told. 
Since the expert knew best, all the client needed to do in order to recover was to 
follow the ‘profound instructions and prescriptions’ of the expert. The clinician would 
be held responsible for the client’s well being, but the client would be held 
responsible if they failed to follow the instructions of the expert to the letter. While 
such an approach has continued to lose favour, it continues to have a significant hold 
over clinical opinion and training and also over the view held by the general public. 
The reason for the continuing respect for such virtues as passivity and obedience 
within psychiatric services are complicated. However, one reason seems undeniable. 
Psychiatry as the dominant professional group within psychiatric services, has always 
modelled itself on medicine. In medicine, the role of the expert is still greatly 
respected. There continues to be much obedience and passivity from clients to 
medical intervention, which may or may not be a good thing. What it has meant for 
psychiatry is a similar desire to retain the role of the expert. However, there is a 
fundamental difference between psychiatry and medicine in that psychiatry deals with 
psychological dysfunction in terms of thinking, feeling, volition, perception, etc. and 
behavioural dysfunction as a result of the psychological dysfunction.  Part of what 
heals these functions is that clients fully use them appropriately or start to fully use 
them appropriately. Blindly following instructions can never help clients to fully use 
these functions or take responsibility for their use.  
                                                          
13 Spicker (1977) argues that it is hubris of the worst kind for medical practitioners to directly affect 
their patients conduct or moral judgement through medical intervention, moral persuasion or education. 
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                 In what follows the virtues that clients need to recover from mental illness 
will be discussed. 
   
Hope 
The clinical-expert ethos rarely encouraged hope in clients. It was more 
concerned with an honest assessment of the clinician’s view on the client’s likely 
recovery. This could sometimes be very pessimistic or even fatalistic.  The clinician 
did not really care what the view of the client was towards their prognosis since this 
was not an important part of treatment. Today, recovery from mental illness certainly 
does see hope as important. Unfortunately, hope has been proceduralised (because of 
the procedural ethos) and this has meant some of its essential nature has been lost. In 
a practical sense, for example, this can mean that discharge planning commences after 
a certain period, recording where the client would like to live or what they would like 
to do on discharge, as a way of creating hope. Discharge planning is an important 
therapeutic activity except when it is commenced simply because of procedural 
necessity rather than individual need.     
   Hopefulness is an important virtue in terms of recovery. Hope is defined as 
an expectation of a promising outcome. It is important because it gives the client the 
possibility that improvement will occur and that current problems will not continue. 
Hopefulness manifests itself in a number of different ways for the client: in their 
attitude towards self, others and the psychiatric service.  
   A hopeful client will see that their current situation is possibly temporary 
and that perspective will help them to accept it more readily. Acceptance of an illness 
is enormously important since the alternative responses such as unwarranted anger or 
denial are generally unhelpful for recovery.  
  A hopeful client will tend to see others as doing the best they can, even if 
currently they are not making much headway. This hopefulness that the right 
approach or treatment will be found tends to open the client to the world of 
possibilities and options which is important in a psychiatric context.   
  Also, a hopeful client will see the service as doing the best it can and once 
again, the client will be open to the possibility that the service will transfer their care 
onwards when or if that is appropriate. 
  Clients who are in despair about their recovery or who are unrealistically 
optimistic will tend to have a different set of attitudes. A client who is not hopeful but 
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more drawn to despair at their situation will probably experience more self 
stigmatisation since they will probably feel that their condition will continue and not 
necessarily change or improve. It is also probable that they will experience self-pity as 
a result of that self stigmatisation. Clients who are unrealistically optimistic (believing 
for example that ‘this medication will fix all my problems’) will often be disappointed 
as no miraculous solution is found. This can result in clients feeling angry with 
professionals and services in ways that are unhelpful. 
  Hopefulness needs to be  an appropriate response to the given situation. 
There is a level of practical wisdom involved in not over- or under-valuing 
information but  appropriately valuing it. This practical wisdom or assessment can 
sometimes be mistaken. Clients can be hopeful when the information and evidence 
suggest the outcome will not be a positive one. Hopefulness can still, however, be an 
appropriate response even if rationally the outcome is likely to be poor as long as the 
hope is tempered by a rational assessment of the likely outcome. Additionally, clients 
do need to establish collaborative relationships with professionals who can assist them 
to make good assessments of the likely outcomes. 
  Clients who are suffering from mental illness are often not able to rationally 
think through what degree of optimism would be ‘appropriate’ – at least in the early 
stages of the illness - and the very virtue of hopefulness can be undermined by their 
mental state, for example, in depression. Under these circumstances the professional  
has to be loyal, compassionate and able to assess the level of responsibility the client 
can take for their own well being.  
 
Suffering, Self Awareness and Sympathy 
   Mental illness involves suffering. Severe mental illness can involve 
considerable and, at times, intolerable suffering. Suffering14 is generally seen as an 
undesirable and unwanted experience but it can also offer  an opportunity to develop 
particular virtues such as self-awareness, sympathy, trust and courage ( which  will be 
discussed later on). For some clients, suffering can be the first time they have had the 
time and opportunity to self reflect. In the early stages of suffering, during the acute 
stages, this reflection will be somewhat clouded reflection but later, as the acute 
symptoms subside, the client will probably start to ask themselves questions: Why 
                                                          
14 As Sujata  (1976)  indicates, suffering is viewed negatively, particularly because of the fatalistic view 
of thinkers such as Schopenhauer and Nietzche. 
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me? Why now? Will I get better?  Such self-awareness is important since it enables 
the development of the virtues of  responsibility and self-discipline. Self-awareness 
can assist the client to recover in many ways: it can help them plan and organise 
goals, it can help them harness their own internal resources, and it can provide an 
important foundation for developing other competencies, skills and virtues.  
  Self-awareness of one’s own suffering can often lead to an 
acknowledgement and response to the suffering of others. This can help clients to see 
that their own experiences are not unique but part of a common human experience. 
Such sympathy can often flow back to the client with the client being easier on 
themselves, less blaming of themselves, less likely to self stigmatise.  
  Such qualities as self-awareness and sympathy can help clients to trust 
themselves and, perhaps more importantly, trust family and psychiatric professionals. 
Sympathy helps the client feel human solidarity with the suffering of others. The trust 
arises through the client becoming aware that others are trying to ease their suffering  
rather than some other intention. Trust (as we will see) is essential for forming 
collaborative relationships with others and collaboration is an essential component of 
recovery.  
 
Responsibility 
When clients are initially admitted into a psychiatric service we might expect 
that they would have little responsibility for their own health or well being, 
particularly if they are admitted in a crisis state. Given that relatively high acuity 
levels are needed to trigger admission, all admissions will involve psychiatric 
professionals exercising significant responsibility.     
  Responsibility is a complicated concept. It can mean a variety of things. It 
can mean causally responsible for, as in ‘the fire is responsible for burning the house 
down’. This is not the meaning used here. It can also be used to refer to moral blame 
or praiseworthiness in someone’s choices. The concern is with this moral sense of 
responsibility. 
  Aristotle’s conception of responsibility is helpful in making sense of how 
much we can hold someone responsible for their choices and under what 
circumstances. Though Aristotle did not see responsibility as a virtue, he did see it as 
a necessary condition for individual choices being considered virtuous or non-
virtuous. Aristotle defined choice in the following manner:   
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Since, therefore, an object of choice is something within our power at 
which we aim after deliberation, choice will be a deliberate appetation of 
things that lie in our power. For we first make a decision as the result of 
deliberation, and then direct our aim in accordance with the deliberation 
(NE Bk III 1112b26-1113a12).    
Aristotle believed we could hold individuals responsible for their moral choices if 
they are made voluntarily. Mental illness could, under some circumstances, mean that 
someone’s actions are not voluntary but compelled.  This raises the issue of how 
much we can hold someone responsible for their moral character in light of non-
voluntary actions. Aristotle introduces a distinction between full and qualified 
responsibility for one’s character.  While there is some disagreement among scholars 
about whether Aristotle intended to make a case for full or qualified responsibility for 
character, I tend to agree with Meyer (1993)  who argues that Aristotle is making a 
case for qualified responsibility.  It certainly appears that Aristotle is indicating that 
early moral education is vital and that someone who has not had such an education, or 
who has been exposed to bad role models, may be considered less responsible later in 
life than someone who has. Qualified responsibility then is responsibility lessened 
through someone’s upbringing, education or experiences, whereas full responsibility 
is responsibility with no qualifications. This distinction between full and qualified 
responsibility is helpful when discussing responsibility for recovery since mental 
illness does not prevent clients from having moral responsibility. Responsibility is not 
a categorical concept but a continuum concept (as is recovery and mental illness) as 
we can have more or less of it. A client may not be able to take responsibility for 
some aspect of their life but be able to take responsibility for other aspects. Even 
within one aspect of their life there might be differing degrees of responsibility. 
Responsibility is not global but specific and particular.  There can be qualified 
responsibility. For example, a client may be able to take responsibility for self-
grooming but not able to take responsibility for administration of their medication. 
Even within self-grooming, the client may be able to take responsibility for some 
things but not others.  
  As clients move along the recovery journey towards mental health we 
would expect them to exercise increasing levels of qualified responsibility. The virtue 
of responsibility for clients then, is to appropriately assume responsibility for aspects 
of their health, as they are able to. To continue in a dependant relationship when able 
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to take more responsibility will not be conducive to recovery since the client will 
continue to function in an earlier recovery stage. Neither would taking too much 
responsibility early in the recovery journey be conducive to recovery, when the 
mental illness is seriously impacting on their ability to think and exercise appropriate 
judgement since, it is likely, that this will lead to poor decision-making.    
 
Courage 
 Courage is necessary for recovery.  Courage is defined  as “a mean state in 
relation to feelings of fear and confidence” (NE Bk III  1113a6-29). In recovering 
from mental illness there is often a fear of the illness itself and also of the 
consequences of that illness for the client. In order to recover, a certain amount of 
courage to take decisions and live with the consequences of those decisions is needed. 
One also has to accept more responsibility for one’s choices and  have a more 
assertive role in restoring one’s health.  There is also the fear that some choices may 
make the illness worse. 
  In the initial stages of the illness it can take courage simply to stay with the 
illness experience rather than to commit suicide, for example. Later, as more acute 
symptoms dissipate, the client needs to have courage to take the next steps for their 
recovery journey. The client increasingly needs to make decisions for themselves and 
take  responsibility for those decisions. Without the courage to take the next step, the 
client may well find themselves ‘stuck’ at a certain stage of their recovery.  Life 
skills, social skills and self-perceptions are all elements that are affected by mental 
illness but that will not improve without the client having the courage to take the next 
step.  Cowardice could be considered a recovery vice. Its presence will actively 
undermine the recovery journey of the client and perpetuate a continuing sick role. 
Such cowardice needs to be contrasted with another recovery vice, namely lack of 
fear (or impulsiveness).  A client who fearlessly attempts to take responsibility for 
aspects of their life that they are not ready for, will more likely than not fail and their 
recovery will be set back. The right point to exercise courage will be discussed as part 
of the recovery narrative in Chapter 8. 
 
Perseverance 
 For the client who has taken some responsibility for their own health and 
their own recovery journey and who has shown courage in taking the next recovery 
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step, it becomes pivotal that they are able to persevere in their recovery journey.  
Perseverance is the virtue of sticking with something for the attainment of some 
desirable goal. Recovery from mental illness can be a long process. It will be longer if 
the client has had the illness for a long time. The ability to stick with the recovery 
journey and the consequences of this in terms of accepting more responsibility and 
accountability for one’s actions becomes very significant. If the client cannot stick 
with the recovery journey, it will have a tendency to mean they either get stuck in 
their current recovery stage or alternatively that they regress to an earlier stage.  
  If a client fails to make progress due to a lack of perseverance, it is more 
than likely that they will turn to either family or psychiatric professionals to help them 
to get moving again. The problem is this will prevent clients taking responsibility for 
these matters for themselves.  This may not be important if it is for a short period of 
time, but, if the period is extended, this could have repercussions for the whole 
recovery journey.   
  If a client regresses, this obviously has implications for the client’s 
recovery. At its most serious, this might involve a relapse where the client moves 
back towards a crisis stage of their recovery journey.  
  There are times when a client cannot persevere due to their illness. It is 
important to distinguish between these occasions and occasions when the client can 
persevere but chooses not to. There is also the indeterminate case where it is unclear 
whether the client was unable to persevere because of their illness or because they 
chose not to.  It is important to err on the side of caution in these indeterminate cases 
and assume that the illness has had a significant role since otherwise there is a danger 
of prejudice by professionals interfering with the client’s journey. 
  Perseverance needs to be contrasted with stubbornness and fickleness. 
Stubbornness is a tendency to stick with something even when it appears that sticking 
is counterproductive. Perseverance is a rational activity. It involves sticking with 
something because it helps to realise some goal which is viewed as valuable. 
Recovery of mental health is certainly such a goal. Alternatively fickleness is a 
tendency (or vice) of constantly changing and not sticking with anything. In a 
recovery context this might, for example, involve trying many different options for 
treatment and even when one is found that appears to work, still wanting to try 
something else.  
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Collaboration 
  Collaboration is a virtue of being able to work with others. In psychiatric 
services this is a vital virtue for both clients and psychiatric professionals. There will 
be further discussion about a model of practice based on collaboration in Chapter 7. 
For the client, collaboration with psychiatric services is often difficult. This is because 
traditionally psychiatric services have not been collaborative, nor was that even 
attempted. They have been heavily paternalistic. For those clients who have been in 
the system for a long period of time it is, therefore, hard to trust that collaboration is 
anything but symbolic and tokenistic (or simply collaborative behaviours). Even for 
new clients, the old images of paternalism are very much still around.  Collaboration 
rests on an assumption of mutual respect. Clients really need to respect that 
psychiatric professionals have something to offer and psychiatric professionals need 
to respect that the  journey of recovery, as experienced by clients, also offers a certain 
expertise (I will discuss this in Chapter 8).  As shown in Chapter 2, the recovery 
criteria involve improvements to symptoms and functioning that are meaningful to 
clients and professionals. The only way that both groups can comprehend “what is 
meaningful to the other” is through collaboration. While there are different models of 
collaboration,  they all share a concern to ensure that the important aspects of 
someone’s recovery receives input from professionals and clients, thus preventing 
either purely self directed care from the client or paternalism from the professional. 
  The ability to collaborate involves a number of mental functions: 
judgement, insight, cognition, feeling, volition, etc. When someone is very ill, some 
or all of these functions will be affected in such a way that the ability to collaborate 
will be compromised. Under these circumstances, all that professionals can do is use 
their clinical wisdom and model collaborative practice and hope that the client’s 
symptoms and functioning improve to the extent that they are able to participate more 
actively in the collaborative relationship. 
 
Honesty 
   In order to be collaborative, honesty between client and professional is 
essential. If clients are not honest about their experiences, particularly their 
experience of mental states, it will be difficult for any meaningful dialogue to occur 
with psychiatric professionals or others. As for collaboration between client and 
professional, there is an historical legacy that makes honesty  between them less easy 
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than it otherwise might be. Until quite recently, the hard paternalism of psychiatric 
services meant that clients who were very honest about their experiences, in terms of 
symptoms, would receive longer periods in hospital and be subject to more assertive 
treatment. In such an environment, to be discharged required not honesty but skills of 
persuasion; the skill of persuading the professionals that all was well. Honesty is the 
virtue of telling the truth. For a collaborative model to work, honesty is imperative. 
Lying or deception inevitably means that not all the relevant information for making 
informed decisions is available. In order for clients to move on in the recovery sense, 
they need to be honest with themselves as well as with others. Self-honesty involves 
accepting problems as they are according to the evidence. If someone is in denial of 
their illness, for example, it makes it difficult to achieve any kind of honesty.  
 
Self-discipline 
 At some point in their recovery journey, clients become aware of what helps 
them to recover. This is often hard won information, the result of perhaps several 
relapses. This information, if used well, can help them to identify early warning signs 
so that they can prevent the worst aspects of their illness taking hold again.  This early 
warning information can be built into a wellness maintenance programme. To 
continue with a wellness maintenance programme involves considerable self-
discipline. It is this virtue of self-discipline that is so necessary for clients who want to 
recover from mental illness. This kind of self-discipline cannot be given by someone 
else and no one else can take responsibility for it. Self-discipline involves 
perseverance and honesty, since clients need to stick at it and honestly admit to 
themselves if they are failing in that task.  For example, it might be the case that a 
client knows that they are vulnerable to the use of marijuana and that using it 
increases the risk of the symptoms of their illness manifesting itself.  Continuing in 
their recovery means they need to stop using marijuana. Since marijuana has addictive 
properties this is a difficult goal to accomplish, though necessary for recovery.  
 
Practical Wisdom 
 In Aristotle’s terminology, all the previous virtues are considered moral 
virtues. At some level these moral virtues are about emotional balance (that is 
exercising rational control over and directing the emotions) whereas the intellectual 
virtues are about thinking. We must now turn to the intellectual virtues, or more 
  
 
135
specifically  practical wisdom, and its significance for recovery.  Intellectual virtue 
can be seriously affected by mental illness, even more so than moral virtue. Illness 
can involve perceptual and cognitive distortion; and therefore insight, judgement and 
reasoning capacity must be considered when deciding on a client’s capability. 
However, it is unusual for clients not to recover these mental functions to some 
extent, at least sufficiently to be able to understand the implications of their absence. 
Once again, intellectual virtues such as reasoning, practical wisdom and deliberation 
are on a continuum with clients in a crisis state not able to exercise these virtues with 
any degree of consistency and then slowly regaining them over time as they move 
towards self-care.  
  Everyone has different innate capabilities in terms of the intellectual 
virtues, which can be developed or not by education.  In that sense, recovery of 
intellectual capabilities and virtues will be different for each person recovering from 
mental illness. There is no one fixed point that everyone is aiming at.  Each client 
journey will be quite different. Practical wisdom is a key concept for understanding 
the virtues in clients recovering from mental illness. It is also a complicated and 
contentious area of Aristotelian enquiry. For Aristotle, practical wisdom means to be 
good at thinking about what one should do. For a client recovering from mental 
illness, that means being good at thinking about what one should do in order to 
recover from mental illness.  The key notions here are that thinking (itself a universal 
concept applicable in many contexts) needs to be applied by a particular client 
recovering from mental illness. Additionally, practical wisdom seems to be concerned 
with both means and ends. The other key point is that what one ‘ought to do’ is meant 
to be seen in a very specific way in the Aristotelian tradition of understanding the 
virtues. These three key points about practical wisdom will be discussed one by one. 
  Thinking – like mental illness or even like recovery- can be seen in  
universal terms applying to many  different types of people and contexts. This type of 
universal thinking has been instrumental in producing the diagnostic manuals used  to 
diagnose mental disorder. Aristotle himself differentiates between this universal or 
scientific thinking and the practical thinking that must deal with particulars. It is this  
client at this particular time who needs to make decisions about their recovery. The 
need to deal with particulars is one of the reasons why abstract principles and 
procedures often fail to assist with complicated decision-making at an individual 
level.   
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  Aristotle develops a teleological account concerned with relating concepts 
such as nature, function and purpose to the notion of the good life.  As Aristotle notes,  
“every art and every investigation, and similarly every action and pursuit, is 
considered to aim at some good. Hence the Good has been rightly defined as ‘that at 
which all things aim’” (NE Bk I 109421-22).  So every human action has its own aim 
or object. These objects in turn are means to yet other ends, and so on. To give a basic 
example; a client may attend a group therapy session in order to recover the ability to 
relate to others. This ability to relate to others may enable the client to get a job. 
Securing a job means he has an income with which he can go on holiday.  It may be 
that the client would choose none of these things for themselves alone. He may dislike 
groups and not enjoy working in a job. However, the end which he does accept for 
itself affords the motive for the intermediate ends that are necessary stages in the 
progression to the final aim. But equally, to revert to the first step in the process, he 
may attend the group therapy session simply because he enjoys it. Or he might enjoy 
it and recognise that it is a step towards something else that he finds desirable in itself. 
But, however long or short this chain of activities may be, there must be at the end of 
it something that is sought after for itself alone and not as a means to something else. 
Aristotle would maintain that even beyond the end of recovery from mental illness 
there must be a supreme good (eudaimonia) towards which all human activities are 
directed. 
  When Aristotle speaks about what we ‘ought to do’, he is using this phrase 
'ought to do’ in a very particular way. Moral terms for Aristotle have a broader sense 
than we tend to use today. We tend to think of moral decisions as decisions that affect 
others. Aristotle is using such commands as “I should eat healthy food” and “I should 
take my medication” as moral statements. So, for example, a client should take more 
responsibility for their own health as they improve and this will involve taking 
decisions such as when to see psychiatric professionals less often, when to decrease 
the amount of medication they are taking, and when to take responsibility for self 
administering their medication. 
  In broad terms, these characteristics of practical wisdom in the context of 
recovery can be seen to apply to the following stages of the recovery journey: crisis, 
rehabilitation and self-care.   
  In the crisis stage, the only opportunity for displaying practical wisdom  
might be for the client to realise that they should defer to psychiatric professionals. 
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Assuming a client is able to make this decision, they will need to trust that psychiatric 
professionals have their best interests as their prime motivator, not making money or 
passing exams or any of a multitude of other motives. This moral virtue of trust is 
consequently foundational for the realisation of other virtues. It also demonstrates, as 
Aristotle would agree, that at some level the virtues form a unity.  
  In the rehabilitation stage, the client displays practical wisdom by realising 
they need to take increasing responsibility for their own mental health but 
collaboratively with psychiatric professionals. Pragmatism is concerned with clients 
making as many decisions for themselves as they can and taking responsibility for 
them, with psychiatric professionals providing a therapeutic safety net. Courage is an 
important moral virtue for helping the client to rehabilitate. It has significance at all 
points in the client’s recovery journey but it is particularly relevant in the 
rehabilitation phase where there is a  tension between illness and health conceptions.15  
The sick role can be difficult for clients to let go of, and if they have been in that sick 
role for an extended period of time it can be particularly difficult to move on from it 
since it becomes comfortable and predictable. Courage is needed to let go of that sick 
role with all the implications of such a role in terms of the amount of responsibility 
someone can exercise in finding work or educational qualifications.  It is practical 
wisdom that ensures that a client uses appropriate courage to become unstuck and 
take the next step. 
  In the self-care stage of recovery, practical wisdom is displayed when 
clients accept increasing levels of responsibility for their own mental health in terms 
of their wellness maintenance programme, with psychiatric professionals deferring to 
the client’s decisions.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15 Rehabilitation is often seen as a phase in the recovery journey characterised  by tension between 
illness and health, as the acute symptoms subside. The tension  results  from a need to keep symptoms 
under control while pursuing healthy activities such as work, relationships and personal interests.  
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Summary  
   This chapter has indicated why the virtues offer a way of understanding 
how recovery can be facilitated by psychiatric professionals for clients suffering from 
mental illness. Virtues are useful in this sense because, like recovery itself, they are 
concerned with inner growth and development. A conception of the virtues based 
heavily on Aristotelian foundations offers the best way of conceiving of the virtues. 
  In order to ensure the best prospect of recovery, clients who are suffering 
from mental illness need to acquire or develop a sense of hopefulness about the 
possibility of recovery. They need to build on the experience of suffering to develop 
virtues such as self-awareness, compassion and trust. Without these virtues it will be 
difficult to accept or acquire the virtue of accepting increasing levels of responsibility 
for their own well being. In order to do this, they need the virtues of courage, 
perseverance, honesty, self-discipline and a preparedness to be collaborative in their 
dealings with psychiatric professionals. In the Aristotelian sense, these virtues can be 
seen as moral virtues. Clients also need to acquire the intellectual virtue of practical 
wisdom without which they will find it difficult to assess what is the appropriate time 
to accept increasing levels of responsibility. 
  For their part, the psychiatric professional also needs to develop or acquire 
virtues.  Professionals who want to be therapeutic agents in the way they assist clients 
to recover from mental illness, need the virtue of being able to let go of 
responsibilities so that clients can assume those responsibilities. Psychiatric 
professionals also need to be loyal to clients since recovery takes time and frequent 
changes of clinician  can have a destabilising effect. Psychiatric professionals  need to 
be people who have sympathy and compassion for clients who are mentally ill. 
Indeed, without the virtue of sympathy they should not even think about a career in 
this area.  Psychiatric professionals  (like professionals in any field) need the virtues 
of genuineness and integrity.  Since recovery can take a long time, they need to be 
patient and able to wait for the appropriate moment before making interventions. 
They need the virtue of tolerance and the capacity to be collaborative with clients. As 
an intellectual virtue, psychiatric professionals need the virtue of practical wisdom to 
know when to step back and facilitate a client’s assumption of responsibility for an 
activity or function (or the wisdom to know when to take on more responsibility).  
 
  
 
139
  The next chapter will consider what is the best virtue-based collaborative 
model for client-professional interactions. 
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CHAPTER 7 
The Recovery Ethos Part II: The Collaborative Client-Professional 
Model  
  Chapter 6 indicated the virtues that clients recovering from mental illness 
need to acquire or develop if they are to be successful in their recovery. It also 
indicated the virtues that psychiatric professionals will need to acquire if they are to 
be therapeutic agents (or healers).There is a significant overlap between the two sets 
of virtues and so there is a sense in which the way the client and professional relate to 
each other can either reinforce or undermine the virtues they need to acquire. We 
should now  consider the nature of the interaction between clients and professionals. 
As will be argued in Section Four, only the collaborative model provides a basis for 
fully reinforcing professional-client virtues. 
  This chapter has four sections. Section One will critique three models of 
client-professional interaction from past and current practice that have attempted to 
address the issue of how clients and professionals should interact in psychiatric 
services. Section Two will critique a fiduciary-based model from Pellegrino and 
Thomasma (1981, 1988) that has been applied to health. Section Three will  indicate 
some modifications of this fiduciary model for psychiatric practice. Section Four will  
present the collaborative virtue-based model.  
 
  Section One: Critique of Models of Client-Professional Interaction 
The aim of this section is to critique three models of client-professional 
interaction which have been used in psychiatric services. There are three models of 
client-professional interaction that have had historical traction in psychiatric practice 
and that continue to have exponents. These models are: the expert care model, the 
rights-based model and the contractual model.16
 
The Expert Care Model 
The expert care model was developed during the  clinical- expert ethos. It is 
a model characterised by a high degree of paternalism and based on the notion that the 
professional, usually a medical doctor, knows best. The perspective of the client (who 
                                                          
16 While Pellegrino and Thomasma (1981, 1988) offer some discussion of these models, Oakley and 
Cocking (2001) offer a sympathetic treatment of virtue-based models.  
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was referred to as a ‘patient’ during this period, that is, someone who was passive and 
non-assertive) was seen as unimportant compared to the expert’s view. However, for 
all its many defects, this model  was grounded in an earlier Hippocratic view of the 
doctor as having a strong duty of care towards their patient, a duty of care in which 
the doctor was held to be responsible. A central problem with this model was that it 
relied absolutely upon the expertise of the doctor (or other health professional) and 
not at all upon the client’s expertise.  Also – particularly during its highpoint in the 
late Victorian period – it was not interested in the way in which the professional and 
client interacted. It saw the expert’s role almost in technical terms as a vehicle for 
mechanically rectifying structural defects in the client’s brain. This was particularly 
true for experts who based their work on a biological approach to care. However, 
similar concerns were also apparent for psychoanalytically oriented professionals, 
who saw their role as interacting with the client so that they could make a correct 
interpretation of the client’s psychological processes.   
 
The Rights-Based Model 
 Largely because of the paternalistic excesses of the previous expert care 
model there was an increasing recognition of client rights. These rights were 
enshrined in legislation and increasingly in procedures. This approach, while of 
historical origin, is still very much with us in the procedural ethos, which has come to 
characterise the underlying philosophy of psychiatric services. The rights-based 
model was characterised by an increasing emphasis upon the self-determination of the 
client and the need of psychiatric services to respect the client’s choices and 
decisions. The previous expert care model was often demonised by proponents of this 
model. While this model certainly led to increasing tolerance and respect for client 
autonomy, paternalism was often seen as being untherapeutic. The rights-based model 
was not, in itself, concerned with the nature of the relationship between the client and 
professional, only with ensuring that the client’s rights were not violated. There 
tended to be an emphasis upon client rights and not a corresponding set of rights for 
psychiatric professionals, who had all the responsibilities for protecting client rights 
but few of the benefits. The anxiety associated with violating client rights has tended 
to make services focus upon the minimal requirements to ensure no legal redress and 
yet this may involve doing less than would be desirable.  
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  In psychiatric services a rights-based model is particularly problematic 
since there are occasions when the Mental Health Act can be, and needs to be, 
invoked with some justification: that is, for clients clearly a risk to themselves or 
others because of their mental state. In a rights-based model of care, if the client is not 
able to exercise their own rights those rights are codified by a set of procedures where 
principles are enshrined in protocols, guidelines and policies and pre-eminently in 
legislation. As already explained, relatively small numbers of clients, at any time, 
require the Mental Health Act and yet the procedures designed to ensure that their 
rights are respected are transferred onto the majority of psychiatric clients, just in case 
they become unwell and need the Act. 
  The rights-based model has also tended to mean that the responsibility that 
existed during the clinical-expert ethos has shifted from the professional to the 
guidelines and procedures.  At times this has led to frustration for clients who are 
subject to abuse as they try to battle against a ‘system’ to prove their rights were 
violated. The rights-based model required that professionals behaved in a certain way 
because these were the rules. This has led some clients to have a sense of entitlement 
and also, perhaps more seriously, it has led to professionals and clients not trusting 
each other.  
  As clients tried to obtain their rights, some professionals were starting to 
see that it was usually the paternalistic decisions to withhold information or to put 
clients on a new medication without consulting them that created problems, rather 
than, for example, omitting to involve clients in a graduated way to assume  more 
responsibility. Rights are categorical, one has them or one does not. There has been 
(and continues to be) a tendency for some professionals to see rights in a black and 
white way. Either clients are or are not allowed to make decisions for themselves. If 
they have a right to make decisions for themselves, then there are no intermediate 
cases in this analysis. The reality is that there are many intermediate cases or shades 
of grey, which are often not captured in a rights-based approach. 
 
The Contractual Model 
The rights-based model has underpinned the development of the contractual 
model. The contractual model is fundamentally about the client and professional 
agreeing to a set of conditions and forming a contract for their mutual encounters. The 
contractual model accepts that the client has a number of pre-existing rights and that 
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the contract cannot alienate these. The problem is that the contractual model assumes 
a high degree of client competency and understanding in order to be able to agree a 
contract with a professional in the first place. In practice, there is always a significant 
imbalance in power and understanding which makes contracting difficult.  
  The contractual model, not surprisingly, is popular in private practice. 
Psychiatrists such as Szasz are particularly enthusiastic about such a model. Outside 
of private practice, however, it is difficult to see how contracting can occur in any 
sense that is credible. For a client arriving in a psychiatric service during a time of 
crisis, it simply makes no sense to expect that they would formally contract with a 
psychiatric professional.   Contracting involves a significant amount of negotiation. It 
is far from clear that in a non-private context such negotiation is possible for all 
clients for all their admissions. Contracting might be possible during the partnership 
phase of collaboration, but even then, a contract simply based on rights would be a 
very thin contract indeed. 
  
Section Two: Critique of Pellegrino and Thomasma’s Fiduciary-Based Model 
                 The aim of this section is to critique the ‘fiduciary’ model of client-
professional interaction developed by Pellegrino and Thomasma (1981, 1988) for a 
health context.      
  ‘Fiduciary’ comes from the Latin and means ‘in trust’. This model is based 
on a richer and more complex understanding of human relationships, which appeals to 
the older tradition  referred to in the expert care model, namely a model where the 
health professional offers a service based on agreeing to put the client’s interests first 
so that the professional can ‘hold in trust’ the client’s wellbeing. This older tradition 
was taken in an extreme paternalistic direction under the clinical-expert ethos, which 
is partly why it fell from favour for a period. The fiduciary model, which has regained 
popularity in recent years, appeals to the virtues in a more Aristotelian sense. There 
are a number of fiduciary-based models but perhaps the best known is the 
beneficence-in-trust model developed by Pellegrino and Thomasma (1981, 1988).   
  Pellegrino and Thomasma put forward their beneficence-in-trust model as a 
way of avoiding the pitfalls of either an autonomy-based model or a paternalism-
based model.  In an autonomy-based model (such as the rights-based model discussed 
earlier) the client is seen as being the important decision-maker, who simply seeks the 
opinion of clinicians. The autonomy-based model, however, often fails to 
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acknowledge the significant power imbalances that currently exist within healthcare. 
The autonomy-based model is also not well suited to the psychiatric context, where 
the very capacity for independent decision-making can sometimes be affected.  The 
paternalism-based model (or expert care model) is also limited. It might be argued 
that for individuals who are unable to exercise their own decision-making faculties or 
functions, the role of professionals to paternalistically make decisions for the client 
becomes warranted and justified.   However, – if we accept that there might be 
occasions when some degree of paternalism is justified – there is still the problem of 
adapting such interventions for clients who are able to make their own decisions17. 
This capacity is violated by professionals acting paternalistically, even if they are 
doing it for what they perceive to be the best interests of the client. This represents a 
major problem for the paternalism-based models and hence the need to find a model 
that does not have its weaknesses. 
 The beneficence-in-trust model of Pellegrino and Thomasma (1981, 1988 ) 
is a more subtle model than either the autonomy or paternalistic models. In this 
model, Pellegrino and Thomasma reach back to older forms of relationship between 
the health professional and client.  Their focus is on the relationship between doctor 
and patient but the essential characteristics of their approach can be broadened to 
include other professionals. The beneficence-in-trust model is essentially a fiduciary-
based approach based on relationships that appeal to the virtues of both client and 
professional and is primarily motivated by the client’s best interests. While both client 
and professional have responsibilities in this regard, the professional has the prime 
responsibility since there is the power imbalance in terms of knowledge and skills 
mentioned previously.  
  Pellegrino and Thomasma believe that a reinterpretation of the principle of 
beneficence is fundamental to the business of developing a new model. By 
beneficence they mean a complex concept that has a number of levels.  They believe 
non-maleficence is its basis, which is to do no harm (a principle enshrined in the 
Hippocratic oath). The next level is to prevent harm to others. As Pellegrino and 
Thomasma (1988)  say “here we move from a passive non-maleficence to a more 
                                                          
17 There is an extensive literature indicating the ethical justification of paternalism in psychiatric 
services under some circumstances, for example Lavin (1995) argues that civil commitment is 
justifiable under strict conditions. However one of the problems with such conditions, as Culver and 
Gert (1978) reveal in their own work, is that such conditions can easily become procedural and thus 
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active interpretation on behalf of others” ( p.26). It is this positive act which is more 
problematic since, in actively attempting to prevent harm, there is the possibility of 
acting paternalistically. For example, in the case of the  client who has a history of 
self harming the professional decides to require that medications be dispensed weekly. 
This will inconvenience the client since they will need to come in to collect their 
medication on a weekly basis but it may mean they do not have the opportunity to self 
harm on medication. We might agree that for some clients such a level of paternalism 
is warranted but as a general rule feel it will depend on the particular mental state of 
the individual.  
  Pellegrino and Thomasma (1988) see the autonomy-paternalism split as 
unhelpful in terms of developing the beneficence-in-trust model, which is why they 
have sought to conceive a new understanding of beneficence18. They see beneficence 
– our degree of sensitivity to the good of others – as comprising elements of both 
autonomy and non-maleficence in that they do not see paternalism as part of 
beneficence (as Beauchamp and Childress (1994) do, for example).  
Their beneficence-in-trust model has six key features. It is beneficent, the 
existential condition of the client is paramount, it has no automatic ranking of values, 
it is predicated on consensus, it has a prudential moral object, and it is axiomatic (pp. 
32-33). 
The aim of medicine (or health care) is beneficent in that in healthcare we are 
responding to the distress and suffering of the client as a prime driver. They see this 
as having three components: a) the client’s problems take precedence (ordinarily) 
over everything else; b) harm must be avoided since intentional harm would prevent 
them relieving the distress of the client; and c) both autonomy and paternalism are 
superseded by the obligation to act beneficently. 
The primacy of the  existential condition of the client is paramount, by which 
they mean such aspects as the client’s ability to make rational choices about care, the 
nature and past values of the client, the client’s age, the nature of the illness and the 
clinical setting. 
There is no automatic ranking of values in the beneficence model, which 
contrasts with autonomy and paternalism models where either the client’s right to 
                                                                                                                                                                      
potentially inflexible as a form of practical decision making if we rely on them in a final decision-
making way. 
18 In Section Three the differences between beneficence and benevolence (the virtue) will be clarified. 
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choose or the ability of the professional to know what is right is elevated to the 
primary value.  Each client must be treated as an individual and therefore only the 
value of acting in the best interests of the client are non-negotiable; everything else 
has to be negotiated between the professional and the client. As Pellegrino and 
Thomasma (1988) state, “This model requires that patients and physicians become 
able to identify, rank, discuss and negotiate values” (p. 33). 
The beneficence model is predicated on consensus between health 
professionals and between professionals and client. 
Having a prudential moral object is another key feature, by which is meant 
that difficult ethical quandaries must be settled by attempting to preserve as many of 
the client’s and professional’s values as possible. 
Axioms are the sixth key feature. Pellegrino and Thomasma (1988, p.34) 
believe that in order to avoid the pitfalls of situational ethics or the 
autonomy/paternalism models it is necessary to have a number of generalised axioms 
to guide health practice.  
In the next section  I will indicate how this model needs to be modified if we 
want to use it in a psychiatric context.  
 
Section Three: Fiduciary Model Modifications for Psychiatric Practice 
 The aim of this section is to show how the beneficence-in-trust model needs 
to be modified in order to make it appropriate for psychiatric services. The Pellegrino 
and Thomasma model is a significant attempt to embed the client–professional 
relationship in the virtues rather than principles or rights. The model has much to 
recommend it, particularly in general healthcare. While the model was not developed 
specifically for psychiatric services, at no point in their argument do they attempt to 
exclude psychiatric practice and hence we can only assume they meant to include it. 
However, there are a number of serious problems with adopting the model as 
represented directly into psychiatric practice.  Insofar as it attempts to make the case 
that paternalism has no part in beneficence, the model is based on a mistaken 
understanding of beneficence.  
  Paternalism is a more serious issue in psychiatric practice than it is in other 
areas of healthcare since, in psychiatric services, it is more prevalent for clients to lose 
the functional capacity to make decisions and exercise reason in their own best 
interests. There is a wide consensus that under strict circumstances it is warranted and 
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justifiable to override the client’s own wishes if these appear to be at odds with their 
real best interests due to mental illness. Since Pellegrino and Thomasma (1988) define 
beneficence as the sensitivity to the good of others, it would appear that acting 
paternalistically (even when it is warranted and justifiable) is not being sensitive to 
the good of others. However, this would seem to be a mistake. While secluding 
clients, treating them against their wishes and placing them on a section of the Mental 
Health Act preventing them from leaving the mental health unit can be portrayed as 
coercive, it can also be seen as life saving and as acting in the real best interests of the 
client. The client who, while depressed, requests to be allowed to walk on a high 
bridge has clearly expressed a wish. However, most people would accept that being 
sensitive to this person’s true good would involve declining their request, however 
diplomatically.  As previously mentioned, when we see beneficence as more 
important than non-maleficence, it inevitably involves the question of preventing 
harm in a way that might have paternalistic overtones. There will be a matter of 
degree in that the purpose of overriding a client’s wishes must be to prevent 
significant harm  that cannot be achieved using other methods19. In a psychiatric 
context, it is important to see that paternalism is justified and warranted under certain 
circumstances and that it is about being sensitive to the good of others but also about 
being able to act benevolently for the client’s good20.  
   A second problem arising from the first is that Pellegrino and Thomasma 
(1988) see consensus as pivotal to their model. However, they make little allowance 
for the competency needed to make consensus happen and the way competency can 
be assessed. There are different tests for assessing competency. Roth et al. (1977, pp. 
279-84) identifies five tests for assessing competency: a) evidencing a choice; b) 
reasonable outcome of choice; c) choice based on rational reasons; d) ability to 
understand; and e) actual understanding.  The first test is very elementary and is 
probably only relevant to clients who are unconscious for whatever reason. The 
second test considers whether the outcome is reasonable given the person’s 
                                                          
19  Johnson (2002) has a useful account of the standard of decision-making capacity to be applied; as 
she says: “In other words, the extent to which an attending health care professional is bound morally to 
respect the choices of a person deemed ‘rationally incompetent’ depends primarily on the severity of 
the risks involved to the patient if her or his choices are permitted. The higher and more severe the 
risks involved, the higher and more rigorous should be the standards for determining the patient’s 
decision making capacity, and the more certain attending health care professionals should be that the 
patient has met these standards”  (pp.228-229).    
20 Acting benevolently, for the client’s good, is not an absolute even with people deemed incompetent  
as Van De Veer (1986) has shown. 
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circumstances. The third considers whether the choices people make are based on 
rational reasons. This involves assessing whether the reasons people adduce for their 
choices make sense within their context. There are times when, due to mental illness, 
a client may not have rational reasons. The fourth test considers whether clients have 
the ability to understand their options and the proposed course of treatment. The fifth 
test considers whether clients actually understand the options and treatments 
available. 
  These five tests can be seen as forming a continuum towards a more 
exacting level of assessment in that the actual understanding of their options and 
treatments is a significantly higher threshold for a client than the ability to evidence a 
choice. The point of this is that consensus (like collaboration, which  will be discussed 
later) relies on a certain competency. The crucial issue  that we need to be clear about 
is how we are determining competency, since the result would be quite different 
depending, for example, on which of the previous five tests we use.  It is quite 
legitimate to say that consensus can be achieved along the client’s recovery pathway 
from crisis to self help, provided we indicate that we are using a particular 
competency test. Brock and Buchanan (1989) make the important point that 
competency is a competency about a particular action and that therefore we need to 
clearly identify the choice and action we are referring to, rather than a global 
conception of competency.  
  Consensus is not always possible, even when people are mentally well. 
Consensus can be very problematic when individuals are mentally ill. Therefore, I 
prefer to talk about agreement between client and professional rather than consensus, 
since this indicates a particular collaborative outcome. Consensus, as we have already 
seen, can easily lend itself to a procedural mentality, which is something I am trying 
to distance myself from in this thesis. 
   The third problem with the beneficence-in-trust model as presented by 
Pellegrino and Thomasma is that the axioms they state are not practically helpful in a 
psychiatric context and can be seen as implicit within a virtue-based model. The four 
axioms they state are: 1) both doctor (or health professional) and client must be free to 
make informed decisions and to act fully as moral agents;  2) physicians have the 
greater responsibility in the relationship because of the inherent inequality of 
information and power between themselves and those who are ill; 3) physicians must 
be persons of personal moral integrity; and 4) physicians must respect and 
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comprehend moral ambiguity yet not abandon the search for what is right and good in 
each decision. As will become clearer in the next section, the problem with these 
axioms is that they provide a specious procedural appearance to things best handled in 
a virtue approach, since these axioms provide no substance for assisting with practical 
decision-making over and above the values implicit in the virtues that clients and 
professionals need to have developed.  The virtues of integrity and the virtues 
connected to responsibility, honesty and collaboration cover these axioms.    
      
Section Four: Collaborative Virtue-Based Model 
The aim of this section is to present the collaborative virtue-based model. 
Collaboration and partnership are currently buzz words in psychiatric practice. 
Everybody wants to be collaborative. Unfortunately, the reality and the intention are 
poles apart. This is because collaboration necessarily relies on a virtue-based 
approach, which is sadly missing from current psychiatric approaches.  
  Collaboration, as already seen, involves the client and professional working 
together. My contention is that it is only when that working together is founded on a 
virtue-based approach that collaboration is possible.  Other approaches, relying on 
principles and rules, may appear to involve collaboration but the reality is that the 
principles and rules always bias the process towards the professional.  Much of what 
passes for collaboration is best referred to as consultation.  
  This section will describe the main components of the collaborative model 
which is loosely based on the beneficence-in–trust model already described.  The 
collaborative model is a model being proposed as an ideal model for psychiatric 
services. This will be done, firstly by providing a rationale for the collaborative 
model; secondly describing the components of the collaborative model; thirdly by 
indicating the major features of the model; and fourthly by giving some practical 
implications of the model. 
 Firstly,  as already discussed, collaboration is the virtue of being able to 
work with others and this involves sharing both moral and intellectual virtues: the 
moral virtues are honesty, integrity, perseverance, sympathy and the like; the 
intellectual virtue is practical wisdom which both the professional and client can bring 
to the encounter; and by sharing the technical expertise that both possess. For the 
professional, this expertise is knowledge and skills in diagnosing, treating and 
researching mental disorder and mental illness, whereas the client brings an expertise 
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in their own experience of mental illness which can help them recover. Together, this 
collaboration is a powerful combination since neither the professional nor the client 
has a complete picture of the situation by themselves, but in combination there is the 
potential for a more complete understanding. Collaboration is also a matter of having 
the appropriate collaborative attitude. Both the professional and the client need to 
really value and respect the expertise of the other. If either or both are full of their 
own hubris in terms of believing their contribution is more important ultimately than 
that of the other, the possibility of meaningful collaboration is much reduced. This 
attitudinal respect is quite different from seeing that, at various phases of the 
collaborative relationship, either the client or professional can have more to 
contribute. The collaboration is ultimately focused on the good of the client and this 
provides its foundational purpose.  
  Secondly there are a number of components to the collaborative model: a) 
fiduciary base;  b) phases of collaboration; c) attempts to reduce or eliminate ‘ethical 
dissonance’; and d) processes for dealing with differences between clients and 
professionals.   
  a) The model has a fiduciary base in that the client’s well being is ‘held in 
trust’ by the professional. The virtues of both client and professional pertinent to 
recovery from mental illness are both potentially optimised by a collaborative model 
in that they are both working on the same project for the same purpose, namely the 
good of the client in terms of their recovery from mental illness.      
  b) As previously discussed, the collaborative model accepts that for 
collaboration to occur there needs to be a certain level of competency in the client 
and, given the focus on recovery, a shifting emphasis on professional and client 
responsibility.  In the early phases of the encounter, the responsibility is 
predominantly the professional’s (although this will depend upon competency 
assessments and even in the earlier phases the client may be deemed responsible for 
aspects of their own well being) and this can become true partnership during the 
rehabilitation period of the client’s mental illness, where there is an increasing 
emphasis upon wellness in addition to illness. Finally, the later stages of collaboration 
involve the client assuming increasing levels of responsibility for their own wellness.  
  c) The term ‘ethical dissonance’, relates to the  differing perception between 
the professional and client with regards to what the client should do for their recovery 
and hence the level of responsibility a client can safely assume for their recovery. 
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Collaboration is the virtue of being able to work with others. It can be seen to involve 
a collaborative attitude and a collaborative expression of that attitude in collaborative 
behaviours. Where the disagreement between client and professional is great, the 
possibility of a collaborative behaviour is lessened; where the disagreement is small, 
the possibility of collaborative behaviour is increased. While the collaborative 
behaviour is affected by disagreements, the collaborative attitude from both client and 
professional needs to be strong at all times. There will be periods, particularly in the 
initial stages following admission, when for clients who are incompetent in terms of 
their reasoning, memory and judgement skills and who have some perceptual 
disturbance, the likelihood of collaborative behaviour is small. Under these 
circumstances, the professional needs to ensure they retain a collaborative attitude but 
accept that due to the client’s capability, most of the decisions will be taken by the 
professional and so the decisions will be professionally determined.   However, as the 
client’s competency increases, their capability improves and hence their involvement 
in decisions affecting them also increases. During the partnership stage of 
collaboration, the client’s own  journey ( and the story clients tell themselves about 
that journey) becomes an increasingly determining factor.  
  d) Ethical dissonance can usually be managed, but sometimes the level of 
disagreement is so large that a process of resolution is necessary. In the first instance, 
the client’s own wishes for their life, based on their values and concerns should be the 
predominant feature, unless there is compelling reasons for believing the client is 
unable to articulate these in their own best interests. If a client is currently 
psychotically disordered, for example, the professional is obligated to try and discover 
what is in the best interests of the client, based on the client’s values and advance 
directives by conducting discussions with the client, their family and friends, etc. It is 
in this area that the idea of collaborative phases is particularly useful since it can 
guide professionals as to their responsibilities.  However, where necessary, the 
professional needs to consider substituted judgements as a next possibility; 
involvement of a  clinical leadership team, a reviewed opinion from another service, a 
regional ethics committee and finally the legal system in ascending order are ways 
disagreement can be handled to resolve disputes that cannot be resolved within the 
client-professional relationship.  
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 Thirdly, these components of the collaborative model have a number of 
features: a) a beneficent aim, b)  values that are negotiated,  c) optimisation of virtues, 
d) principles, and e) the valuing of expertise. 
a) The aim of the collaborative model is a beneficent one as it is in the 
beneficence-in-trust model, namely the good of the client. This does not imply that 
other aims will not be present – such as the need for services to account for spending, 
for example – but only to say that the dominant aim needs to be the beneficent one. 
b) The collaborative model does not assume – as do expert care models or 
rights-based models - for example, that ultimately the values of the client or the 
values of the professional should dominate.  In the collaborative model, the values are 
negotiated between the client and the professional.  This negotiation can be more time 
consuming than models that automatically defer to either the client or the 
professional, but what it loses in terms of time it gains in terms of acceptability.  
c) The model provides an opportunity for the optimisation of the virtues for 
both clients and professionals. It does this by focusing on what is the good of the 
client in terms of their recovery from mental illness and hence the virtues which 
professionals need in order to assist clients with this journey – mentioned in Chapter 6 
Section Two – and the virtues needed by clients in order to recover from mental 
illness mentioned in Chapter 6 Section Three, are mutually reinforcing.  
d) Moral principles, that are internally generated by the ‘community of 
interest’ in psychiatric services can be of assistance to professionals and clients alike. 
The key point is that these principles are not imposed but negotiated collaboratively 
by the professionals and clients involved. How this negotiation can occur will be 
further discussed in Chapter 9 when we discuss the psychiatric community. 
e) This collaborative model is premised on the assumption that both 
professionals and clients have a particular expertise, which neither possesses alone. 
This expertise, if harnessed through mutual sharing, respect and valuing, can provide 
clients with the opportunity to recover.   
Fourthly, there are practical implications to using the collaborative virtue-
based model.  This model rejects the simplistic approach of the autonomy-paternalism 
dichotomy which has dogged psychiatric practice for much of its history and also the 
current focus upon the dominant principle of justice. By emphasising the need to 
reduce ethical dissonance and to increase consensus and negotiation,  the model does 
not distance itself from collaborative paternalism, that is, benevolent acts aimed at 
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temporarily assisting the client to recover while disregarding the client’s current 
wishes (unlike Pellegrino and Thomasma’s (1988) model). There are numerous 
examples of when this collaborative paternalism is necessary, such as depressed 
clients who are threatening suicide, and clients under the influence of hallucinations 
or delusions who are threatening to do harm to themselves or others. Collaborative 
paternalism is limited, specific and only justifiable until the client can account for 
those activities or functions themselves. 
  Likewise, autonomy is not the aim of psychiatric practice; the aim is the 
beneficent one of furthering what is good for the client in terms of recovery from 
mental illness. Increasing client autonomy is a means to that end.    
 
Summary 
This chapter made a case for a collaborative virtue-based model as the best 
available model for the client-professional relationship in psychiatric services. The 
chapter critiqued rights-based and expert care models as being too focused on 
autonomy and paternalism respectively.  
The collaborative virtue-based model would provide an optimisation of the 
virtues of  clients and professionals and provide a vehicle for the expertise of both 
professionals and clients to be maximised. 
In the next chapter I will have more to say about how the virtues necessary 
for client recovery can be developed through a recovery narrative. 
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CHAPTER   8 
The Recovery Ethos Part III:  
Constructing a Recovery narrative 
 
  This chapter will provide the third component of the recovery ethos, namely 
the need for clients to construct a recovery narrative of their illness experience. By  
recovery narrative I mean that clients are able to tell their story of a journey into 
mental illness and then of that journey towards mental health1 in such a way that the 
experience of mental illness is seen to have a meaning for that person. For those who 
are currently receiving psychiatric services, this will mean the client possibly using 
the collaborative relationship with psychiatric professionals to explore the issues 
thrown up by the construction of a narrative through a  virtue-based model, as 
discussed in the previous chapter.  
  This chapter will argue that constructing a recovery narrative is a critical 
component of recovery for clients who have been mentally ill by showing how 
important it is for people to tell their story in their own terms and thus make practical 
decisions about their own recovery.2 This idea of constructing a recovery narrative is 
a crucial component of recovery since it affects the way clients view their own 
symptoms and functioning. A recovery narrative can be facilitated by the presence of 
virtues at critical points in the client’s recovery journey. These crucial moments are 
called ‘critical points’3 since they are pivotal moments when clients can make 
decisions which will have serious implications for the rest of their recovery. In some 
sense, every decision or every moment is crucial in someone’s recovery, but there 
seem to be moments of particular significance, where new pathways can be taken or 
new relationships established. The decisions clients make at these critical points (like 
other decisions they make) are influenced by the dispositions they have established in 
their life as well as their ability to rationally think through the options available to 
them. This combination of moral and intellectual virtues can be seen at its most 
crucial in these critical points. 
                                                 
1 Another way of phrasing this is to say ‘recovery from’ illness and ‘recovery of’ health. 
2 Parfit (1984) indicated the lessening of psychological connectedness between thoughts and memories 
as time progresses which raises the problem of the continuation of personal identity. However, I am 
assuming in this thesis that there is sufficient continuity of personal experience to talk about the same 
identity when discussing the recovery narrative, albeit one which changes.  
3 Empirical evidence does support this contention of key moments in someone’s recovery. See footnote 
five below.  
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 There are four sections in this chapter. Section One will provide a rationale 
for the way in which the construction of a recovery narrative can help people recover 
from mental illness. Section Two will explain the significance for recovery of 
narrative and narrative ethics.  Section  Three will show how the virtues connect to 
the notion of a recovery narrative through the ‘critical points’. Finally, Section Four 
will show how the collaborative model can help clients take advantage of ‘critical 
points’ in constructing their recovery narrative.   
 
Section  One: Rationale for the Construction of a Recovery Narrative  
In this section my aim is to explain why constructing a recovery narrative is 
vital for recovery from mental illness and then how that narrative helps clients to 
recover. 
Constructing a recovery narrative is a vital component of  recovery.4 Unless 
a client develops an appropriate narrative they are unlikely to advance in their 
recovery. The relevant virtues can only be displayed where there is an appropriate 
narrative, which  provides the client with a basis for reflection, a ground for hope, and 
a foundation for anticipating difficult moments.     
Constructing a recovery narrative provides a necessary link between the 
virtues and the psychiatric community (to be discussed in the next chapter) in that 
recovery narratives are a means of promoting the virtues  through moral education 
aiming at the goal the community has selected.  
Constructing a recovery narrative is an important part of the illness 
experience for clients recovering from mental illness. This is not about discovering 
information which is already held somewhere but a more active and creative process 
of synthesising information, experiences, beliefs, feelings and thoughts into a 
coherent and meaningful account. The construction is always open-ended and 
provisional since the client never knows with certainty what will come next and, 
therefore, it is always in the process of development.    
  It might appear that the claim that constructing a recovery narrative will 
assist with recovery from mental illness is an empirical one. Although traditional 
                                                 
4 Gillett (1999) provides a broad philosophical justification for a discursive understanding of 
psychiatric care, which includes narrative.  
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empirical methods could provide evidence for the value of such an approach,5 my 
focus in what follows is instead on how the recovery narrative forms a credible and 
coherent part of the recovery  ethos.6   
There are three main ways in which constructing a recovery narrative can 
help clients recover, based on the therapeutic nature of the storytelling process, the 
ability to find some meaning in the illness experience and the increased ability to 
make practical decisions helpful for their recovery. It is hard to say what exactly the 
psychological processes are which give rise to a changed view with regards their 
illness but the changing perspective seems to be connected with the telling of the 
story. As clients start to tell their own story, in their own terms, they take ownership 
of it and this helps them to see that the illness experience did not come out of nowhere 
but was part of their life.7 Arthur Frank (1995)  refers to this process as one of giving 
testimony to their illness experience. Frank believes that the testimony of suffering is 
the communal and individual moral duty of the ill person. In his discussion of Frank’s 
understanding of testimony, Brody (1997) states that Frank wants us to rethink the 
way testimony works. Ordinarily we imagine a sick person thinks about their 
suffering, finds words to describe it and then communicates this to another, while the 
other, through some process of empathy, then imagines what it must be like to suffer 
in that way. But Frank sees this as too mediated an account, and argues instead that 
we fail to understand the power and importance of testimony unless we understand it 
in a more direct way. According to Brody’s interpretation, we need to:  
See the story of the sick person as the suffering body itself giving the 
testimony of its suffering; and the listener to the story is necessarily 
                                                 
5 Such empirical research has occurred.  Lapsley et al. (2002) interviewed  forty participants on their 
recovery journey from mental illness. They found that stories fell into three broad themes: journeys 
into illness, journeys towards recovery; and onward journeys.  While the focus of this research was 
more on what those recovery journeys look like qualitatively, rather than whether the telling of stories 
in itself aided recovery, there is a sense in which those who are on the recovery pathway become better 
able to make sense of their illness experience and so there is a chicken and egg element to this material.   
6 The most respected methodology in an empirical sense is a randomised-controlled trial. If one could 
assign clients into two groups, in one group the client and professional virtues through a collaborative 
relationship would be stressed, with the use of a strong narrative style. The other group would consist 
of treatment where the virtues in a collaborative relationship were not stressed and where the client’s 
narrative was disregarded. Then we might have empirical evidence for this aspect of the recovery 
ethos. However, the ethical problems associated with this approach are obviously not acceptable. This 
problem will continue to attach to research connected to the virtues.   
7  Leibrich (1999) provides an example of the way in which individuals who have experienced mental 
illness, through telling their own story, take possession of that story and, through the ownership, some 
sense of meaningfulness. Another example  is  the equally compelling collection of client stories     
edited by Read and Reynolds (1996). 
 157
present, not as a taker-in of information, but as herself a potentially 
suffering body that receives the testimony of suffering in a more direct 
body-to-body fashion (p.21).    
This part  of Frank’s account of illness narratives is not altogether convincing. Even 
allowing for the possibility that sufferers of physical diseases such as cancer – as is 
the case with Frank who had cancer – experience testimony in the way described, it is 
hard to see the parallels with mental illness where the body per se is not involved and 
where we do not usually see the brain in any direct fashion, as psychosurgery has 
deservedly fallen from favour. Frank is on a mystical quest with regards to his 
understanding of testimony and the simpler view already mentioned, that it is about 
transmitting a story with great feeling to others, is a far more useful and meaningful  
account of testimony and hence of the essential motive behind the construction of the 
recovery narrative.   
  Constructing a recovery narrative helps clients find meaning in their illness 
experiences through their development of an ‘explanatory model,’ which is a client’s 
attempt to answer the following types of questions: What is the cause of the illness? 
Why did it occur when it did? What are the implications of the illness? What is the 
source of improvements and exacerbations? What do I most fear about this illness? 
What do I expect from treatment? In other words, an explanatory model is the way a 
client accounts for the illness and the experiences associated with it. Developing an 
explanatory model is also directly related to the criteria for recovery itself, in that the 
client develops answers, from the client’s perspective, to questions about symptoms 
and functioning. This explanatory model provides a partial picture of the mental 
illness the client is experiencing, since it is a subjective one, and as will be seen later 
on, can be combined with the explanatory model of psychiatric professionals.   
  While there have been many attempts to analyse the explanatory model of 
clients, the work of  Kleinman (1988) has been one of the most influential.  Kleinman 
distinguishes between three different aspects of an explanatory model, all associated 
with meaning. These are: the meaning of symptoms, the meaning derived from 
cultural circumstances, and the meanings derived from personal and social 
circumstances. All three of these are important in enabling clients to construct a 
recovery narrative from mental illness. 
  There are many symptoms associated with mental illness, and psychiatric 
professionals focus on identifying these symptoms in an objective way.  Identifying 
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the subjective experiences of clients does, however, form part of the skill of 
recognising symptoms. Although psychiatric professionals use different explanatory 
models, the dominant one is  the framework provided by the classification systems. 
Clients often have different sets of associations with their symptoms and do not see 
them simply as evidence of a mental disorder. Some clients find it helpful to use the 
same framework as psychiatric professionals but others find this too constricting.  Part 
of the process of constructing a recovery narrative is for the client to start explaining 
what the symptoms mean to them in terms of their own explanatory model. 
  The meanings that people attach or associate with their illness experience 
can be influenced by that person’s cultural circumstance.  As Kleinman (1988) says, 
“it is not just that certain symptoms are given particular attention in certain cultural 
and historical settings, but that the meanings of all symptoms are dependent on local 
knowledge about the body and its pathologies” (p. 23). In order to construct a 
recovery narrative, some understanding by the client of their own cultural context is 
important since this will influence the meaning they associate with their experiences. 
  The final type of meaning – the personal and social – is one that has 
particular importance in chronic disorders. As Kleinman (1988) indicates, “Unlike 
cultural meanings of illness that carry significance to the sick person, this third, 
intimate type of meaning transfers vital significance from the person’s life to the 
illness experience” (p. 30).  For example, someone who has a mental illness such as 
depression may find that their experience of the illness is affected by their experiences 
of work and relationships.  This personal experience of the meaning of mental illness 
is the area most difficult to contain within established explanatory models and hence 
the area most likely to suffer where the professional explanatory model is dominant. 
The final way in which constructing a recovery narrative helps clients is  to 
enable them to make practical decisions about their recovery. I will have more to say 
on this in a later section since this is the focus of the chapter, but essentially it links to 
the notion  of ‘critical points’ in a client’s recovery and the understanding of which 
virtues can be helpful.    
 Constructing a recovery narrative is a rational activity, but also necessarily 
an emotional journey. That emotional journey can best be understood through the use 
of narrative ethics. 
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Section Two: Clarifying ‘Narrative’ and ‘Narrative Ethics’ 
The aim of this section is to clarify and justify the use of the terms ‘narrative’ 
and ‘narrative ethics’. The term narrative is being used almost interchangeably with 
‘story’ quite deliberately. Hunter (1992) says “in using the word ‘narrative’ somewhat 
interchangeably with ‘story’ I mean to designate a more or less coherent written, 
spoken or (by extension) enacted account of occurrences, whether historical or 
fictional” (p. 306).  There are different ways of understanding the term ‘narrative’. 
This thesis is associating narrative with the idea of story, but that still leaves some 
ambiguity. A fundamental distinction  that needs to be made is between a person’s life 
journey and the narrative of that life journey as a story.  Narrative is the story that 
someone tells about something. In reality, these two often go together in that in 
practice, in order to learn about someone’s life we need to hear stories about that life. 
In discussing recovery, the focus is upon the person’s life journey, in the sense that 
we are interested in what really happens to the person. In order to find out about this 
life, we also need some narrative as a story, whether told by the clients themselves or 
by others. The focus in this thesis is on how the story the client tells themselves and 
others about their recovery can itself help with their progress. It is important that these 
two things are differentiated, even though they are so interwoven. 
There are different types of stories that can provide insights into the client’s 
life journey. These range from autobiography to memoir, biography to fiction.8 In 
recovery from mental illness, clients will have their own story of the illness 
experience. If they write it down, which most do not, it will be a memoir or possibly 
an autobiography.  If others write the story of their journey, it will probably be a 
biography, which raises the question of the status of clinical notes as the most 
common written record of a client’s experiences. Clinical notes certainly tell a story; 
in some cases that story can be long and consist of several volumes of notes written 
by different ‘authors,’ most of whom do not see themselves as contributing to an 
overall story. Sometimes clients will add sections themselves in the first person, 
present tense but generally the clinical notes are written in a third person, past tense 
                                                 
8  Hardwig (1997) notes that there are different types of stories in narrative ethics but that the 
autobiography has become a dominant preoccupation, largely due to a societal emphasis upon 
autonomy. In broad terms I agree with this interpretation and with his solution, which is that we need to 
attend to many stories in understanding a particular client narrative. The collaborative model I have 
introduced in the last chapter is a model that  attempts to value the possible multiple sources of stories.  
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style.9  They are authoritative in that the health authority displays its logo on them 
and vouches for them in some official sense.  These clinical notes have a general 
theme of treating and managing the client’s mental disorder. Such an account  
purports to tell the truth of the client’s disorder and  attempts to provide an account of 
the client’s life, which can only fail because it is focused upon mental disorder rather 
than mental illness. It cannot claim to be a full narrative because it is not a work of 
fiction (though sometimes entries can be fictitious) and nor is it a biography (even 
though like a biography it  comments on another’s experience of life). In clinical 
notes there may be multiple authors who moreover only  comment on a particular 
component of a client’s life, namely their mental disorder.  It is, therefore, not 
surprising that many clients of psychiatric services complain that their experiences 
and their voice are not represented or captured by clinical notes.  Such accounts tend 
to have a focus on disorder, so that a recovery narrative (in the broader sense) is not 
seen as part of the purpose of those notes. In most cases, once the disorder is under 
control, psychiatric services would discharge the client to other services.  
  Narrative ethics10 in this thesis is simply the use of stories to make sense of 
practical decision-making in someone’s life journey. As Nelson (1997) indicates, 
there has been in bioethics a turn away from impartialist accounts  - since these 
accounts, as Williams (1981) has observed,  remove much of what gives life meaning, 
such as love, commitment, friendship, etc.  Stories are enormously important in the 
way we all make sense of the world. They are also particularly important in the way 
people frame their experiences and try to make sense of them. Historically, in 
psychiatric practice, the client’s stories (in their terms) have been largely ignored. As  
Coles (1989) has shown, the client’s story is a vital component of the psychiatric story 
but one ignored for a long time.  Coles discovered, working as a psychiatrist, that it 
was only when he started to really listen to a client’s story, and not purely in order to 
apply the correct diagnostic account, that he began to understand what psychiatric 
practice really meant.                         
                                                 
9 Chambers (1997)  points out that the problem for bioethical cases is the style in which cases are 
usually presented. In his view the ‘bioethics case’ has (he believes) become a genre in itself which has 
created expectations around its style. He believes that bioethical cases can be distinguished by their 
reportability. An event of some kind usually occurs  with an ethical dimension, by their action or plot, 
by their tempo or length, and by their style of closure.  He believes that there can be a tyranny of the 
genre in which only cases presented in a certain way will be considered ‘real’ bioethical cases, thus 
excluding many others, with clinical case notes perhaps being a case in point.   
10 Newton (1997) has a good general overview of the nature of narrative ethics.  
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  Discussing recovery narratives in connection with ethics is moving towards 
the area of study known as narrative ethics. It will be useful to explore the meaning of 
this term. Murray (1997) understands narrative ethics as having four main meanings 
within bioethics: a) narrative as moral education; b) narrative as moral methodology; 
c) narrative as an appropriate form of moral discourse; and d) narrative in moral 
justification. In what follows I will discuss these four areas and indicate  the 
connection with recovery from mental illness. My focus will be on the idea of 
narrative as moral education, for it is particularly relevant to my earlier discussion of 
the way in which psychiatric professionals can teach the virtues that clients need in 
order to recover from mental illness. The other three meanings of narrative ethics will 
feature to a lesser extent. 
 There is a long tradition of seeing narrative as a way of providing moral 
education. Fairy tales, as illustrated by Bettelheim (1988), and nursery rhymes are 
ways of communicating morality stories to children and, arguably, soap operas on 
television are ways of communicating moral themes to adults. The place of literature 
also indicates that moral ideas can be communicated through stories in ways that 
makes them digestible and understandable.11  Narrative can therefore be seen, at the 
very least, as providing a way of educating professionals and clients about the way 
recovery from mental illness is possible. This is particularly true for issues connected 
with either relinquishing or assuming responsibility. For clients, this emphasis on 
moral education can take many forms, perhaps most strikingly through the use of 
personal testimony in which someone recounts their own personal experiences of 
recovery from mental illness. Personal testimony can be a very powerful form of 
communicating moral precepts and ideas. For example, the way in which someone 
manages to bounce back from successive relapses can be a ‘morality tale’ of sorts in 
which we hear of courage and the determination to recover. Testimony is always 
about someone’s personal experiences, whether in the written or oral form of 
narrative. Narratives written about someone else’s experiences of recovery can also be 
powerful. Such narratives, whether factual or fictional, can provide an insight into 
how it is possible to recover from  mental illness. Paradoxically, reading or listening 
                                                 
11  Nussbaum (1990) has been a strong advocate of the moral value of literature. 
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to a story that lacks a positive resolution12 can also be a morality tale that can help by 
indicating which choices and decisions will not assist in the recovery journey. 
Professionals have much to learn from narrative also. For professionals, this can 
simply be an example of how they can learn from the client’s story. It can also be an 
example of the way professionals can learn from written narratives, such as clinical 
case notes, how to be less judgmental or more tolerant of the people they are trying to 
help.  One of the most important ways in which moral education is important, 
however, is through the guidance and support of psychiatric professionals teaching 
clients the virtues they will need in order to recover. This teaching can take many 
forms, from explicit lecturing to being a role model of how certain virtues can help 
recovery and enable one to maintain health. 
 Narrative can be seen to be at the heart of the moral methodology used to 
explain ethical issues in healthcare. Even if practitioners are strongly wedded to 
principle-based care and rules, they invariably will place these in the context of the 
case study. The case study has a long history in psychiatric practice, and traditionally 
involves considerable gathering of data  about the client’s history in various forms, 
including for example the social, occupational, family and personal histories.13 This 
involves a narrative thread even if the practitioner does not subscribe to a narrative 
case study tradition, since even the most rigorous psychopathological tradition of case 
study involves the practitioner telling the story of how the client came to have a 
mental disorder. If we were interested in the client’s illness experience, then some 
narrative of how the client came to the present point would seem unavoidable. It 
might be said that the best case studies meld the psychopathology and narrative 
traditions together in a collaborative whole.     
 Philosophers and ethicists often use narrative in the form of hypothetical   
stories to support their views14. As Murray (1997) indicates, hypotheticals have had a 
long tradition in philosophical writing, and are often used as a way of showing the 
plausibility or implausibility of some assertion in ethics.  It seems to be the case that 
                                                 
12 An example of a  narrative lacking positive resolution in the form of a diary that could be used 
paradoxically (i.e. what not to do for someone intent on recovery from mental illness) could be 
Strindberg’s famous writings(1979). 
13 The American Psychiatric Association  (1994b) provides one of the best known case study based 
publications in psychiatric practice based on case studies, and  illustrates the way even very 
psychopathologically orientated publications still use a strong narrative thread.   
14 Perhaps one of the most celebrated examples of this in ethics is  MacIntyre’s (1981) opening chapter 
of After Virtue where he paints a disturbing picture using storytelling techniques. 
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narrative helps to advance arguments, not in a direct sense but by pushing our 
intuitions by indicating the extreme implications of particular points. In working with 
recovery from mental illness, the need often arises, for example when discussing 
particular issues related to the future of a client’s care, to resort to hypothetical 
situations and hence to some form of narrative. In this context, narrative refers to 
more descriptive and detailed situations than basic statements such as ‘What if you 
didn’t have your wife to take care of you next year?’   
 Narrative sometimes assists in moral justification. The way in which we 
come to know or believe that our moral judgements are accurate is a complex process.  
Narrative can assist in moral justification through its connection to dominant 
narratives that exist within any particular society. Dominant narratives are stories that 
are believed by most people within that society and certainly by the dominant 
members of that society. All societies have stories about, for example, the role of men 
or women. These dominant narratives can provide one means (though possibly not the 
best means) of understanding complex issues. Also, and perhaps of greater relevance 
for psychiatric services, there is the way that narrative can provide a justification for 
particular interventions or decisions based on the stage that a client has reached in 
their recovery15. For example, a client in crisis would justify more paternalistic 
interventions than a client actively recovering.                                        
The following section will link the notion of narrative to critical points in a 
client’s life and indicate that it is the acquisition of key virtues at these  moments 
which can aid or hinder their recovery. Developing a recovery narrative can help with  
acquiring these virtues since these critical points occur at key moments along the 
client’s recovery pathway.  
 
 Section Three: The Virtues and Decision-Making at Critical Points 
This section aims to show how clients can make practical decisions in their 
lives during ‘critical points’ of their recovery by acquiring particular virtues. Clients 
acquire these virtues in many ways, pre-eminently through moral education. The 
stories clients tell themselves about these critical points are a significant way of 
developing these virtues.  
                                                 
15 One way of understanding this notion, as MacIntyre (1981) has indicated, is related to the idea of 
‘narrative unity’ by which he means that each person has a story that spans that person’s life and holds 
them accountable for the actions and experiences that compose a narratable life. 
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  Both client and professional virtues have an important role to play in 
ensuring that the experience a client has of mental illness is recovery focused.16 
Critical points17 are the crucial decision-making crossroads in mental illness 
experience. My claims about these critical points are neither empirical nor conceptual 
and are offered simply as suggestions about what might possibly be happening.  
 The virtues discussed earlier in this thesis are needed at all points in a 
client’s recovery. Of course, in many cases the client will not have fully acquired 
some or all of these virtues, and will still have habits that make acquiring or 
exercising the virtues difficult. Nevertheless, I would maintain that at key moments – 
critical points – particular virtues need to be present if the client is to move forward in 
their recovery. If the client does not have that particular virtue at that point, then he or 
she will need to wait until they acquire that virtue before making progress.   
 The following discussion of critical points in connection to the virtues needs 
to be seen as a broad outline of a story that the client can come to tell themselves 
about their experiences. As I have already indicated, a recovery narrative involves 
clients telling the story of their illness in their own way, in ways which are 
meaningful to them. It will be for the client to provide the detail to these stories of 
critical points and thus to own them.  Clients who start to tell themselves stories about 
their experiences in the way that follows are more likely to take advantage of the 
critical points and thus assist with their recovery journey.  
 The virtue of hopefulness is a pivotal virtue early in someone’s illness 
experience.If, in the first few days of their illness experience, the client does not have 
hope - at least in the attitudinal sense- that matters will improve, then it is possible 
that their recovery will be set back. The hopeful person can view their current state as 
one that can move to a better state.  While this virtue will be important at other points 
in their illness as well,  in the first few hours and days of their illness experience it is 
particularly important. It may well be that initially the client is too critically unwell to 
have any sense of emotional feeling, so the critical point is that first realisation of self-
awareness that they are in hospital or receiving assistance. 
  In addition to hopefulness in the first few hours and days of their illness 
experience, clients need to show trust and collaboration from the earliest moments of 
                                                 
16 Recovery focused simply means a focus on an improvement in symptoms and functioning. 
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their experience. Without trust, a vital critical point will have been lost, possibly 
resulting in a poor relationship with psychiatric professionals being created. Once 
again, a client who is very unwell may not be psychologically able to make sense of 
their emotions, so the critical point will be the first moment when the client has a 
sense of being able to trust or not trust psychiatric professionals, which will form the 
basis of the collaborative relationship. 
  Self awareness18 has many shades and can be seen to lie on a continuum. At 
one end there is a lack of self awareness when people are unconscious or asleep 
(though there is a continuum even within sleep). There is a level of partial self 
awareness that covers a wide variety of mental states and includes people who are 
mentally ill,  from those with little self awareness to those with reasonable levels of 
awareness. There is a level of more normal self awareness, which includes most 
people most of the time. Finally, at the other end of the continuum, there is a level of 
extraordinary self-awareness. It is important to realise that self-awareness has these 
various shades. The virtue of self-awareness is something that can be worked on and 
developed to a certain extent. At the lower levels, moving from no awareness to 
partial  awareness, pharmacotherapy, (or at least biophysical interventions), is 
probably a major factor in increasing self awareness, but in later parts of that 
continuum further developments will require more self directed activity such as 
meditation. As a consequence, there are several critical points when it comes to the 
virtue of self-awareness. If someone is in a crisis state, such as  a critical psychotic 
state, they will probably have very limited self awareness. At this moment, the critical 
point is not specifically about self awareness but about trust and collaboration. If the 
client can trust the professional and collaborate with them,19 then it is likely their 
critical symptoms will decline and a higher degree of self awareness will become 
evident.  In moving from partial to substantive self awareness in their life, the client 
can make choices that will either contribute to or undermine their attempts to increase 
their self-awareness. For example, the client who decides to attend a self-help group 
will probably gain greater insights into their own character and interaction with others 
than someone who chooses not to.  
                                                                                                                                            
17 In Lapsley et al., (2002) it was found that clients in their research referred to the idea of turning 
points as representing a moment when they make a decision that has important implications for their 
recovery. 
18 Insight, which is an important test in psychiatric interviewing, can be seen as variety of self 
awareness. 
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  Responsibility as a virtue is relevant to a number of critical points. Firstly 
there is the moment, perhaps paradoxically, when the client realises they cannot 
assume responsibility for their life or some aspect of their life. This will clearly be 
dependent on the level of self-awareness obtained. A second critical point in terms of 
responsibility is that moment when, perhaps for the first time in their illness 
experience, the client takes ownership of some aspect of their care or treatment. It 
may initially be a minor or even insignificant matter, but the crucial thing is the taking 
ownership of it and hence responsibility for it.  In order to take responsibility, the 
virtue of courage is needed since it is difficult (sometimes beyond belief) to take what 
is – from the clients’ perspective – a step in the dark. Courage, however, is crucially 
important in large-scale steps or changes; for example, moving from inpatient 
facilities to community services; from seeing psychiatric professionals frequently to 
less frequently.   
   The virtue of perseverance is important for the whole of someone’s illness 
experience but there are at least two critical points when perseverance is pivotal and 
where an illness experience can lose its recovery focus. The first of these is during 
that period of the illness experience when the acute symptoms have gone, when some 
of the previous pre-morbid level of self-awareness has returned and there is a need for 
the client to stick with a rehabilitation programme of some kind. For example, 
reacquiring life skills and vocational skills can take a long time and without 
perseverance it is likely the client will give up at the first sign of problems or 
difficulty. A second critical point is later in their illness experience, when the client 
has to stick with their wellness maintenance programme. A wellness maintenance 
programme is essentially a list of things the person can do to keep well; this might 
include getting a good night’s sleep, abstaining from alcohol, avoiding stressful 
situations, and continuing to take their prescribed medications.  
  The virtue of honesty is particularly important in the partnership phase of 
rehabilitation where the client’s explanatory model and the professional’s explanatory 
model are coming together and some negotiation starts to occur for a mutually 
satisfactory explanatory model. At this point, client honesty is a recognition of what 
they have achieved, and what they are (and are not) capable of achieving for 
themselves. Another critical point in terms of this virtue of honesty occurs in the later 
                                                                                                                                            
19 Some mental states, such as paranoia, make this difficult.  
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stages of their illness experience when a client is assessing whether they can be 
discharged from psychiatric services. While this decision might (and usually is) made 
by psychiatric professionals, the client has an important role in honestly determining – 
using practical wisdom – whether they are able to take care of themselves. The risks 
of continuing to receive care from psychiatric services unnecessarily are in many 
respects as significant as those involved in discharge when further psychiatric services 
are needed. 
  The virtue of self-discipline has at least three critical points. The first of 
these is upon being admitted into psychiatric services and involves the client  
following the treatment plan or crisis plan established with psychiatric professionals. 
The second occurs when the client is discharged from inpatient to community services 
(or in the case of clients receiving community services alone, discharged from the 
service). Upon being discharged the client will have a sudden sense of freedom and 
without self-discipline over their budget, lifestyle and treatment plan it is likely that 
their illness experience will not be recovery focused. The third critical point occurs  
when a wellness maintenance regime has been established following their discharge, 
and when self-discipline is needed to continue with the programme. 
  Clients can learn to tell a story of their illness experience and the critical 
points that can feed into their construction of a recovery narrative. The value of this is 
that if they fail to exercise the virtue needed to take advantage of a recovery point on 
this occasion in their life journey, next time (perhaps after a relapse) the narrative will 
help them to know how best to deal with a possible future relapse in the sense of 
making better decisions. 
 
Section Four: Client Narrative about Professional Relationships 
The aim of this section is to show that in the same way that clients can tell 
themselves stories about their illness experience and the importance of critical points 
in their recovery,  they can also tell themselves stories about their relationship with 
psychiatric professionals. This can assist their recovery.   
Chapter 6 indicated the key features of the collaborative virtue-based model 
between clients and psychiatric professionals. The collaborative relationship (in the 
form of the model proposed) is a crucial factor in ensuring that clients are able to take 
full advantage of the critical points when they arise in their experience of mental 
illness. However, it is more likely that clients will have a collaborative relationship if 
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they have learnt to tell themselves and others stories about their experiences with 
psychiatric professionals that are collaborative. 
Clients tell themselves and others many stories about their experiences with 
psychiatric professionals. However, there are two types of story which are particularly 
unhelpful for recovery. The first type is about needing to always make decisions for 
themselves, or to be independent, which makes it difficult to collaborate with 
professionals. The second type of story is about  always needing to follow a 
professional’s advice and not making decisions for themselves, which is also 
unhelpful in terms of developing a collaborative relationship. 
There are various ways in which the collaborative relationship with 
professionals can help with clients utilising the critical points. There are three main 
ways: firstly, clients can learn what the critical points are; secondly, they can learn 
how to recognise the critical points; and finally, they learn who can help them get 
over the various critical points.  
 Clients learn how to tell themselves ‘collaborative’ stories with 
professionals through moral education, since clients primarily learn through their own 
personal experience or through the teaching of professionals. One way of learning 
through personal experience is by developing a ‘collaborative story’ of their 
experiences with psychiatric professionals. A collaborative story is simply a story – 
part of a recovery narrative - of how clients and professionals can work together to 
achieve a mutual goal. 
  In the following discussion I provide a broad outline of the kind of story a 
client could tell themselves about how a collaborative relationship with psychiatric 
professionals could work in utilising the critical points. Once again, it is for the client 
to provide the detail to this story for themselves.   
  If they have a collaborative relationship, the critical points can be utilised 
more easily by the professional and client. In the case of hopefulness, a virtue seen as 
quite foundational early in someone’s admission into psychiatric services, 
collaboration can be crucial.  The expertise of the professional can help provide a 
realistic assessment of the severity of the situation while the client’s expertise can 
show how, as an individual, they might overcome their present problems. All of these 
provide the basis necessary if the client is to be hopeful about their situation. 
 In some respects, collaboration is the perfect antidote to suspicion between 
clients and professionals and hence contributes towards creating a trusting 
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relationship, particularly during the early critical point when clients have just entered 
the service. If the professional and client are able to collaborate, even over small 
matters, there is more likelihood that they will come to trust each other. 
  As was shown, the client’s virtue of self awareness affects a number of 
potential critical points corresponding to the various phases in the self awareness 
continuum. In the early critical point when there is partial self awareness for the 
client, a collaborative relationship with a professional can ensure a more tailored 
individual dose of medication, for example. Later, critical points can be assisted 
through appropriate and tailored educational or psychological interventions.  
Collaboration, which is needed from the start, has a vital role in the rehabilitation 
phase, or partnership phase, of recovery.  
  As was shown, the virtue of perseverance has at least two critical points and 
the collaborative relationship can be helpful in realising both. The first occurs in 
rehabilitation and is marked by a concern with both illness and health. Rehabilitation  
is often seen as the crossover period between illness and health and the related client-
professional explanatory models.  The critical point in this phase of the illness 
experience is the ability of the client and professional to pool their expertise and work 
together for the client’s good. The client’s illness experiences will probably not be 
recovery focused if they are unable to appreciate the expertise the professional can 
provide at this point.  
 The collaborative relationship can assist clients with self discipline through 
support and encouragement, which will mean clients can take advantage of all three of 
the critical points connected to self discipline. 
  Without collaboration occurring in the way described, the possibility of 
clients assuming appropriate levels of responsibility for their own healthcare becomes 
very difficult. For professionals to relinquish responsibility for particular activities, 
they need to know and understand the client they are working with and in order  for 
that to happen there needs to be collaboration.  
  The client and the professional working together can influence the recovery 
narrative the client is starting to develop about their experiences. The idea that 
collaboration between client and professional changes in the course of the client’s 
illness experience is vital. For their decision-making to be recovery focused, the  
narrative that the client is constructing also needs to include this changing 
collaborative relationship. 
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  Summary 
  This chapter has detailed the third part of the recovery ethos, that of 
developing a recovery narrative for clients recovering from mental illness. This aspect 
of the recovery ethos needs to be seen as complementing the virtues already discussed 
in  Chapter 6.   
 Clients can begin to construct their own recovery narrative and this is a vital 
component of recovery from mental illness. Constructing a recovery narrative is 
essentially about learning to tell one’s own story in one’s own way. An important 
distinction was drawn between a client’s life journey and the narrative about that life, 
indicating that the focus was on the client’s life journey, since a narrative can be 
potentially false. The interest is not in the narrative in the final instance, but in the life 
itself, more specifically, in making that life journey go better.  
  It was indicated that there are critical points, which are fundamental 
moments when recovery could be assisted or impeded, and that progress during these 
moments depends upon particular virtues. It was also shown how the collaborative 
relationship between professionals and clients could help utilise those critical points. 
The kind of narrative a client constructed of their experiences impacted on their 
relationship with professionals and accordingly their ability to take advantage of the 
critical points.     
 The recovery ethos exists at several levels. For the individual client  there is 
the recovery narrative and virtues, while in terms of their relationship with 
professionals, there is the collaborative model.  There is also the level of the 
psychiatric community.  The next chapter will show how the psychiatric community 
provides an essential basis to the virtues and narrative already discussed, in terms of 
developing a recovery ethos.  
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CHAPTER     9 
The Recovery Ethos Part IV:  
The Psychiatric Community  
 
This chapter will present the final component of the recovery ethos. The 
virtues, the client-professional collaborative model and the client recovery narrative 
are vital components of the recovery ethos considered from the perspective of the 
client and the psychiatric professionals who are working with the client. This chapter 
will make the case that the recovery ethos needs to be based in the psychiatric 
community as a whole.  
The purpose of this chapter is to show how psychiatric services need to share 
the recovery ethos with  other mental health services to  form a psychiatric 
community, in the sense of a group with shared values and goals. Such a  psychiatric 
community  does not currently exist because of the justice/autonomy split between 
psychiatric and other mental health services (excepting primary services). The chapter 
will also show that such a psychiatric community is vital to fostering recovery in a 
pluralistic way.  
  ‘Psychiatric community’ is a term that needs to be explained. The thesis 
will use an Aristotelian understanding of the notion of community. A community, in 
the Aristotelian sense, is a group of people who share a common goal or telos. The 
character traits that are considered to be virtues depend on this goal, and narratives are 
a means of promoting these virtues ( i.e. through moral education).  
 This thesis has been concerned with psychiatric services, which has meant 
those services provided in New Zealand through publicly funded psychiatric services 
to those with serious mental disorder. However, as mentioned previously, there are 
also other mental health services in New Zealand, provided by non-governmental 
organisations (NGO), primary  providers and private providers.  There have been 
differences in the application of the procedural ethos between these various services. 
This difference is particularly marked in the way that psychiatric services are geared 
towards justice as the dominant principle and non-governmental and private  services 
are geared towards autonomy. This split, in itself, has helped to undermine the 
possibility of a psychiatric community.  However, in this thesis, reference to 
‘psychiatric community’ includes all the current psychiatric and other mental health 
services: that is psychiatric services, primary services, NGOs and private care and all 
the professionals and clients associated with them with the shared telos already 
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mentioned. It is this expanded notion of psychiatric community that I have in mind, 
not a community simply based around current publicly funded psychiatric services.  
  This chapter, at first glance, may appear to introduce a focus upon political 
philosophy at odds with the direction of the rest of the thesis. However, this would be 
a serious misreading of the chapter. While it certainly casts an eye over some political 
terrain, it does so in order to show how the psychiatric community is necessary if we 
want a recovery ethos.  
  Section One will show that, currently, a form of liberalism is dominant as 
the service approach within psychiatric and other mental health services, which has 
had dire consequences for the whole notion that there can be a  psychiatric 
community. The section will provide this analysis through an historical overview.    
  Section Two will provide an analysis of how the development of a 
psychiatric community needs a common telos.        
  Section Three will show that  liberal communitarianism is the best  
approach for developing that common telos. 
  Section four will show how  a psychiatric community can provide the basis 
for the recovery ethos through a pluralistic approach to fostering recovery. 
 
 Section One: Dominance of Liberalism 
 The aim of this section is to show that presently liberalism is dominant 
within psychiatric and other mental health services.  The procedural ethos, which is 
the current de facto philosophy of psychiatric and other mental health services,  is 
based on liberalism. An historical analysis will be provided showing how liberalism 
became dominant within those services replacing earlier notions of ‘community’.  
  New Zealand, like many other western countries, could be described as a 
liberal democracy in that it has  a respect for individual rights, for the rule of law, for 
diversity in conceptions of the good life, and a system of democratic institutions. 
Currently there are various forms of liberal democracy, from an individualistic liberal 
democracy such as the United States, to more socially orientated countries such as 
Japan.  New Zealand is probably tending towards the individualistic end of that 
spectrum.1
                                                          
1  Fukuyama  (1992) makes the case that liberal democracy is spreading throughout the world and that 
it represents a final political form and hence his term ‘end of history’. However, it is not necessary to 
accept his conclusion on the end of history to accept that liberal democracy is on the rise and that it has 
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  It is not part of my focus in this thesis to explore the political form of New 
Zealand’s liberal democracy. It is, however, my focus to show that the liberal 
assumptions that govern our political life have also come to dominate psychiatric 
services. These psychiatric services are comprised of psychiatric professionals and 
their clients and the various service infrastructures that make such services possible.    
  As discussed in Chapter 1, the current procedural ethos has been with us for 
only a relatively brief period of time. The clinical-expert ethos, the utilitarian ethos 
and the superstitious ethos preceded it and formed and shaped the psychiatric and 
other mental health services in ways that partly made those services unique.   
  It can be argued that psychiatric services, as we now understand them, had 
their origin in the asylums and were characterised by the utilitarian ethos which was 
concerned with the consequences of treating large numbers of people for the greater 
good of society2. The early utilitarian ethos contributed a great deal to psychiatric 
services, something which is still present: namely a strong focus on consequences, 
particularly the need to weigh up the risks and benefits of any proposed action. The 
psychiatric service during the asylum period was characterised by something of a 
divide between clients and those caring for them, which probably contributed to the 
dependency and paternalism that the asylum system engendered.  
  As the utilitarian ethos merged into the clinical-expert ethos, many aspects 
of psychiatric services that are still with us came to be established. A stronger sense of 
being a separate service became evident in the late Victorian and early Edwardian 
periods. This was manifested in separate activities; laws, procedures and activities 
occurring in the asylum which would not be permitted or tolerated outside. For 
example, in late Victorian asylums it became quite accepted for clients to work in the 
fields and factories attached to the asylum for no money or at least only a token 
payment3. The justification was that this was therapeutic. While it might have been 
therapeutic, it should be remembered that clothing and other items sold by the 
hospitals did make money and this money was ploughed back into the asylum. From 
our perspective today this appears an illiberal practice that does not seem to respect 
the work practice of individuals, though such practices continue to have a small role 
                                                                                                                                                                      
given considerable scope for human improvement to those societies who have embraced it, most 
importantly through the relative peaceful co-existance of liberal democracies. 
2 See Shorter (1997) for an explanation of the way in which increasing numbers of clients were housed 
in the asylums during the Victorian period. 
3 See Williams (1987) for a New Zealand perspective, based on a history of Porirua hospital.  
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within psychiatric services. A different ethos was at work here, one still informed by 
the utilitarian ethos and the implicit understanding of the dependency of clients upon 
the asylum system. 
  Psychiatric services under the clinical-expert ethos became a paternalistic 
service, where individuals deferred to the authority of the psychiatrist and 
superintendent. This paternalism was perhaps more marked than in any other service. 
The range and depth of paternalism practised in psychiatric services was all 
encompassing. It covered what clients would do with their time, what they would eat, 
whom they would associate with and even when they would go to bed. It was a total 
institution.4  
  During the asylum period, psychiatric services created a particular type of 
‘community’. It was a ‘community’ that had a strong bias towards paternalism and to 
the value placed on the perspective of the expert and correspondingly had little 
respect for the stories told by clients of their illness experience. While it has become 
commonplace to reject the approach of this period, it is impossible to fully understand 
the kind of virtues needed to recover from mental illness without having some 
appreciation of the history of this ‘community’. Virtues such as compassion, trust, 
sympathy, technical expertise and the way psychiatric services accepted considerable 
responsibility for clients, were all-important virtues and were refined during this 
period. Likewise, clients often showed and were encouraged to show trust in 
professionals, along with a certain measure of self discipline and perseverance to 
apply the necessary treatments.  
  All across the western world, the psychiatric asylums started to close from 
the nineteen sixties onwards. There has been much debate on the reasons for this 
development. Whatever the combination of economic or therapeutic reasons that 
converged to make closure necessary,  there can be little doubt that the culture of the 
psychiatric asylums had become untherapeutic (because of  the level of paternalism) 
towards the end.  Closing the asylums became not just an opportunity to start again 
for psychiatric services, but a chance to get rid of the kind of  ‘community’ the 
asylums had created.  As Barham (1992) wrote:  
                                                          
4 This sense of the psychiatric community as a total institution has perhaps been best captured by  
Goffman (1961) in which he indicated what was involved in an asylum being a total institution. He 
discussed the institutionalisation that was caused by this socialisation process and how 
institutionalisation could look surprisingly like the effects of mental disorder.  
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the concept of community care did not seem to require much specification 
simply because the character of the ex-mental patient in the community 
remained to a large degree unspecified. The distinctive character of the 
mental patient of a previous era could, it was believed, now be erased from 
the script of social life and replaced by a less remarkable or distinguishable 
persona (p. 12).    
Of course, the reality was that communities are not determined by bricks and mortar 
but by the narratives and character of people that underpin them. Closing the asylums 
ended the ‘community’ that the asylums had created and in its place came various 
services but no overall ‘community’. Since there was an attempt to erase evidence of 
that previous ‘community’ at a formal level, it meant that informally new services 
developed to take its place, for example, self help movements of one kind or another, 
community centres, day centres and the like5. 
  In attempting to eradicate the asylum another conception of ‘community’ 
was emphasised. This was the ‘community’ that ex-mental patients (during the 
asylum period the term patient was preferred) needed to join. It was the ‘community’ 
beyond or outside of the asylum walls. The reality was that this ‘community’ often 
did not see itself as a ‘community’ and was less than welcoming to those who had a 
history of mental illness. Without a real ‘community’ to fall back on, many ex-
patients found readjustment difficult. While it was difficult for patients, it was also 
difficult for psychiatric professionals, who had also lost their asylum-based 
‘community’. Or, at least, they were encouraged to let that previous sense of 
‘community’ go. In the process of trying to eradicate that previous asylum-based 
‘community’, the newer procedural ethos started to arise as a way of achieving 
consensus.  
  The procedural ethos  (as discussed in Chapters 4 and 5) has become the 
underlying philosophy of psychiatric services due to the need to replace the clinical-
expert ethos. This period of replacing the clinical-expert ethos  with the procedural 
ethos coincided with an increasing focus on liberal rights in society and the realisation 
that there was nothing to replace the expert with. This dilemma was more marked in 
psychiatric services than elsewhere because not only was there disagreement about 
philosophical questions in psychiatric practice but also disagreement about 
                                                          
5 These centres are now all considered to be non governmental organisations. 
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methodological and causative questions. The level of disagreement, it was thought, 
could only be resolved by an appeal to liberal principles as a way of dealing with 
diversity. However, remnants of the previous asylum-based community and the 
clinical-expert ethos remained, so the psychiatric services that appeared with the 
procedural ethos  were a strange blending of liberalism and paternalism.   
  This blending of liberalism and paternalism is a strange combination in 
psychiatric services. It is a unique combination in that individual rights, personal 
freedoms and autonomy are respected within the context of a paternalistic framework 
where individual rights can be removed, that is, autonomy can be overridden by a 
particular understanding of justice6.That understanding of justice  is not the pure 
liberal one where someone’s rights are removed and their liberty curtailed because 
they are imposing on others, but the more serious case where liberty can be removed 
or curtailed because someone might hurt  others due to their mental disorder. This 
psychiatric approach to justice does exist, it is true, within a liberal society where laws 
exist permitting psychiatric services to act in the way they do. Those laws and the sort 
of psychiatric practice we have now, have been formed partly by the historical legacy 
of the psychiatric past.  
  The procedural ethos was introduced partly to resolve the problem of 
diversity of views but also to deal a death blow to the clinical-expert ethos. It could be 
argued that the clinical-expert ethos did involve some untherapeutic ingredients that 
needed to change. Unfortunately, in trying to change the culture of psychiatric 
services and make them less paternalistic, damage was done to the notion of a 
community. An asylum-based community which had developed over hundreds of 
years and which had developed some useful, creative and specific ways of dealing 
with psychiatric problems was, in a short space of time, dismantled7. As this 
community was in the process of being dismantled it was  stigmatised as unhealthy. It 
was thought that it was no longer a good idea to have people with psychiatric 
problems being together. Individuals with psychiatric problems, it was commonly 
believed, should be living in the community not in some separate ‘community’. The 
wholesale dismantling of the asylum-based community, while necessary in itself, has 
                                                          
6 While beneficence also provides a justification for overriding client autonomy under some 
circumstances, justice remains the dominant principle in psychiatric services. Where beneficence and 
justice come into conflict, justice will be the dominant principle. 
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done damage to any potential psychiatric community. While there is much about that 
earlier asylum community that we may wish to abandon, the dismantling during 
deinstitutionalisation was too sudden and complete.  The asylum based community 
did have a telos based on clinical expertise which ensured that the community had a 
common purpose. As the asylum based community was dismantled, a fragmentation   
occurred in the numbers of psychiatric and other mental health services and with it 
any common purpose or telos. 
As we have already seen, with the procedural ethos in psychiatric services 
the principle of justice has come into sharp focus, whereas other mental health 
services (excluding primary services) have become focused on the principle of 
autonomy.  These services have, consequently, come to see themselves as being in 
competition or at least as non-complementary. 
The appeal to recovery as the philosophy of psychiatric and other mental 
health services it was hoped would provide a common purpose. However, as I have 
indicated earlier, recovery itself has been proceduralised and has not succeeded in 
becoming an ethos since different forms of the procedural ethos have made agreeing a  
common purpose impossible.      
    
 Section Two: Development of a Psychiatric Community 
 If psychiatric and other mental health services are to become a psychiatric  
community, there needs to be a common purpose or goal. That common purpose was 
there in earlier periods, during the clinical-expert ethos for example, but in ways 
which were untherapeutic.  
  An ethos, though hard to pin down, is an important part of any community. 
Currently the procedural ethos is the dominant philosophy in psychiatric services. In 
terms of the notion of developing a psychiatric community, this ethos has 
unfortunately been very damaging. The procedural ethos has helped to individualise 
care which, while arguably a good thing in itself, when taken to extremes has tended 
to undermine the possibility of a psychiatric community.   
  To develop, the  psychiatric community therefore needs a philosophy that 
recognises the importance of this tradition. The recovery ethos is such a philosophy, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
7 As the asylums were dismantled they were replaced by psychiatric services and many other mental 
health services, which included non- governmental organisations, private services and primary 
services. 
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which recognises character and narrative but which is open to the need to respect the 
traditions of the past. Respecting the traditions of the past does not mean uncritical 
acceptance of them. There will be elements from the past that we need to abandon; 
there will be new developments we need to adopt. Such an approach is gradual and 
incremental rather than sudden and absolute. The dismantling of the psychiatric 
asylums during the deinstitutionalisation period was, in many respects, a sudden and 
absolute attempt to abandon the traditions of the psychiatric community as it had 
developed up to that point. Such a dismantling shows little respect for the traditions of 
the past in psychiatric practice. An attitude towards respecting traditions is perhaps 
best captured by MacIntyre (1981) who says:  
… a living tradition then is an historically extended, socially embodied 
argument, and an argument precisely in part about the goods which 
constitute that tradition. Within a tradition the pursuit of goods extends 
through generations, sometimes through many generations. Hence the 
individuals search for his or her good is generally and characteristically 
conducted within a context defined by those traditions of which the 
individual is a part, and this is true both of those goods which are internal 
to practices and the goods of a single life  (p 207). 
Psychiatric and other mental health services with their own distinct traditions, values, 
history and ways of developing character form an essential component of the recovery 
ethos.  
               However, one of the main purposes of such services is to agree on the telos 
of clients and professionals being there, the purpose and goal they are aiming at. This 
telos needs to be explicit and connect to the community in clear and (preferably) 
participatory means. As indicated, that telos was present during the clinical-expert 
ethos. Unfortunately, the liberal agenda that has become dominant in healthcare 
generally and specifically within psychiatric services, has removed the telos and 
replaced it with procedures that are meant to be neutral and impartial. It is not part of 
my purpose to critique liberalism per se, though there have been attempts to show that 
liberalism assumes notions of the good. However, what is clear is that the variety of 
liberalism and paternalism underpinning the procedural ethos within psychiatric and 
other mental health services does make explicit assumptions about justice and 
autonomy which provides a confusing and contradictory sense of the goods which are 
being pursued in those services.   
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  In the remainder of this  section an indication of what the telos of the 
psychiatric community should be will be given. This telos, while based on the goods 
to be pursued, will also provide a solution to the problem of focusing on the principles 
of justice and autonomy.  Psychiatric services, like much of healthcare, are motivated 
by the need to do things that are for the client’s good. This is fundamentally the 
purpose of psychiatric and of other mental health services. Therefore, the telos of 
psychiatric and other mental health services can be seen as acting for the good of the 
client.  
  Perhaps one of the most widely respected attempts to understand the 
client’s good is that of Pellegrino and Thomasma (1988). Drawing upon an 
Aristotelian understanding of good in relation to the virtues, and rejecting autonomy 
and paternalistic-based approaches to client good, they see client good as having four 
strands.  As they say: “Inherent in the physician’s offer to help is a promise to use her 
knowledge and skill for the patient’s good” (p. 76).  They see the client’s good as 
having four strands: the client’s concept of ultimate good; the good of the client to 
choose; the particular good of the client; and the biomedical good.  Firstly, the client’s 
concept of ultimate good; by this they mean “the concept we hold of the ultimate 
good is the reference standard for all decisions, including clinical decisions” (p.77).   
This ultimate good, or good of last resort, underlies all other decisions. It is often the 
good that is hardest to articulate. Ultimate good refers to bedrock values that people 
hold, such values are not reducible to a more fundamental value. It is often in 
connection with ultimate goods that conflicts arise in clinical practice (or life 
generally). 
  Secondly, the good of the client to choose, by which they mean the good of: 
[the] patient as a human person, with freedom to make his or her 
decisions…[so] to place medical good or the quality of life ahead of freedom 
to choose is to rob the patient of their humanity …[However,] the once-
competent person who at the time of the decision is comatose, psychotic, or 
otherwise unable to reason and choose does not lose claim as a human being 
to have his interests respected ( Pellegrino and Thomasma 1988,  p. 88). 
 In some cases, surrogate decision-makers or proxy decision-makers will be needed to 
make decisions for the client while they are incompetent. These surrogate choices 
must be as near as possible to what the clients would have made for themselves. If no 
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surrogates are available, then health professionals will need to make the decisions, 
hopefully basing their decisions on the life plan or perceived life plan of the client. 
  The third strand of client good is the particular good of the client.  This 
involves the client’s own perception of the particular good of the moment. The 
difference “between this and the previous step, then, is the difference between laying 
down a life plan or system of values and making an individual choice or preference 
about treatment” (p.89). 
 Fourthly, there is biomedical good. As Pellegrino and Thomasma (1988) 
define it, this should be seen as the basis of health professionals making decisions for 
the best interests of clients based on their technical competency.  
  The four strands of client good are in ranked order with ultimate good being 
the highest good and biomedical the least. According to Pellegrino and Thomasma, 
this provides a meta-ethical scheme for ranking goods which can assist with clinical 
decision-making8.  
  Psychiatric and other mental health services are fundamentally about the 
client’s good and the client’s good is achieved by helping the client recover from 
mental illness. Pellegrino and Thomasma’s ranking of client goods is helpful. While 
there are problems with their ranking, it is not part of my purpose here to critique this.   
  The telos for developing a  psychiatric community can, therefore, be seen as 
the client’s good, with some possible ranking of conceptions of client good.  In other 
words, the telos of the psychiatric community is the good of the client in connection 
with recovery from mental illness.   
  However, while particular services may agree on ways of helping clients 
recover from mental illness using some ranking of client goods, if we are to have a 
psychiatric community committed to a recovery ethos, we need a community which 
actually sees itself as a community. I want to turn now to how the various disparate 
services in the psychiatric and other mental health sector can come to see themselves 
as a psychiatric community. 
 
                                                          
8 Additional to this, Pellegrino and Thomasma (1988, pp. 84-86) provide a way of  resolving disputes: 
clear directives from the client should come first, followed by negotiated values of the client, proxy 
judgments, hospital ethics committees and the legal system. 
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Section Three: Liberal Communitarianism 
 The aim of this section is to show how liberal communitarianism is the best 
way of  developing a common telos for psychiatric and other mental health services 
and of helping these services to see themselves as a psychiatric community.   What 
follows can, therefore, be seen as an ideal in many respects, though in the case of 
New Zealand it is an ideal quite readily realisable since some of these organisational 
structures are already in place. In order to follow this aim,  a broad political vision of 
liberal communitarianism, contrasted with liberalism will be presented.   
  Liberal   communitarianism is not a new idea; Aristotle and Rousseau have 
certainly advocated such a perspective amongst classic philosophers. In modern times, 
there have been many advocates of such an approach.9 Modern liberal 
communitarians have developed their ideas in response to the perceived dominance of 
liberalism.  Classical Liberalism is founded on the ideas of John Locke and, to some 
extent, the work of Thomas Hobbes. Both Locke and Hobbes had a starting point in a 
state of nature in which the first law was derived from the most fundamental of all 
passions, that for self-preservation. This state of nature was, however, unpleasant in 
many respects and hence people chose to leave it and establish civil society. In doing 
so, they forfeited their absolute right to executive power and transferred this onto the 
government. The government’s purpose was limited to protecting property, life and 
liberty (the framers of the American constitution certainly subscribed to these ideas) 
and government would put aside the various conceptions of human good, since this 
led to disagreements and hostility – particularly due to religious rivalry.  
  Liberal communitarianism is fundamentally an approach which, like 
liberalism, assumes that individuals are autonomous and that there is a diversity of 
values in society. Unlike liberalism, however, a liberal communitarian also believes 
that the community within which an individual exists also has a role in forming the 
individual in the first place. Also the community needs some agreement between 
those individuals on the types of goods being pursued. This agreement is achieved 
through toleration, discussion and persuasion.  
  Until quite recently psychiatric services were effectively ‘the psychiatric 
community’ in that there was a common telos during the asylum period when the 
                                                          
9 Michael Sander, Alasdair MacIntyre,  Charles Talyor, Robert Bellah, William Sullivan, Benjamin 
Barber and William Galston are some of the best known advocates. Though quite a disparate group, 
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clinical-expert ethos was dominant. Today there is no psychiatric community since 
there is no agreed telos. As already indicated, during the clinical-expert ethos, when 
the psychiatric community was synonymous with psychiatric services, it was easier to 
have a common purpose. Today there is no longer a common purpose for psychiatric 
and other mental health services. This has generated significant disagreements, which 
the procedural ethos has attempted to resolve, unsuccessfully in my view, due to 
differences in the principles underlying the procedural ethos. Psychiatric and other 
mental health services have become fragmented following the recent closure of the 
asylums and with it the loss of any agreed common purpose. This 
deinstitutionalisation of the asylums and the so-called ‘community care movement’ 
which followed has seen a worsening split between psychiatric services and other 
mental health services for those with serious mental illness.   In some services, for 
example, there is a focus on treatment of mental disorder, whereas others focus on the 
social integration of clients.  In some services, symptom reduction is seen as the 
crucial criterion for determining recovery, in others, functioning is.  
Liberal communitarianism could help with the development of a psychiatric 
community by identifying a common purpose and clarifying the client’s good in a 
way that is consistent and intelligible both within the community and to the wider 
society.  
If  psychiatric and other mental health services are to become a community 
with a shared purpose, there needs to be some basic structural changes in the way 
services are delivered.  As Emmanuel (1991) has indicated, a liberal communitarian 
approach can be applied successfully to healthcare. As services are currently 
delivered, this appeal to liberal communitarianism is, however, an ideal; but it is one 
which, even if not fully implemented, could serve as an important moral ideal for 
delivering policy and services.  
   Psychiatric  professionals have a key role in  developing the psychiatric 
community mentioned.  Fundamentally, it is the role of psychiatric professionals to 
ensure the psychiatric communities telos is practically implemented.  If, for example, 
the community decides that living wills are to be used, then the professionals will 
need to ensure that they are presenting this as an option to clients, discussing the 
implications of their use and making available the paperwork should a client wish to 
                                                                                                                                                                      
they share a number of convictions, most notably that humans are inevitably situated in and partly 
constituted by, historical communities and traditions.  
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use one. The psychiatric professionals are also required by the community to exhibit 
the kind of professional virtues that we have already mentioned.  
A psychiatric community, as defined in this discussion, would be 
philosophically based on the idea of recovery as the telos. Exactly what this would 
mean would be something that the community would have to determine for itself. 
Given the conceptual understanding of recovery already developed, a psychiatric 
community will need to work within a recovery ethos in which virtue and narrative 
and are seen as co-equal constituents, since these contribute to the community in the 
sense already described. The last section of this chapter will indicate why these 
ingredients are so essential for developing a shared purpose or telos. Within the 
psychiatric community we can see that there will be many different services included. 
Some of those services, for example, crisis services and hospital based services, will 
usually be provided by psychiatric services, since this is where most of the 
professionals able to provide those services are currently found. Other services will 
target other parts of the illness-health continuum: some services focusing on 
rehabilitation; others on self-help, work and relationships. The range of services is 
considerable. Currently, these services are often delivered from alternative frames of 
reference and see more ground for disagreement than for agreement. A recovery ethos 
would provide that common philosophical underpinning. The following shows the 
strengths and weaknesses of using a liberal communitarian approach to developing a 
shared telos.  
 
Strengths of a liberal communitarian model for developing a shared telos  
(i) Resolving disagreements 
  A liberal procedural ethos has not provided adequate answers for 
disagreements in psychiatric and other mental health services, which is a major 
consideration given the disagreement on core principles between psychiatric and other 
mental health services in New Zealand.  In many respects, the procedural ethos 
operates by papering over disagreements and providing a notional sense of a set of 
minimal conditions that everyone, regardless of their conception of the good life, can 
assent to. The problem is that people do not let go of their deepest convictions simply 
because there is a procedure which can prevent open disagreement and dissent.  That 
deep set of values and beliefs will often try to find other ways of being heard, not 
always constructively.  
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  The liberal communitarian approach, like the liberal approach, accepts that 
people will have differing conceptions of the good life. The liberal communitarian 
approach holds out the prospect that the best ideas within the psychiatric community 
can persuade others to adopt them and that this set of ideas will inform policy and 
protocols within the community. It is seen as a virtue that members of the community 
can participate in community decision-making through the various forums and 
committees which would be available. Indeed, such membership is an important 
ingredient in developing civic virtue, as we will see later. Toleration, like 
participation, is also an important virtue with such a liberal communitarian approach, 
since there will be many views on how to develop and implement the telos. Such a 
conception of the good life and its relationship to the community might make the 
good life appear a mechanical process applied to diverse issues. It might appear that 
once the telos is determined in terms of the recovery vision for that particular service 
within the psychiatric community (where differing aspects of recovery would be 
emphasised depending upon the recovery stage) policies, protocols and guidelines are 
established and there is nothing more to discuss or deliberate on. This would simply 
be incorrect. The good life in terms of the telos of the service is never settled and 
fixed. As Emmanuel (1991) says:  
a conception embodies a picture of human life that is but a sketch in need of 
specification and refinement. These details are added in the process of 
deliberation, whether that deliberation is abstract, about the conception of the 
good life itself, or whether it focuses on a specific policy and implicates 
refinement of the conception of the good life (p.213).    
Specifying exactly what recovery means in terms of the service and the wider 
psychiatric community is subject to change simply because new clients have new 
needs and their stage of recovery will be different. The reality of being involved in a 
psychiatric community informed by a liberal communitarian approach, therefore, is 
that disagreements are more likely to be open and honest10 with an appeal to some 
kind of decision-making process for particularly important decisions. 
 
                                                          
10 Ethical dissonance will still exist between psychiatric professionals and clients within a liberal 
communitarian approach but there will be a greater commitment to the virtues needed to resolve or 
work with that dissonance. By ethical dissonance, I refer to differences between the perspectives of 
clients and professionals in terms of how much responsibility it is believed clients can assume at any 
point in their recovery. 
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   (ii) Participation 
  In a liberal communitarian approach, participation is a vital characteristic. 
Members of the community are not simply permitted to participate but actively 
encouraged to participate in all aspects of the community. Participation is important 
for several reasons. Firstly, the community needs to have a sense in which 
deliberation about important issues is occurring in order to identify the telos and the 
way it will be realised. Secondly, participation reflects the therapeutic goals of the 
psychiatric community, where clients assume increasing levels of responsibility and 
hence participation in the community’s activities will have a therapeutic value. 
Thirdly, participation helps both professionals and clients to develop or reacquire 
civic virtues, and finally, participation is an important decision-making tool. 
  In emphasising participation in the way the liberal communitarian approach 
does, the community will have a sense of communal ownership of decisions and 
hopefully this will lead to a greater sense of social inclusion. 
  The liberal communitarian approach of the psychiatric community will also 
provide a necessary milieu for the collaborative model to achieve fruition, where full  
participation is seen as vital for enabling the expertise of professional and client to 
develop.  
 
(iii) The client’s voice and recovery narrative 
 A participatory community will also be one where the client’s voice will be 
heard. The client’s voice and the associated recovery narratives are, as already 
indicated, an important counter to the professionalisation of psychiatric services. The 
clients’ voice and the associated recovery narratives will occur through the various 
administrative and deliberative structures of the psychiatric community. There are at 
least four ways that the client’s voice will become prominent : 1) in the formal 
representation of clients at the various levels of the community, to ensure the client 
perspective is always heard; 2) through an increased focus on ‘success’ stories for 
clients to model themselves on; 3) in the development of policy and protocols in the 
community which reflect the client perspective; and 4) in becoming part of the voice 
of the community, particularly in terms of the interface with the public. At present the 
client voice and the professional voice are often presented by the media as being at 
odds. While disagreement will still exist in the liberal communitarian approach, there 
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will be an increased concordance between professionals and clients such that this will 
be represented (one hopes) in media profiles. 
 
(iv) Socialising particular virtues 
 Virtues are learned, and in that sense practice in the virtues is indispensable.  
Learning takes place through parental, school and community influences, amongst 
others. Since communities have greater local control over the sort of organisation and 
culture they use and endorse under a liberal communitarian approach, the kinds of 
virtues and recovery narratives that assist recovery from mental illness – for both 
professionals and clients – can become emphasised and enculturated. Over time, these 
virtues will become the virtues that the community selects for, particularly in terms of 
its recruitment of psychiatric professionals. 
 
(v) Sharing responsibility 
 One of the problems with the current organisation of psychiatric services is 
that professionals carry the bulk of responsibility for some activities. This leads in 
turn to professionals practising defensively and creating a risk averse culture that is 
itself harmful for the prospects of recovery, since in order to recover individual clients 
do need to take calculated risks. This emphasis upon professional responsibility spills 
over from psychiatric services into the general societal view that psychiatric services 
are absolutely responsible for someone once they are receiving any services from 
psychiatric services. This notion of responsibility is seen in categorical ways as 
meaning psychiatric services either are responsible (if a client is part of psychiatric 
services or historically received psychiatric services) or not responsible only when 
someone has never received psychiatric services.   
  In a psychiatric community, sharing responsibility is a way of ensuring 
shared agency between professionals and clients.  May (1992) makes a case for 
membership of a group as a way of increasing social responsibility. May argues that 
people should see themselves as sharing responsibility for various harms perpetrated 
by, or occurring within their communities. This is a point with which I agree, 
particularly in the case of the current psychiatric services where both professionals 
and clients, in different ways, fail to adequately accept some responsibility. In the 
case of professionals, that lack of responsibility extends into the political and funding 
arena and the presentation of psychiatric issues to the general public. In the case of 
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clients, the failure to accept some responsibility for their own mental well being or 
aspects of their own mental well being. 
 
Possible problems with a liberal communitarian approach  
Impracticality 
 Introducing a liberal communitarian approach can appear hopelessly 
impractical. However, this appearance of impracticality is at least partly due to the 
idealistic nature of much of the liberal communitarian approach compared to what 
currently exists. There are real problems associated with introducing  liberal 
communitarianism. The first is clarifying membership which would be difficult in the 
early phase of the community since people would be leaving and joining all the time. 
In principle, however, this is no different to the way citizens arrive and leave the 
country. It simply requires some means of keeping track of people’s movements. 
Another problem would be how to develop a participatory method11 for ensuring that 
values are shared. A third problem could be that participation and full deliberation of 
members would take more time than clinical services can provide. However, it must 
be remembered the issues that would receive full community discussion would not be 
individual clinical decisions, which would remain at the level of professionals and 
clients. Perhaps the most serious problem is that the mental state of clients can hinder 
participation. Particular mental states, such as psychosis, are not commensurate with 
assuming responsibility for voting or sharing community responsibility (or, we might 
add, with full citizenship12). It is for this reason that the community would need to 
agree – through a process of full discussion and deliberation – how clients who are 
seriously unwell would be dealt by the community. The community would need to 
assume that all members had full voting and participation rights, unless there were 
compelling reasons for their removal or suspension. Psychosis or intoxication would 
be such compelling reasons. In order to ensure that political considerations were 
minimised (that is removing discussion and possibly voting rights from people who 
disagreed with a particular policy direction, for example) it would be necessary to 
                                                          
11 Since any well functioning community has a shared goal, with shared values and shared tradition, the 
question for the liberal communitarian is whether it is possible to create such a community. 
Fortunately, in the case of the psychiatric community, those shared traditions already exist from which 
a shared set of values can be worked. 
12 See Sayce (2000) for more understanding of the practicalities of how recovery from mental illness  
connects to the notion of citizenship. 
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have such  restrictions agreed in a quasi-legal process, perhaps involving both judges 
and clinicians. 
 The common telos which a liberal communitarian approach can provide is 
the essential basis of a psychiatric community and for such a community to start to 
see itself as a community. However, such a community needs to show how it can 
provide the essential basis for the virtues and the recovery narratives in  a way which 
enables decisions to be made in a pluralistic manner.  
 
Section Four: Implications of a Common Telos 
               The aim of this section is to show that having a common telos for the 
psychiatric  community means that members of that community will need to adopt 
certain virtues and work with the notion of recovery narratives in order to facilitate 
recovery in a pluralistic way. The section starts with civic virtues since these are 
foundational, before considering pluralism and its connection to the psychiatric 
community. 
 Mental illness can mean that people are unable to participate in the 
community as citizens in the fullest sense. One way of understanding how the 
psychiatric community can help clients become fully citizens again is to use 
Aristotle’s (1959) approach to  civic virtues. Aristotle discusses civic virtue in the 
context of membership of a state, but there is an analogy with membership of a 
community that is pertinent to my discussion.  
  Aristotle thought those citizens in any state or community were members of 
a particular association. Citizens within that association have various duties to 
perform. However, while there are various duties, within the psychiatric community 
there is one common purpose, namely recovery. Civic virtue, according to Aristotle 
(1959, p. 71) must be relative to the constitution of the state or organisation. Being a 
good citizen for Aristotle is connected with both living in accordance with the telos of 
the group and with actively promoting the good of the state or organisation. The role 
of the psychiatric community is therefore to prepare clients for active citizenship in 
the fullest sense once they leave the community. Being a good citizen for Aristotle 
meant performing the duties of one’s role within the state. Not everybody has the 
same duty, which is also true for the psychiatric community. In the psychiatric 
community, the role of the client is to attempt to recover from mental illness:  the role 
of the psychiatric professional is to try and help clients to recover from mental illness. 
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There are also various offices within the constitution or community.  Aristotle 
considered that while there were different types of citizens (depending on their role) a 
person who occupies those offices and honours of the state is a citizen in the higher 
sense. 
  People who are mentally ill are sometimes unable to fully participate in 
citizenship. For example, at the most basic level, people under the Mental Health Act 
are unable to vote in elections or participate in a jury.  The psychiatric community 
has, therefore, two prime objectives in connection with civic virtue. Firstly, it is to 
provide an opportunity for members of the community to acquire the basic civic 
virtues that will enable them to participate as citizens in the community and the 
broader society. Secondly, it is to provide an opportunity, through participation, for 
members of the psychiatric community to obtain offices and honours within the 
community by which to fulfil the higher levels of citizenship mentioned by Aristotle. 
 The conception of recovery developed in Chapter 2 was one that saw it as 
focused on improvements in symptoms and functionality as the recovery criteria from 
both a client and professional perspective. However, recovery from mental illness 
needed to be seen in pluralistic terms in the sense of its facilitation. To reiterate, by 
pluralistic is meant that there are a variety of methods from biological, psychological 
and self help approaches which have their own particular merits and that recovery 
focused interventions involve identifying when one type of approach is more 
appropriate than another. This conception of recovery connects to the notion of a 
psychiatric community in three ways. Firstly, no psychiatric or other mental health 
service can deliver all of a recovery-focused service. Some services will focus on the 
crisis and acute part of the illness–health continuum and some will focus on 
rehabilitation or self care. They will all target different parts of the recovery 
experience. The recovery narrative that clients learn to tell themselves about these 
experiences, in collaboration with professionals, can help them connect to this 
psychiatric community in several ways. By having a common narrative for the 
imaginary ideal client in terms of which services are available for each part of the 
continuum, clients can assess their own experiences more usefully. Additionally, 
professionals can specialise in working with the experiences of clients in certain parts 
of the continuum. Secondly, while each service in the continuum will be aiming to do 
something different, they are all aiming at recovery as the telos of the service. 
Agreement about the telos will provide an overarching sense of purpose to the 
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psychiatric community and enable particular services (aimed at particular parts of the 
recovery narrative) to develop virtues in their professionals and clients pertinent to 
that stage of recovery. As we saw earlier, this involves developing civic virtues 
additional to moral and intellectual virtues. Thirdly,  while client good is equated with 
recovery, and while client good is comprised of varying conceptions of client good, 
(such as Pellegrino and Thamasma’s (1988)) it is important to recognise that in a 
psychiatric crisis it is sometimes necessary to overrule the client’s consent. A 
pluralistic approach to facilitating recovery accepts that, on some occasions, 
professional interventions without reference to the client’s wishes are necessary.  
  Pluralism, in the sense I have been using the term, connects the psychiatric 
community, the virtues and recovery narrative. It does this by recognising that there 
are many ways of facilitating recovery from mental illness. However, although there 
are many ways of facilitating recovery, there are ways that decisions about particular 
interventions or treatments can be made. Those decisions are not determined by 
procedures or by pragmatism but by particular virtues, moral, intellectual and civic, 
applied to the stage of recovery a client is currently in. The way particular virtues are 
connected to particular stages of the recovery narrative is determined by the 
psychiatric community and its liberal communitarian approach in which everyone can 
participate in a decision-making process through the development of civic virtues.    
  A final point about pluralism and the psychiatric community is that while 
predominantly it will be about biological, psychological, social and self help 
approaches, it will have the potential to be about much more.  Traditionally, the 
biopsychosocial model has meant that psychiatric services have been eclectic 
predominantly in terms of biological, psychological and social interventions. When 
other approaches such as self help, culture and spirituality have been needed, they 
have been applied in an eclectic manner in line with the procedural ethos. Applying 
such interventions using eclectic procedures is less than helpful because eclectic 
procedures are unable to respond, in a flexible way, to individual needs.  
  Spirituality, perhaps more than any other area, shows the intrinsic weakness 
of the procedural ethos. While client narratives and the virtues will help clients and 
professionals to make decisions about which type of intervention is needed at any 
point, the psychiatric community will provide the overall basis for determining which 
goods should be pursued and what those goods mean to the individual. Decisions 
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involving meaning are central to any spiritual quest and such decisions simply cannot 
be left to procedures13.   
 
Summary 
 This chapter has discussed the basis of the  recovery ethos in the need to 
develop a psychiatric community.  
  It has argued for an Aristotelian understanding of community, based on the 
notion of a shared set of values or telos. I provided a brief historical analysis of how 
the current procedural ethos had developed with its emphasis on the individual where 
there was no agreed values or telos.  
  The wholesale dismantling of the psychiatric asylum-based community that 
occurred with deinstitutionalisation has caused damage to very idea of a psychiatric 
community. While there is much about that ‘community’ which we may wish to 
abandon, the attempt to dismantle the ‘community’ which occurred during the 
deinstitutionalisation era was too sudden and wholesale. That attempt may have 
succeeded in formally destroying the ‘community’, but new services emerged to try 
and take its place. Unfortunately, this has resulted in a fragmentation of the 
psychiatric and other mental health services, all committed to different, and at times, 
conflicting, goods. 
   I argued that to develop a psychiatric community there would need to be a  
common telos but where there would be some local control over how that telos was 
reached.  That telos would be the client’s good that would be achieved through 
recovery from mental illness.  
  Liberal communitarian approaches are most likely to achieve the objectives 
of deliberation and participation that a psychiatric community would need to develop 
a shared telos.  Liberal communitarian approaches, while respecting the individual, 
also see a need to respect the community as a whole.  I indicated that the development 
of civic virtues and eventually citizenship, for clients recovering from mental illness, 
was an important role of the psychiatric community.  
 Finally, I indicated how a pluralistic approach to facilitating recovery was 
best achieved through a psychiatric community with its virtue and narrative 
components. 
                                                          
13 The tendency to resort to procedures is well illustrated by Ross (1994), who  laments the lack of 
guidelines for spirituality.  
 192
CONCLUSION 
   This thesis has presented a case for the development of the recovery ethos 
as the underpinning philosophy of psychiatric services. This case has not been an easy 
one to make since there has been no previous attempt to develop a systematic 
philosophy of psychiatric services based on recovery as opposed to either a 
philosophy of psychiatry or a philosophy of  client empowerment ( ‘the recovery 
approach’ which I discussed in Chapter 2) which are both now familiar terms. Indeed, 
part of the problem in this regard is that psychiatric services have often seen 
themselves as not having an ethos, as being simply an instrumental service that 
pragmatically does the best it can for people with mental disorder. As I showed in 
Chapter 3 with regards the conceptual foundations of  psychiatric services, and then 
subsequently in Chapters 4 and 5 with regards the procedural ethos, psychiatric 
services have adopted a procedural ethos as the underpinning approach to decision-
making which is an ethos based on using eclectic procedures to treat mental disorder. 
The scope of this thesis was psychiatric services in New Zealand. The reason 
for the scope of psychiatric services is that this is where the largest payoff to 
developing a recovery ethos is to be found in terms of an impact on clients recovering 
from mental illness. However, as I indicated, a larger scope involving psychiatric and 
other mental health services together could also have focused upon developing a 
recovery ethos. At various points in the thesis that broader scope has been 
acknowledged and mentioned. Mention was made, for example, of the way a different 
type of procedural ethos operated in psychiatric  and other mental health services 
(such as the private sector and non governmental organisations).  
 This thesis began by identifying two questions to be answered. Why is the 
procedural ethos a problem for achieving recovery from mental illness in psychiatric 
services? How do we replace a procedural ethos with a recovery ethos?  
 In order to answer the first question it was necessary to show that a 
procedural ethos is currently dominant within psychiatric services. In order to do this, 
an historical analysis was provided indicating the way that the ethos of psychiatric 
services has changed in the past two hundred years from superstitious, to utilitarian 
ethos and clinical-expert, to the current procedural ethos.  
   The procedural ethos has become the de facto philosophy of psychiatric 
services in the past half century mostly in response to the liberalism in society more 
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generally. This liberalism has affected all areas of life, including both education and 
health. The main effect has been an increasing withdrawal by the state in promoting 
any one conception of the good life over another. In the context of psychiatric 
services, this has extended to a reluctance to promote any particular clinical school or 
approach over another and thus has emphasised procedures as a way of making 
decisions. This procedural emphasis has meant that the focus within psychiatric 
services has been on the need for psychiatric professionals to find consensus through 
procedures based around diagnosing and treating mental disorder.  These procedures 
have used the eclecticism of  the biopsychosocial model as a way of making 
decisions. Eclecticism stressed the way that the various health domains (biological, 
psychological, social) should be seen as equally important for each stage of a client’s 
recovery based upon procedural justice. Eclecticism was contrasted, as a way of 
making decisions, with pluralism. Like eclecticism, pluralism accepts that the various 
domains are important, but unlike eclecticism, it does not see them as equally 
important for each stage of a client’s recovery. Pluralism does not see client self help 
as another domain to be proceduralised but instead sees it in terms of the client 
assuming responsibility for aspects of their own health along the illness-health 
continuum. The ‘recovery approach’ which was the dominant client approach had 
itself become proceduralised, in that client self help was seen as simply another health 
domain to be treated as equally important to the others.  
  The procedures within psychiatric services were based on the principles of 
justice, autonomy and beneficence, with justice being the dominant principle. 
Psychiatric services were contrasted with other mental health services (excepting 
primary services) where autonomy was the dominant principle underpinning 
procedures. Within psychiatric services there has always been a strong, almost 
illiberal tradition of paternalism which created a particular type of service in response 
to the liberalism within the wider society. Unlike other liberal inspired services within 
society, psychiatric services (within the context of the legislative imperative) were 
allowed to place the principle of justice before those of autonomy or beneficence. 
This meant, in practice, that there was a conflict between the principle of justice and 
the ‘recovery approach’ which emphasised client empowerment and autonomy. This 
conflict was most evident between psychiatric services and other mental health 
services which did not have the same legislative imperative to contend with.  This 
conflict was not resolvable using principle based theories, such as deontology or 
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utilitarianism, since they both fed into the procedural ethos. The most notable modern 
theory within healthcare using principles from both deontological and utilitarian 
traditions has been the four principles approach, which has also not succeeded in 
being able to resolve this longstanding problem of reconciling autonomy with the 
occasional need for paternalism.   
  The conceptual difficulties with the procedural ethos have resulted in a 
number of practical problems, which has not helped recovery from mental illness to 
occur. These range from a reliance on externalised decision-making to a lack of value 
placed on reflective practice. The implications of these problems have been that 
clients have not taken appropriate responsibility for aspects of their own health, which 
has undermined recovery and is why the thesis has emphasised how we could replace 
the procedural ethos with the recovery ethos as the second question we were 
attempting to answer. 
  In Chapter 2  the concept of recovery was clarified. The concept of recovery 
is a complex concept, which is why it is used in many different ways. It was argued 
that recovery was best understood as being concerned with improvement in mental 
health along the illness-health continuum.  It was also argued that the recovery criteria 
included improvements in functioning and symptoms and that we need to understand 
this from both a client and professional perspective.  Psychiatric services have a long 
tradition of fostering recovery (as we saw in Chapter 1), alternating between 
biologically and psychologically based approaches.   The current ‘recovery approach’ 
which has been adopted formally by psychiatric services has sought to reject much of 
this historical legacy. In particular, it has tended to ignore or even dismiss the 
professional perspective,  focusing instead on a client perspective towards symptoms 
and functioning. The result of this has been a tendency to see treatment and care 
connected with this biological approach as unhelpful, coercive or unethical. 
Psychiatric staff – particularly nurses and doctors who work mostly from such a 
biological perspective – have often found the adoption of the ‘recovery approach’ 
difficult and challenging and hence the relatively poor adoption by psychiatric 
services of a  ‘recovery approach’, since so many professionals feel marginalized by 
it. 
The thesis argued that recovery did merit being seen as the underlying ethos 
of psychiatric services but that, in order to include all the various professionals and 
clients, a more pluralistic approach to facilitating recovery was necessary than either 
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dogmatically seeing it in professional or client terms based on eclecticism. A 
pluralistic approach to facilitating recovery also countered the eclecticism of the 
biopsychosocial model which itself had fed the procedural ethos. It was indicated that 
the recovery ethos could apply to all mental illnesses with the degree of insight being 
the only complicating factor, which could be more affected in some illnesses than in 
others. Additionally, a broader conception of recovery was needed, based on the 
illness-health continuum, since recovery in theory could be seen as open-ended.   
  The thesis stressed the need for a changing emphasis for the conceptual 
basis of psychiatric services. This involved working out what disorder, illness, health 
and dysfunction meant and what their relationship might be. It was indicated that it 
was possible to have a view of recovery based on either a disorder conception or 
health conception ( in Chapter 3) and that mental health needed to be seen as the 
primary conceptual foundation alongside mental  illness.  As already mentioned, 
recovery is best understood as occupying the illness-health continuum. Currently 
psychiatric services have a focus on mental disorder and with it an emphasis on 
professional skills in diagnosis and classification rather than how the client can help 
themselves. A crucial distinction was made between disorder and illness. Mental 
disorder was identified with the objectively identified signs and symptoms of the 
disorder whereas illness was seen as the client’s response to that disorder.  The 
changing emphasis upon mental illness, which is the client’s response to mental 
disorder, would increase the client taking more responsibility for their own health 
where appropriate.  
  The thesis also rested on a functionalist philosophy of mind in which the 
mind was seen as emergent from the brain. This view was contrasted with qualia and 
reductive materialistic accounts of philosophy of mind and indicated that a 
functionalist/emergent philosophy was more conducive to understanding recovery.    
  Developing a recovery ethos to replace the procedural ethos provided the 
main  thrust to the thesis.  A recovery ethos involves all the possible components 
which are involved in a psychiatric service, that is the internal world of the client, the 
relationship between clients and professionals and the surrounding service and 
community. Hence the components of the recovery ethos, the virtues of clients and 
professionals, the client-professional virtue-based model, the recovery narrative of the 
client and the psychiatric community.  
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  In order to recover from mental illness, it is necessary but not sufficient to 
have recovered from mental disorder. Once the disorder is under control, or at least 
manageable, the client can begin to recover from the broader problems incurred 
through mental illness. In order to  recover from mental illness, both the client and 
psychiatric professional need to develop particular virtues: in the case of the client, 
virtues of hopefulness, self- awareness, compassion and trust, responsibility, courage, 
perseverance, collaboration, honesty,  self discipline, and practical wisdom: in the 
case of psychiatric professionals, virtues connected to responsibility, loyalty, 
sympathy and compassion, genuineness, patience, tolerance, collaboration and 
practical wisdom. 
   Arising from these virtues, it was identified that there was a need for a 
collaborative virtue-based professional relationship, which would be based on the 
collaborative model of Pellegrino and Thomasma between client and professionals in 
order to maximise the professional and client virtues.  
  Clients will improve their chances of recovery from mental illness by 
developing a recovery narrative which enables them to make sense of their illness 
experience and find some kind of meaning in that illness experience. Constructing 
such a recovery narrative would enable clients to make best use of ‘critical points’ by 
learning when particular virtues could help move them forwards in their recovery and 
also by showing the way such a recovery narrative could help develop a collaborative 
relationship with psychiatric professionals.  
  The final component of the recovery ethos was the need for psychiatric 
services and the other mental health services to develop a psychiatric community 
which would form the basis for the recovery ethos so that the telos of recovery could 
become the ends of psychiatric care. I  contrasted this with the current liberal 
procedural ethos where the ends are instrumental and hide the numerous 
disagreements and controversies in psychiatric care. The psychiatric community, 
through the development of an agreed telos, would indicate the moral, intellectual and 
civic virtues needed to reach that goal.  Additionally, the psychiatric  community 
would indicate what moral education, through client narratives, would be needed to 
support those virtues. 
  In conclusion, I  return to the reminiscence with which this thesis began. By 
the adoption of a recovery ethos, the managers, clinicians, family and others involved 
in discussing ‘recovery focused’ services would have a clearer sense of what recovery 
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means and of how it could be achieved. I would hope that agreement could be 
achieved without the resort to procedures as the final decision-making approach. 
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